Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Jerry L. Blankenship applied for living miner benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, claiming he suffered from coal dust-induced pneumoconiosis and was totally disabled. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found Blankenship entitled to a rebuttable presumption of total disability due to pneumoconiosis under 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4) and determined that his former employer, Island Creek Coal Company, failed to rebut this presumption. Consequently, Blankenship was awarded benefits. The Benefits Review Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision.Island Creek petitioned for review, arguing that the ALJ improperly conflated the presence of pneumoconiosis and disability causation with the separate total disability analysis. Additionally, Island Creek contended that the ALJ failed to adequately explain his decision to credit the opinions of Blankenship’s medical experts over those of Island Creek’s experts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with Island Creek. The court found that the ALJ improperly relied on the presence of pneumoconiosis and the causation of Blankenship’s impairment in concluding that he was totally disabled. The court also determined that the ALJ failed to provide a sufficient explanation for crediting the medical opinions of Drs. Nader and Green over those of Drs. McSharry and Sargent, violating the duty of explanation under the Administrative Procedure Act.The Fourth Circuit granted Island Creek’s petition for review, vacated the decision of the Benefits Review Board, and remanded the case with instructions for the Board to return Blankenship’s case to the ALJ for reconsideration consistent with the court’s opinion. View "Island Creek Coal Co. v. Blankenship" on Justia Law

The case involves Jamie Christopher Henderson, who was convicted and sentenced following a jury trial for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, and possession of firearms in furtherance of his drug trafficking crimes. Henderson appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support these convictions, and that his sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable.The case originated from an incident on April 30, 2019, when law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at Henderson’s residence. They witnessed Henderson toss items underneath a vehicle, including a gun. The officers recovered a loaded handgun, a plastic bag with cocaine and crack cocaine, a cigarette lighter, and a glass crack pipe from underneath the vehicle. Henderson was arrested. Inside the trailer, police found a loaded rifle, a loaded handgun, cocaine powder and crack cocaine in a toilet tank, and a second loaded handgun in a kitchen trash can. They also seized three digital scales and a digital video recorder containing footage from security cameras showing Henderson and other men, armed with multiple handguns and a rifle, standing in the front yard of the residence as cars and people would approach it.Henderson was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, possession of a firearm in furtherance of the drug-distribution conspiracy, possession with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, possession of a firearm in furtherance of the possession-with-intent offense, and possession of a firearm as a felon. He pleaded not guilty. At trial, the Government presented the testimony of the law enforcement officers, Henderson’s videotaped confession, the security footage from the trailer, and a letter Henderson had written to his brother. Henderson presented the testimony of his mother and daughter who claimed that Henderson was a drug user, thief, and liar—but not a drug dealer. The jury convicted Henderson on all counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentence. The court found that there was substantial evidence to support the conviction and that the sentence was not procedurally or substantively unreasonable. The court noted that Henderson faced a heavy burden in challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and that the court's role was limited to considering whether there was substantial evidence to support the conviction. The court found that there was abundant independent evidence that Henderson was engaged in a large-scale drug trade, which supported the trustworthiness of his confessions. The court also found that the district court did not err in calculating the quantity of drugs attributable to Henderson for sentencing purposes. The court concluded that Henderson's sentence was substantively reasonable and that he failed to overcome the presumption of reasonableness that applies to a below-Guidelines sentence. View "United States v. Henderson" on Justia Law

