Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs—North Carolina Wildlife Federation and No Mid-Currituck Bridge-Concerned Citizens and Visitors Opposed to The Mid-Currituck Bridge (a community organization) sued the North Carolina Department of Transportation and the Federal Highway Administration (together, “the agencies”) —asserting that the agencies violated the National  Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) in approving a bridge project. Specifically, the NEPA provides that for an action “significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,” the Act requires an agency to prepare a detailed Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”). The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiffs fault the agencies for glossing over the environmental impact of the extra 2,400 units that would be constructed under the bridge scenario. They claim that the EIS “made no attempt to evaluate the effect of the Toll Bridge’s additional development on the habitat, wildlife, and natural resources of the Outer Banks.” But the EIS does adequately account for this added development. The EIS noted that a bridge would likely lead to an increase in day visitors, which could lead to more beach driving. More beach driving may “increase the likelihood of collisions” with wild horses on the beaches, but would have “no effect on threatened and endangered species. The agencies also found no “appreciable improvement” in water quality under the no-build and existing roads scenarios. The agencies’ no-build baseline properly reflected the lower level of development that would result without the toll bridge. The agencies didn’t mislead the public about this fact. In sum, the agencies’ consideration of the no-build alternative did not violate the Act. View "No Mid-Currituck Bridge-Concerned Citizens v. North Carolina Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s order affirming the Social Security Administration’s (“SSA”) denial of her application for Social Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”). In her application, she alleged major depressive disorder (“MDD”), anxiety disorder, and attention deficit disorder (“ADHD”). Following a formal hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) determined that Plaintiff suffered from severe depression with suicidal ideations, anxiety features and ADHD, but he nonetheless denied her claim based on his finding that she could perform other simple, routine jobs and was, therefore, not disabled. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by (1) according to only little weight to the opinion of her long-time treating psychiatrist (“Dr. B”) and (2) disregarding her subjective complaints based on their alleged inconsistency with the objective medical evidence in the record.   The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to grant disability benefits. The court agreed with Plaintiff that the ALJ failed to sufficiently consider the requisite factors and record evidence by extending little weight to Dr. B’s opinion. The ALJ also erred by improperly disregarding Plaintiff’s subjective statements. Finally, the court found that the ALJ’s analysis did not account for the unique nature of the relevant mental health impairments, specifically chronic depression. The court explained that because substantial evidence in the record clearly establishes Plaintiff’s disability, remanding for a rehearing would only “delay justice.” View "Shelley C. v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs own a beach house in Dare County, North Carolina. In the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, Dare County banned nonresident property owners from entering the county. As a result, Plaintiffs could not reach their beach house for forty-five days. In response, they sued Dare County, alleging that their property was taken without compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. After the district court found that the ban was not a Fifth Amendment taking and dismissed Plaintiffs’ suit for failure to state a claim, Plaintiffs appealed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the ban did not physically appropriate Plaintiffs’ beach house. And though it restricted their ability to use the house, compensation is not required under the ad hoc balancing test that determines the constitutionality of most use restrictions. The court further explained that Dare County’s order is neither a physical appropriation, a use restriction that renders the property valueless, nor a taking under Penn Central. The effects of the order were temporary, Plaintiffs had a chance to occupy their property before it took effect, and while the order was operative they could still exercise significant ownership rights over their property. View "Joseph Blackburn, Jr. v. Dare County" on Justia Law

When the ACA’s mandate and SRP were still in effect, a husband and wife (“Taxpayers”) did not maintain the minimum insurance coverage required by the ACA. The taxpayers did not include their $2409 SRP when they filed their 2018 federal tax return. The Taxpayers filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection in the Eastern District of North Carolina. The IRS filed a proof of claim for the unpaid SRP and asserted that its claim was entitled to priority as an income or excise tax under Section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Taxpayers objected to the government’s claim of priority. The bankruptcy court granted the objection, concluding that, for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, the SRP is a penalty, not a tax, and therefore is not entitled to priority under Section 507(a)(8). The government appealed to the district court, which affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision. The district court held that even if the SRP was generally a tax, it did not qualify as a tax measured by income or an excise tax and thus was not entitled to priority. The government thereafter appealed.   The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court concluded that that the SRP qualifies as a tax under the functional approach that has consistently been applied in bankruptcy cases and that nothing in the Supreme Court’s decision in NFIB requires the court to abandon that functional approach. Because the SRP is a tax that is measured by income, the government’s claim is entitled to priority under 11 U.S.C. Section 507(a)(8)(A). View "US v. Fabio Alicea" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Lancaster Hospital Corporation (Lancaster) operates an inpatient rehabilitation facility that provides services for Medicare beneficiaries. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) denied Plaintiff’s request for reimbursement because the provider failed to submit information in a form that could be audited. The district court granted summary judgment to HHS.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Lancaster asserts that—even if some reductions were warranted—the Board erred by denying its entire 1997 reimbursement request. There appears no doubt Lancaster provided services to Medicare beneficiaries in 1997, and denying all reimbursement for that year may seem harsh. But the principle that people “must turn square corners when they deal with the Government” “has its greatest force when a private party seeks to spend the Government’s money.” However, the court explained that under Heckler v. Community Health Servs. of Crawford Cnty., Inc., “As a participant in the Medicare program,” Lancaster “had a duty to familiarize itself with the legal requirements for cost reimbursement,” including the need to provide cost data in a form “capable of being audited.” Thus, the Board’s decision to deny reimbursement for the fiscal year 1997 was neither arbitrary nor capricious and was supported by substantial evidence. View "Lancaster Hospital Corporation v. Xavier Becerra" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s dismissal of her putative class action against the West Virginia Parkways Authority, in which she alleges that the Parkways Authority improperly collected fees. And the Parkways Authority appeals the district court’s holding that it was not entitled to sovereign immunity under the United States or West Virginia Constitutions.   Plaintiff relied on the Class Action Fairness Act for jurisdiction. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case remanded to the district court with directions to dismiss without prejudice. The court concluded that here, Section 1332(d)(5)(A) bars jurisdiction under Section 1332(d)(2) of the Class Action Fairness Act. The court explained that the Parkways Authority is the only, and thus “primary,” defendant. And it is a “governmental entity.” The Parkways Authority’s sovereign-immunity claim is strong enough to conclude that the district court “may be foreclosed from ordering relief” against it. So Section 1332(d)(2)’s jurisdictional grant “shall not apply.” Since that is the only provision that Plaintiff relies on to establish jurisdiction over her putative class action, the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear it. View "Blazine Monaco v. WV Parkways Authority" on Justia Law

