Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A noncitizen who had unlawfully entered the United States in 1997 was arrested in North Carolina in 2015 and charged with three felony drug offenses: possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, sale of cocaine, and delivery of cocaine. The charges were later dismissed in exchange for his cooperation with law enforcement. Meanwhile, during pending criminal proceedings, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings on the ground that he was inadmissible as a noncitizen present without admission or parole. The noncitizen conceded removability and applied for cancellation of removal, arguing that his removal would cause hardship to his family.The Immigration Judge (IJ) conducted hearings at which the noncitizen, represented by counsel, testified under oath to facts constituting the drug offenses. The IJ found that these admissions established the essential elements of the charged offenses and that the noncitizen had failed to demonstrate good moral character, a requirement for cancellation of removal. In so ruling, the IJ determined that the procedural safeguards from the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision Matter of K- were satisfied, as the noncitizen had testified voluntarily, under oath, and with counsel present. The IJ denied cancellation of removal and ordered removal to Mexico.The noncitizen appealed to the BIA, arguing that the IJ misapplied Matter of K- and that his admissions did not establish all elements of the offenses, specifically knowledge of the substance as cocaine. The BIA dismissed the appeal, finding that the admissions were valid and that the elements of the North Carolina drug law were met. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions, holding that Matter of K- did not require reversal under these circumstances and that the noncitizen’s admissions precluded a finding of good moral character. The petition for review was denied. View "Diaz v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A noncitizen from El Salvador entered the United States and was released on bond after expressing fear of returning home. Removal proceedings were held before the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), but he failed to appear at a hearing and was ordered removed in absentia in 2019. The order became final immediately upon entry. Over three years later, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a warrant for his removal after he was arrested for an unrelated offense. He was placed in Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody, but escaped before his scheduled deportation. After being apprehended, he was indicted for escape and for corruptly obstructing a pending proceeding under 18 U.S.C. § 1505.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia acquitted him on the escape charge but convicted him under § 1505, finding that the execution of an EOIR-issued removal order by ICE was part of a “pending proceeding” before EOIR. The district court denied the defendant’s motion for acquittal, reasoning that the statute’s term “proceeding” should be interpreted broadly to include ICE’s execution of the removal order, as this act was under the authority and direction of the EOIR order.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation issue de novo. The appellate court held that, under the plain text and statutory context, ICE’s execution of a removal order after EOIR has issued a final order does not constitute a “pending proceeding . . . being had before” EOIR under § 1505. The court further found that ICE enforcement actions are not “proceedings” within the meaning of § 1505, but rather are akin to routine law enforcement activity. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment, vacated the conviction, and remanded for further proceedings. View "US v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

A native and citizen of Jamaica entered the United States as a child and overstayed his visa. Years later, he was placed in removal proceedings and sought cancellation of removal. The Department of Homeland Security argued that he was ineligible for cancellation because he had two prior convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude. The dispute centered on whether a 2009 North Carolina misdemeanor larceny charge, which resulted in a “Prayer for Judgment Continued” (PJC) conditioned on completion of community service, counted as a conviction under federal immigration law.The Immigration Judge determined that the 2009 PJC qualified as a conviction for immigration purposes because the state court imposed a requirement to complete community service, which the judge found to be a form of punishment. As a result, the Immigration Judge ruled that the applicant was ineligible for cancellation of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision in its own written opinion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed both the Immigration Judge’s and the Board’s decisions. The Fourth Circuit held that a North Carolina PJC conditioned on completion of community service constitutes a conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) because the community service requirement is a punitive sanction, not merely administrative or compensatory. The court explained that the imposition of discretionary community service is intended to discipline or deter and thus qualifies as punishment. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review, holding that the petitioner’s 2009 PJC is a conviction for purposes of federal immigration law and renders him ineligible for cancellation of removal. View "Gardner v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A noncitizen from Honduras was convicted in Virginia in 2012 of a Class 1 misdemeanor for identity theft, specifically for using another person’s identity to obtain money or goods with intent to defraud. Under Virginia law, a Class 1 misdemeanor carries a maximum sentence of up to twelve months in jail; the individual received a suspended sentence of thirty days. Following this conviction, the Department of Homeland Security began removal proceedings against him. He conceded removability but applied for cancellation of removal under federal law.An Immigration Judge found him ineligible for cancellation of removal, concluding that his conviction was for a crime involving moral turpitude and a crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed, as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) and § 1229b(b)(1)(C). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed this decision. The petitioner then moved for reconsideration, arguing that a recent Virginia case, Belcher v. Commonwealth, 878 S.E.2d 19 (Va. Ct. App. 2022), showed that a twelve-month sentence should not be equated with one year for these purposes. The BIA denied the motion, finding Belcher inapplicable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed both the BIA’s affirmance and its denial of reconsideration. The court held that a crime punishable by “a sentence of one year or longer” includes offenses with a maximum sentence of twelve months, as twelve calendar months constitute one year. The court rejected arguments that distinctions in Virginia law or legislative intent altered the plain meaning of the federal statute. As a result, the Fourth Circuit denied the petitions for review, upholding the BIA’s determinations. View "Ulloa v. Bondi" on Justia Law