The case involves United Therapeutics Corporation (UTC), a biotechnology company, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The dispute centers on the interpretation of a tax provision that coordinates two tax credits: the research credit and the orphan drug credit. The Commissioner claimed that UTC disregarded one of the provision’s two commands, improperly reducing its tax liability by over a million dollars. UTC argued that the relevant half of the coordination provision lost effect in 1989 and has been moribund since.The United States Tax Court disagreed with UTC's argument. The court interpreted the statute’s terms by reference to their ordinary meaning, giving effect to the full coordination provision. The court rejected UTC's argument that changes to the tax law since its enactment rendered part of the coordination provision ineffective. The court also disagreed with UTC's interpretation of two regulations it relied on for support.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the tax court's decision. The appellate court agreed with the tax court's interpretation of the coordination provision according to its ordinary meaning. The court also found that the tax court correctly rejected UTC's arguments based on the interpretation of predecessor statutes and regulations. The court concluded that the tax court correctly resolved the case in favor of the Commissioner. View "United Therapeutics Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Antonio Davis, who was serving a 210-month prison sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin, petitioned the district court for compassionate release due to his elevated risk of severe COVID-19 and a change in the law regarding his career offender status. The district court denied his request, concluding that Davis was not due compassionate release based on his susceptibility to COVID-19 and did not fully consider each of Davis’s arguments.Davis was indicted on charges of conspiracy to distribute and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin in January 2013. He pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin in June of that year. Davis received a career offender enhancement because he had previously been convicted of certain other offenses and because the offense at issue here was a “controlled substance offense” at the time of conviction. In February 2021, Davis filed a pro se motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that he was uniquely susceptible to the potential spread of COVID-19 due to his type-2 diabetes and hypertension. He also argued that a recent court decision invalidated his career offender Guidelines designation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in part the district court's decision. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Davis failed to show extraordinary and compelling reasons for release based on the pandemic. However, the court found that the district court did not properly address Davis’s arguments regarding intervening changes in law and rehabilitation. Therefore, the court vacated the district court’s denial of compassionate relief and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

The case involves Vanda Pharmaceuticals, a drug manufacturer, and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). Vanda challenged a 2020 regulation by CMS that expanded the definition of a "line extension" drug under the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program. This program requires drug manufacturers to reimburse Medicaid if they increase their prices faster than inflation. A "line extension" drug, which is a new formulation of an existing drug, can also be liable for price increases of the original drug. Vanda argued that the regulation expanded the definition of a line extension beyond what the Medicaid statute permitted.Previously, the district court granted summary judgment to CMS, disagreeing with Vanda's argument. The court held that the agency's regulation was within the bounds of the Medicaid statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the agency's definitions of "line extension" and "new formulation" were within the Medicaid statute's ambit. It also held that the agency's interpretation of the oral-solid-dosage-form requirement was not contrary to law. The court rejected Vanda's argument that the agency's rulemaking process was arbitrary and capricious, finding that the agency had reasonably considered the relevant issues and explained its decision. View "Vanda Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled on a case involving a plaintiff, Joann Ford, and a healthcare provider, Sandhills Medical Foundation, Inc. Ford, a former patient of Sandhills, alleged negligence, breach of implied contract, invasion of privacy, and breach of confidentiality against Sandhills for failure to protect her personally identifying information (PII). Her PII was stolen from Sandhills' third-party computer system in a cyberattack after she had ceased being a patient.The district court had previously granted Sandhills immunity from the suit, concluding that the theft of Ford's PII arose out of Sandhills' performance of “medical, surgical, dental, or related functions,” as per 42 U.S.C. § 233(a), thus substituting the United States as the defendant. However, the Fourth Circuit Court disagreed with the lower court's interpretation of § 233(a).The appellate court determined that data security does not fall under a “related function” within the meaning of the statute. The court emphasized that § 233(a) immunity applies when alleged damages arise from the provision of healthcare, which was not the case here. Ford’s injury did not arise from Sandhills’ provision of healthcare, but from a data security breach that occurred at least a year after she ceased being a patient at Sandhills.Therefore, the court concluded that Sandhills was not immune from the suit under § 233(a) and that the United States could not be substituted as the defendant. The case was vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ford v. Sandhills Medical Foundation, Inc." on Justia Law

