Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was on active duty with the United States Army. He bought a car from Select Cars of Thornburg in Fredericksburg, Virginia, and financed his purchase with a loan from United Auto Credit Corporation. The loan financed not only the car’s cost but also the cost of Guaranteed Asset Protection. Guaranteed Asset Protection is like extra insurance, covering any amount still due on the car loan after auto insurance is paid out if the car is totaled or stolen. Plaintiff’s claims arise from this single loan. This loan, Plaintiff alleged, violated the Military Lending Act because the loan agreement mandated arbitration and failed to disclose certain information. The district court dismissed the case, holding that the loan was not covered by the Act at all.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that a statutory provision must be given the ordinary meaning it had when it was enacted. Relevant dictionaries, carefully considered, sometimes shed light on that ordinary meaning. Yet here, dueling dictionaries provide more than one linguistically permissible meaning.  But by examining the relevant phrase in its statutory context. This context shows that while “the express purpose” can be used in different senses, it is best read in Section 987(i)(6) to mean the specific purpose. This loan was offered for the specific purpose of financing Plaintiff’s car purchase. And that satisfies Section 987(i)(6)’s relevant condition and the Act is inapplicable. View "Jerry Davidson v. United Auto Credit Corporation" on Justia Law

Appellants challenged the appointment of Social Security Administration Acting Commissioner Nancy Berryhill under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA). They argue that no one may serve as an acting officer under 5 U.S.C. Section 3346(a)(2), which allows acting service while a nomination is pending in the Senate unless that nomination occurred during the initial 210-day period of acting service allowed by 5 U.S.C. Section 3346(a)(1). Appellants assert that Section 3346(a)(2) serves only to toll Section 3346(a)(1)’s time limit and does not authorize an independent period of acting service.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court rejected Appellants’ argument because Section 3346(a)(1) and Section 3346(a)(2) are, by their plain text, disjunctive and independent. Because Berryhill was legally serving as Acting Commissioner, her appointments of the ALJs who decided Appellants’ cases were valid. The court explained that Appellants’ reading of the statute would shift the balance against the President. It would prevent him from designating anyone to serve as an acting officer if he submits a nomination after the 210-day period has elapsed, thus leaving the office vacant for as long as the Senate takes to consider it. View "Barbara Rush v. Kilolo Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a claim under 42 U.S.C 405(g), believing the Social Security Administration miscalculated his benefits. He filed his claim more than one year after the SSA verbally denied his request for review, and after he did not receive the requested written documentation of the SSA's denial.The SSA filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Sec. 405(g)’s waiver of sovereign immunity applied only with respect to judicial review of a “final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security” and that Plaintiff had not obtained a final decision, having refused to exhaust the four-step administrative process. The district court granted SSA’s motion.Finding that Sec. 405(g)’s exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional, the Fourth Circuit nonetheless concluded that exhaustion is a mandatory requirement of the Social Security Act that may be excused only in a narrow set of circumstances, which were not present in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "L.N.P. v. Kilolo Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Defendants Southern Coal Corporation and Premium Coal Company, Inc. (collectively, “Southern Coal”) asked the Fourth Circuit to reverse a district court’s order granting a motion to compel compliance with a consent decree (the “Decree”) to which they previously acquiesced. The Decree operated to resolve allegations of approximately 23,693 Clean Water Act violations, pre-litigation, levied against Southern Coal by Plaintiffs Alabama, Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia, and the United States of America (collectively, the “government”).   The Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court properly found the Decree’s plain language to mandate compliance with the Clean Water Act and derivative permitting obligations. The court explained that although the plain language of the Decree clearly supports the district court’s conclusion that Southern Coal was obligated to maintain National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits—and that alone is sufficient basis to affirm—the court may also consider the circumstances surrounding the Decree and the general nature of the remedy agreed upon. Here, the underlying dispute revolved around tens of thousands of NPDES-permitting and CWA violations. It cannot reasonably be argued that, in formulating the Decree, the parties contemplated undermining its efficacy by authorizing the exact conduct that it sought to remedy. If Southern Coal intended such a backdoor to compliance, then it likely did not negotiate the Decree in “good faith” to forge an agreement that was “fair, reasonable, and in the public interest,” as it purported to do as a Decree signatory. View "US v. Southern Coal Corporation" on Justia Law