A man from Honduras, who had been granted asylum in the United States, sought to obtain derivative asylee status for his wife by filing a Form I-730 petition. His wife, however, had previously been removed from the United States after being apprehended at the border in 2014. Although she returned with her husband in 2020, she was ineligible for asylum and instead applied for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture. An immigration judge denied her request for withholding of removal, and she appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. While that appeal was pending, her husband’s I-730 petition for her was denied by United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), which reasoned that a statutory provision (Section 1231(a)(5)) barred any form of relief for noncitizens with prior removal orders.The petitioner challenged USCIS’s denial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The District Court did not address the merits of his complaint, instead dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. The District Court held that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) barred judicial review of the USCIS’s decision because the act gave the agency discretionary authority over such petitions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed whether the District Court had jurisdiction to consider the legal question of the agency’s statutory interpretation. The Fourth Circuit held that when the agency’s decision is based solely on a question of law—specifically, the interpretation of statutes—rather than the exercise of discretion, federal courts retain jurisdiction to review that decision. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further consideration of the merits. View "Ortez Reyes v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services" on Justia Law

A noncitizen and lawful permanent resident was arrested in Virginia after participating in a cocaine transaction observed and recorded by law enforcement. He was indicted for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and possession with intent to distribute. Through retained counsel, he negotiated a plea agreement in which he pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge, avoiding a mandatory minimum sentence, while the government dropped the other charge. The final agreement omitted certain adverse immigration provisions, but included an acknowledgment that he wished to plead guilty regardless of immigration consequences, including potential automatic removal.After sentencing, the defendant learned he would be subject to mandatory deportation. He filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, claiming his attorney provided ineffective assistance by failing to advise him that his guilty plea would result in mandatory deportation. The district court initially denied relief, finding he had not shown prejudice, relying on his plea agreement’s language. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that he had demonstrated prejudice and remanded for the district court to consider whether counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient.On remand, following an evidentiary hearing, the district court found the attorney had advised the defendant he was “deportable” and would face deportation proceedings, but did not state he would definitely be deported or was subject to “mandatory deportation.” The court held that, given the complexities and uncertainties of immigration outcomes, counsel’s advice met constitutional standards.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that, when the clear consequence of a plea is deportability, counsel need only advise that the plea will render the defendant deportable and subject to removal proceedings; there is no constitutional requirement for counsel to state that deportation is mandatory or absolutely certain. View "United States v. Murillo" on Justia Law