A real estate development company PEM Entities LLC (PEM), asserts a North Carolina county violated the Federal Constitution and state law by imposing new rules for getting water and sewage services. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding the company lacked standing to bring its takings and due process claims, its equal protection claim was too insubstantial to raise a federal question, and the court should not exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims once the federal claims were dismissed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that without a constitutionally protected property interest, PEM’s takings and due process claims fail as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of PEM’s takings and due process claims because they fail to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Further, the court concluded the district court was right to dismiss PEM’s equal protection claim but should have done so for failure to state a claim rather than lack of jurisdiction. Thu, having concluded the district court correctly dismissed all of PEM’s federal claims, the court saw no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. View "PEM Entities LLC v. County of Franklin" on Justia Law

Section 20.5 of North Carolina’s 2017 Farm Act contains provisions making it illegal to enter into two types of contractual agreements: (1) any settlement agreement conditioned on an agricultural producer’s union affiliation (the Settlement Provision) and (2) any agreement that would require an agricultural producer to process dues checkoffs for its farmworker-employees (the Dues Provision). The Farm Labor Organizing Committee and others (collectively, FLOC) contend that these prohibitions violate the First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. FLOC initiated this action against the Attorney General of North Carolina and the Governor of North Carolina (collectively, the State). The district court held that the Settlement Provision violated the Constitution and so enjoined it, but upheld the constitutionality of the Dues Provision, and then held that neither provision violated Section 1981.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court as to the Settlement Provision and vacated the accompanying injunction, but affirmed in all other respects. The court explained that a rational basis supports Section 20.5. Agriculture is North Carolina’s largest industry, which makes it a subject of great interest for state legislators. The state also embraces its right-to-work policies and has worked repeatedly to strengthen them. In addition to these general bases for enacting Section 20.5, both challenged provisions respond to discrete legislative concerns. Further, the Settlement Provision prohibits parties from conditioning a settlement agreement on an agricultural producer’s union affiliation. Thus, the court rejected the broad reading advanced by FLOC and adopted by the district court that this statutory provision bars any settlement agreement between an agricultural producer and labor union. View "Farm Labor Organizing Committee v. Joshua Stein" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the decision rendered in the Eastern District of North Carolina in 2021 granting summary judgment to several officials of North Carolina’s Central Prison (the “Central Prison defendants”), against whom Plaintiff— a Central Prison inmate — pursued various state and federal claims. In awarding judgment to the Central Prison Defendants, the district court ruled that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust all administrative remedies available to him prior to filing his lawsuit in federal court, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (the “PLRA”).   The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded. The court explained that in these circumstances, however, the record presents numerous disputed issues of material fact about how North Carolina’s prison grievance procedure functions and is administered, including whether Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies of his own accord and whether such remedies were meaningfully “available” to him. Accordingly, because the district court’s award of summary judgment was erroneously premature and otherwise flawed. View "Matthew Griffin v. Nadine Bryant" on Justia Law

The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act requires manufacturers of new tobacco products to obtain authorization from the United States Food & Drug Administration (FDA) prior to marketing their products. In reviewing a manufacturer’s Premarket Tobacco Product Application, FDA must determine that the marketing of the product is “appropriate for the protection of the public health.” Section  910(c)(4), 123 Stat. at 1810. The agency denied Avail Vapor LLC’s application for its flavored electronic cigarettes, chiefly on the grounds that its products posed a serious risk to youth without enough offsetting benefits to adults.   The Fourth Circuit upheld the FDA’s decision denying Avail’s application. The court explained that under the Tobacco Control Act (TCA) the FDA has the daunting task of ensuring that another generation of Americans does not become addicted to nicotine and tobacco products. The TCA gives FDA the flexibility to determine whether marketing of a new tobacco product is appropriate for the protection of public health, taking into account evolving science and an everchanging market. FDA made the determination that Avail’s flavored ENDS products, seeking in all respects to mimic those sweet treats to which youth are particularly attracted, pose a substantial risk of youth addiction without enough offsetting benefits to adult smokers. FDA could not allow young adults to perceive e-cigarettes as another Baby Ruth or Milky Way, only to find themselves in the grip of a surreptitious nicotine addiction. Substantial evidence supports the assertion that “[t]here is an epidemic of youth use of e-cigarette products, and flavored products like petitioners’ are at the center of that problem.” View "Avail Vapor, LLC v. FDA" on Justia Law