Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) could withhold records relating to a criminal investigation based on Exemption 7(A) of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This exemption allows federal agencies to withhold records if their release could reasonably be expected to interfere with law enforcement proceedings.In the case, Mark Zaid, an attorney, requested records related to the FBI's criminal investigation into one of his clients, Zackary Sanders, who had been charged with production and possession of child pornography. The FBI refused to release the requested records, citing Exemption 7(A) of FOIA. Zaid then sued the FBI to release the records, but the district court found the records were exempt from disclosure.The appeals court agreed with the district court's decision, stating that the disclosure of these records could reasonably be expected to interfere with ongoing or future investigations and prosecutions of child pornography cases. The court also noted that forcing the FBI to disclose information exchanged between law enforcement agencies could make those agencies hesitant to share information in the future, which would harm FBI investigations. The court also dismissed Zaid's arguments that cited two decisions from the Middle District of Florida, stating those decisions were not binding on the district court or the appeals court. View "Zaid v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, Ricky Pendleton, is an inmate in the West Virginia prison system who follows the "Sufi Original Traditions" of Islam. His religious beliefs require a diet that promotes "compassion and harmlessness to living creatures," which he interprets to mean a diet of "vegetables, fruits and certain fish." In 2014, prison officials introduced a new diet program for those with religious dietary restrictions. However, the program only offered one "religious special diet" designed to meet the needs of all faiths by following the rules of the most diet-restrictive ones. This diet used soy as its primary protein source, which Pendleton's body had problems digesting. Pendleton requested a religious accommodation, but this request was denied. He filed two grievances, which were also denied. Pendleton then filed a pro se complaint against three prison officials. The district court dismissed Pendleton’s complaint, concluding he had not adequately alleged he was being forced to consume any foods forbidden by his religion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the district court's judgment. The court held that Pendleton had plausibly alleged that prison officials imposed a substantial burden on his religious practice by forcing him to choose between a government-provided benefit (the diet) and his religious convictions. The court also rejected the argument that Pendleton could obtain a meat-free and soy-free diet by obtaining test results showing he has a medically significant allergy to soy. The court concluded that Pendleton need not produce documentation of his alleged soy allergy to survive a motion to dismiss. Instead, it was enough that he had plausibly alleged that he cannot digest soy and that he suffered gastrointestinal distress after switching to the religious special diet. The court also held that Pendleton’s Free Exercise Clause claim and his motion to be severed from the prison’s diet program should be reconsidered by the district court. View "Pendleton v. Jividen" on Justia Law

This case was before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit where the City of Huntington and Cabell County Commission (plaintiffs) brought a suit against AmerisourceBergen Drug Corporation, Cardinal Health, Inc., and McKesson Corporation (defendants), three distributors of opioids. The plaintiffs alleged that these companies perpetuated the opioid epidemic by repeatedly shipping excessive quantities of opioids to pharmacies, thus creating a public nuisance under West Virginia common law. The district court ruled in favor of the distributors, holding that West Virginia’s common law of public nuisance did not cover the plaintiffs’ claims.After a bench trial in 2021, the district court held that the common law of public nuisance in West Virginia did not extend to the sale, distribution, and manufacture of opioids. The court found that the application of public nuisance law to the sale, marketing, and distribution of products would invite litigation against any product with a known risk of harm, regardless of the benefits conferred on the public from proper use of the product. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ proposed remedy, a 15-year “Abatement Plan” developed by an expert in opioid abatement intervention. The court held that this relief did not qualify as an abatement as it did not restrict the defendants' conduct or their distribution of opioids but generally proposed programs and services to address the harms caused by opioid abuse and addiction.The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia: Under West Virginia’s common law, can conditions caused by the distribution of a controlled substance constitute a public nuisance and, if so, what are the elements of such a public nuisance claim? View "City of Huntington v. Amerisourcebergen Drug Corporation" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the convictions of three South Carolina law enforcement officers who were found guilty of various abuses of power. The trio, Sheriff George Underwood, Chief Deputy Robert Sprouse, and Lieutenant Johnny Neal, were convicted on multiple counts, including financial corruption, civil rights violations, and conspiracy.Underwood used his position as sheriff to enrich himself through illegal means, including forcing deputies to perform work on his personal property while on public payroll. He also orchestrated a scheme with Neal to skim money from the extra compensation meant for deputies at drunk-driver checkpoints. Additionally, Underwood and Sprouse misused county money for personal travel expenses.The court also found that Underwood abused his authority by targeting enforcement against opponents and refusing to investigate offenses reported against friends and supporters. Notably, Underwood unlawfully arrested a citizen for recording a car accident scene, which led to a violation of the citizen's civil rights.After the Federal Bureau of Investigation uncovered the corruption, Sprouse and Neal conspired to lie and fabricate documents to cover up their misconduct. The jury convicted the defendants on various counts, and the appeals court affirmed those convictions. The court also ruled that the district court's calculation of restitution for the losses sustained was reasonable. View "United States v. Underwood" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) alleging negligence, wrongful death, and survival claims arising from the death of Eleusipa Van Emburgh who was treated at a Navy medical center. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that regulations enacted under 28 U.S.C. § 2672 do not impose additional jurisdictional requirements beyond those listed in 28 U.S.C § 2675. As such, the court reversed the district court's decision for six of the plaintiffs and remanded the case for further proceedings. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of one plaintiff, Imelda Crovetto, who failed to satisfy one of the jurisdictional requirements listed in § 2675.The Court of Appeals held that the jurisdictional requirements laid out in 28 U.S.C. § 2675 were the sole source of jurisdictional requirements for the FTCA’s administrative exhaustion requirement. The court found that the implementing regulations did not impose additional jurisdictional requirements. The plaintiffs satisfied these jurisdictional requirements when they submitted their claims to the agency, included a specific valuation of their claims, and waited until after their claims were denied before filing suit. View "Estate of Eleusipa Van Emburgh v. US" on Justia Law