This appeal is the latest installment in a series of challenges to Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC’s (“MVP”) plans to build a natural gas pipeline. Because it intends to construct a portion of the pipeline in West Virginia, MVP obtained a Clean Water Act (“CWA”) certification from the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (the “Department”). The certification reflected the Department’s conclusion that MVP’s activities during the pipeline’s construction would not violate the state’s water quality standards. Disagreeing with that determination, landowners and members of various environmental organizations in the state (collectively, “Petitioners”) petitioned for review of the Department’s certification.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the certification, finding the Department’s justifications for its conclusions deficient. The court found that the Department’s reasonable assurance determination suffers from four interrelated failures: It did not (1) sufficiently address MVP’s violation history, (2) include conditions requiring compliance with the O&G CGP and SWPPP, (3) provide a reasoned basis for relying on EPA’s upland CGP, or (4) articulate an adequate explanation for forgoing location-specific antidegradation review. Considering these oversights, the Department’s conclusion that MVP’s in-stream construction would be conducted in a manner that will not violate state water standards were arbitrary and capricious. View "Sierra Club v. West Virginia DEP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a federal inmate, sued Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) staff alleging, inter alia, discrimination and retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act. The district court dismissed the action for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies. According to the court, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) required Plaintiff to exhaust both the BOP’s Administrative Remedy Program and an additional remedy, particular to prison discrimination claims, administered by the Department of Justice’s Director of Equal Employment Opportunity. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that he was only required to exhaust the BOP’s Administrative Remedy Program under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Plaintiff asserted in the alternative that the Department of Justice remedies were not “available” to him.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the PLRA’s exhaustion provision is plain. It requires prisoners to utilize all “available” administrative remedies. For Rehabilitation Act claimants, these remedies include both the BOP’s ARP and a separate EEO process administered by the DOJ. Here, Plaintiff failed to exhaust these remedies despite them being “available” to him under the PLRA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice to his ability to exhaust the EEO remedies “available” to him within the meaning of the PLRA. View "Webster Williams, III v. Michael Carvajal" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a now-retired Special Agent with the United States Secret Service, filed a civil suit against two United States Park Police officers (“officers”) under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Plaintiff asserted that the officers violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment by unlawfully seizing him during two traffic stops. A jury found the officers liable for Plaintiff’s emotional injuries resulting from the constitutional violations and awarded him a total of $205,000 in compensatory damages and $525,000 in punitive damages. The district court entered final judgment in accordance with the jury verdict and later denied the officers’ post-trial motions seeking judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Plaintiff presented a cognizable Bivens claim because his claim is not meaningfully different from the claim asserted in Bivens. Both cases involved allegations of unjustified, warrantless seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment committed by federal “line” officers conducting routine police work. Also, the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. They violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights by significantly prolonging the initial stop without justification and by initiating a second, unjustified stop. This constitutional right to be free from such unlawful seizures was clearly established at the time the seizures occurred. Further, the court held that Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of emotional injury to support the compensatory damage award, and the punitive damages award was not excessive. View "Nathaniel Hicks v. Gerald Ferreyra" on Justia Law

Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC (‘‘MVP’’) submitted an application requesting both a Virginia Water Protection individual permit (“VWP Permit”) from Virginia’s Department of Environmental Quality (“DEQ”) and the State Water Control Board (the “Board”) (collectively, “the Agencies”) and a certification from the United States Army Corps of Engineers (“Army Corps”) pursuant to Section 404 of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) to build a pipeline. After an extensive review of MVP’s application, the Board adopted DEQ’s recommendation to approve MVP’s application. Petitioners filed this action against the Agencies and several individuals associated with the Agencies (collectively, “Respondents”), asking the court to review the Agencies’ decision.   The Fourth Circuit denied the petition for review, concluding that Agencies’ decision to grant MVP’s application was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The court explained that Petitioners’ argument that the Agencies failed to consider whether the Pipeline will comply with Virginia’s narrative water quality standard is belied by the record. DEQ addressed this issue in its responses to the public comments, in which it listed a host of conditions that it placed on the VWP Permit to “ensure that Virginia’s water quality is protected both during and after construction.” The court further explained that the DEQ described the indicators it uses to measure water quality, which Petitioners have not challenged. Accordingly, the court found it is clear from the record that DEQ considered a variety of factors in determining that the construction and operation of the Pipeline would comply with Virginia’s narrative water quality standard. View "Sierra Club v. State Water Control Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiff initiated a civil action in district court contesting the denial of her claim for disability insurance benefits by Defendant Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the “SSA”). Plaintiff has asserted that the SSA Commissioner erred in multiple ways. Her arguments include that, pursuant to precedents of this Court, the Commissioner should have accorded substantial weight to a prior determination by the Department of Veterans Affairs (the “VA”) that Plaintiff is 100% disabled, but the Commissioner instead followed contrary new SSA rules providing that such a determination need not be considered, much less given any weight. As Rogers would have it, the new SSA rules cannot — and thus do not — abrogate this Court’s precedents. The district court concluded, however, that the new SSA rules supersede our precedents and that the Commissioner acted appropriately in adhering to those rules. After then addressing many, but not all, of Plaintiff’s other arguments, the court affirmed the Commissioner’s decision. Plaintiff appealed from the court’s judgment.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the court’s judgment and remanded for the court to further remand this matter for administrative proceedings. The court concluded that by omitting the menstrual cycle evidence from the residual functional capacity assessment as to Plaintiff, the ALJ’s decision is sorely lacking in the analysis needed for the court to review meaningfully the ALJ’s conclusions. That legal error alone demands further administrative proceedings. View "Shanette Rogers v. Kilolo Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an employee of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement division of the Department of Homeland Security (“ICE” or “Agency”), petitions for review of the final judgment of the Merit Systems Protection Board (the “Board”), which rejected Petitioner’s claim that the Agency suspended him for two days in retaliation for his disclosures of misconduct.   The Fourth Circuit denied the petition. The court explained that after conducting a hearing and considering the evidence, the administrative judge denied the corrective action sought by Petitioner, concluding that Petitioner’s protected disclosures were not contributing factors to the discipline imposed and, alternatively, that the Agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the action even in the absence of the disclosures. The court denied the petition explaining that the administrative judge committed no legal error and his factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. View "Yuriy Mikhaylov v. Dept. of Homeland Security" on Justia Law