This case was heard in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and involved the Estate of Arturo Giron Alvarez and 773 other plaintiffs, who brought claims against The Rockefeller Foundation (TRF), alleging the foundation's involvement in nonconsensual human medical experiments in Guatemala from 1946 to 1948. The experiments involved exposing people to sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) to study the diseases and potential treatments. The defendants had previously filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted by the district court. The plaintiffs appealed this decision, specifically challenging the decision relating to TRF.The appeal hinged on the question of whether Dr. Soper, an Associate Director of TRF who was assigned to the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau (PASB) in Guatemala during the time of the experiments, was acting as an agent of TRF, thus making TRF liable for his actions. The court found that despite TRF paying Dr. Soper's salary during his time at the PASB, there was no indication that TRF was directing or controlling Dr. Soper’s work. Furthermore, the evidence showed that Dr. Soper considered himself no longer with TRF, and the PASB's constitution prohibited him from taking outside direction.The court concluded that TRF's connection to the experiments was too tenuous to be held liable for them. It affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of TRF, stating that Dr. Soper was not an agent of TRF during the time of the experiments. View "In re Estate of Alvarez v. Rockefeller Foundation" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed a case where an inmate with celiac disease sued a doctor for depriving him of a gluten-free diet. The district court had granted summary judgment to the doctor because the plaintiff did not have an expert witness to testify about the standard treatment for celiac disease or the causal link between the doctor’s conduct and the plaintiff’s alleged harm. The appeals court held that no expert testimony was needed to avoid summary judgment in this case. The court found that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact about the doctor's knowledge of his celiac disease and the excessive risk it posed by failing to respond reasonably, even without an expert.The court also clarified that expert testimony is not necessary to establish an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference. The court held that while determining whether medical professionals responded reasonably to a particular risk can involve an examination of the relevant standard of care, the fact that expert testimony may be necessary in some cases does not mean it was in this one. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Phoenix v. Amonette" on Justia Law

This case was before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit where the City of Huntington and Cabell County Commission (plaintiffs) brought a suit against AmerisourceBergen Drug Corporation, Cardinal Health, Inc., and McKesson Corporation (defendants), three distributors of opioids. The plaintiffs alleged that these companies perpetuated the opioid epidemic by repeatedly shipping excessive quantities of opioids to pharmacies, thus creating a public nuisance under West Virginia common law. The district court ruled in favor of the distributors, holding that West Virginia’s common law of public nuisance did not cover the plaintiffs’ claims.After a bench trial in 2021, the district court held that the common law of public nuisance in West Virginia did not extend to the sale, distribution, and manufacture of opioids. The court found that the application of public nuisance law to the sale, marketing, and distribution of products would invite litigation against any product with a known risk of harm, regardless of the benefits conferred on the public from proper use of the product. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ proposed remedy, a 15-year “Abatement Plan” developed by an expert in opioid abatement intervention. The court held that this relief did not qualify as an abatement as it did not restrict the defendants' conduct or their distribution of opioids but generally proposed programs and services to address the harms caused by opioid abuse and addiction.The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia: Under West Virginia’s common law, can conditions caused by the distribution of a controlled substance constitute a public nuisance and, if so, what are the elements of such a public nuisance claim? View "City of Huntington v. Amerisourcebergen Drug Corporation" on Justia Law

The case involves Joel Smithers, who was a doctor of osteopathy and was convicted on 861 counts associated with his opioid prescription practices. He was sentenced to a total of 480 months in prison. Smithers was charged under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), which makes it unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance without authorization. Authorization is defined by Drug Enforcement Agency regulations as a prescription issued for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his professional practice. Following his conviction, the Supreme Court in Ruan v. United States clarified the mens rea required to convict someone of unauthorized dispensing or distributing of a controlled substance. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that, in light of the Ruan decision, Smithers' jury instructions were incorrect, and the errors were not harmless. Therefore, the court vacated the convictions and remanded the case to the district court for a new trial. View "United States v. Joel Smithers" on Justia Law