The case involved Martin William Luther Hamilton, who pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute fentanyl and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. The probation agent preparing Hamilton's presentence report determined that three of Hamilton’s prior North Carolina convictions qualified as violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which mandates a minimum of fifteen years for defendants who have three prior convictions for offenses that qualify as a “violent felony or a serious drug offense.”Hamilton objected to the ACCA classification, disputing that the third conviction for attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon met the requirements of the ACCA. The district court followed a previous court's unpublished decision which held that a North Carolina conviction for attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon qualifies as a crime of violence for purposes of the career-offender provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines. As a result, the court concluded that Hamilton qualified as an armed career criminal and sentenced him to 180 months’ imprisonment.Hamilton appealed, challenging only the district court’s determination that the attempted robbery conviction was a predicate offense under the ACCA. In response, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, finding no error in the determination that Hamilton’s conviction under N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-87(a) qualifies as a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA. View "US v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Yagoub Mohamed, a self-employed mechanic, sued Bank of America, alleging that the bank's conduct and error-claim procedures violated the federal Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA) and various state laws. Mohamed had applied for unemployment benefits during the COVID-19 pandemic and was found eligible to receive $14,644, which he elected to receive via a Bank of America-issued debit card. However, by the time he received and activated his card, the entire benefit amount had been spent on transactions he did not recognize. The bank opened an error claim and later froze his account due to possible fraud.The district court granted Bank of America's motion to dismiss Mohamed's federal claim, stating that the unemployment benefits he was to receive via a prepaid debit card were not protected by the EFTA. The court did not exercise jurisdiction over the state-law claims.On appeal, the Fourth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that the account in which Mohamed's benefits were held qualified as a "government benefit account" under the EFTA and its implementing regulations. As such, the court concluded that Mohamed had stated a claim under the Act. The court rejected the bank's arguments that it had established the account in question, asserting that the account was established by the state of Maryland, and the bank acted solely under its contract with the state.The court's holding is significant because it clarifies the scope of protection offered by the EFTA for government benefits distributed via prepaid debit cards, and it underlines the responsibilities of banks in managing such accounts. View "Mohamed v. Bank of America, N.A." on Justia Law

Kenneth Hart was convicted of drug dealing, sex trafficking, and witness tampering. He appealed his convictions, arguing that the government violated the Speedy Trial Act by failing to indict him for the witness tampering charge within thirty days of his arrest. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed that the government violated the Speedy Trial Act on the witness tampering conviction, but rejected his evidentiary challenges.The court held that the government failed to indict Hart for witness tampering within the Speedy Trial Act’s thirty-day window. So it vacated only Hart’s witness-tampering conviction and remanded the case for resentencing on the four counts added by the superseding indictment. Hart also contended that the district court erred by allowing certain prejudicial evidence at trial, but the court disagreed and affirmed the district court’s rulings on these evidentiary challenges. View "US v. Hart" on Justia Law

The case revolves around two developers, SAS Associates 1, LLC and Military 1121, LLC, who filed a complaint against the City Council of Chesapeake, Virginia, alleging that their equal protection rights were violated when their rezoning applications were denied by the council. The developers owned several parcels of land in Chesapeake and sought to combine them to create a 90-acre development involving housing units, commercial space, and a conservation district. Their plans required rezoning, which was denied by the Council citing community opposition and the ability to develop under existing zoning classifications. The developers filed a complaint alleging that their application was denied even though similar applications from other developers were approved, and the council's reasons for denial were irrational and arbitrary.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision to dismiss the developers' claim. The Court of Appeals found that the developers failed to demonstrate that they were treated differently from others who were similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of discriminatory animus. Furthermore, the court highlighted that zoning decisions are primarily the responsibility of local governments and that the Developers did not provide any valid comparators to support their claim of discriminatory treatment. The court noted the lack of any evidence to infer discriminatory intent on the part of the City Council members and ruled that the Developers' disagreement with the Council's decision does not render the Council's judgment call pretextual. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing the complaint. View "SAS Associates v. City Council of Chesapeake" on Justia Law

In this case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the defendant, Trezith Rashad Smart, appealed his drug-trafficking convictions. He argued that his prosecution violated the Speedy Trial Act and that the district court erred in not granting his motion to suppress evidence from two traffic stops.Smart was initially stopped for speeding in Louisiana in 2017. During this stop, a drug-sniffing dog was deployed and alerted officers to the presence of cocaine in Smart's car. Smart was later linked to a drug dealing operation in Virginia and further evidence of drug trafficking was gathered during a second stop in 2018. He was subsequently arrested and charged with one count of conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine.On appeal, the court rejected Smart's arguments. It held that there was no violation of the Speedy Trial Act, noting that delays in the proceedings, including changes of counsel and the complexity of the case, were justified and fell within the exceptions provided in the Act. It also held that both traffic stops were constitutional. Specifically, the court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to extend the first traffic stop and deploy a drug-sniffing dog based on Smart's extreme nervousness, inconsistent answers about his travel plans, and the presence of a gas can in his car, which the officer, based on experience, associated with drug trafficking. Consequently, the court affirmed Smart's conviction. View "United States v. Smart" on Justia Law