The case concerns an individual who was born in El Salvador in 1981 to unmarried parents. His biological father acknowledged paternity by signing the birth certificate, but the two did not have a relationship. At age 11, he immigrated to the United States as a lawful permanent resident to join his mother. When he was 16, his mother became a naturalized U.S. citizen. As an adult, he was convicted of drug-related offenses. Years later, removal proceedings were initiated against him despite an earlier case memorandum indicating he had derived citizenship through his mother.An immigration judge (IJ) initially denied his motion to terminate removal proceedings, finding that he failed to prove his paternity had not been legitimated under Salvadoran law, and ordered him removed. The Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) affirmed the removal order but remanded for reconsideration of his claim under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Subsequent IJ and Board orders continued to find him removable and not a U.S. citizen, though relief under CAT was granted and later vacated. Both sides appealed these orders, leading to multiple remands and re-entries of removal orders. Ultimately, the Board reaffirmed its prior rulings, and the petitioner remained in immigration detention.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the consolidated petitions. The court held that it had jurisdiction to review both the 2024 and 2025 Board orders. On the merits, the court determined that, under the relevant federal statute in effect when the petitioner’s mother naturalized, his paternity had not been “established by legitimation.” Because all other statutory requirements were met, he automatically became a U.S. citizen upon his mother’s naturalization. The court granted the petitions, vacated the Board’s orders, and remanded with instructions to terminate removal proceedings. View "Lopez v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The defendant operated an immigration services business, preparing self-petition visa applications under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) for clients who claimed abuse by U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident spouses. Investigators found that the defendant submitted applications containing forged psychological evaluations—some altered from a psychologist’s prior reports—and fabricated residential lease documents for multiple clients. These documents were used as evidence to satisfy VAWA eligibility criteria, such as establishing residence and proof of abuse. The defendant was not a licensed attorney and did not sign the applications as preparer.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland presided over the defendant’s trial. After the government presented its case, the defendant moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the fraudulent documents were not “required” by immigration law and that the statute required submission under oath, which he claimed was not satisfied. The district court denied the motion, ruling that while the regulations did not mandate specific documents, any evidence submitted to establish eligibility became “required” for that application. The jury subsequently convicted the defendant on all counts, and he was sentenced to 57 months’ imprisonment and two years of supervised release. The defendant did not renew his acquittal motion and later appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for several counts and alleging a sentencing error based on a discrepancy between oral and written conditions of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and sentence. The court held that documents submitted to establish eligibility in VAWA self-petitions—including psychological evaluations and lease agreements—constitute “required” documents under 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) once chosen and presented. It further held that the statute’s “knowingly presents” clause does not require an oath for criminal liability. Regarding sentencing, the court found no material discrepancy between oral and written supervised release conditions and concluded that resentencing was not warranted. View "US v. Aborisade" on Justia Law

A native and citizen of Honduras entered the United States without authorization in 2019, seeking protection from removal based on claims of past persecution and a likelihood of future harm by the MS-13 gang. He described a series of violent incidents involving MS-13, including the murders of two brothers, threats, extortion attempts, and physical assaults. The petitioner asserted that reporting these incidents to Honduran authorities would have been futile or dangerous due to widespread corruption and gang infiltration of law enforcement. He also provided evidence that MS-13 continued to search for him and his family after he fled Honduras.Removal proceedings were initiated in 2023. The Immigration Judge (IJ) found the petitioner credible but denied his applications for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The IJ concluded that the petitioner had not shown the Honduran government was unable or unwilling to control MS-13, partly because he had not reported the incidents to police and because police responded to his brothers’ murders. The IJ also determined that the petitioner had not demonstrated he could not reasonably relocate within Honduras to avoid harm, and that he had not established a likelihood of torture with government acquiescence. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, finding no clear error in the IJ’s analysis and dismissing the appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions. The court held that the IJ and BIA abused their discretion by disregarding credible, unrebutted, and legally significant evidence that reporting to authorities would have been futile or dangerous, and by failing to meaningfully engage with country condition evidence of government corruption and gang control. The court vacated the BIA’s decision and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the record compelled the conclusion that the Honduran government was unable or unwilling to control MS-13 and that the petitioner could not reasonably relocate to avoid persecution. The court also found that the agency failed to properly consider evidence relevant to CAT relief. View "Marquez v. Bondi" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant applied for U.S. citizenship in 2011 and, on his application and during an interview, denied ever having committed a crime for which he was not arrested. However, in 2013, he pleaded guilty in North Carolina state court to attempted statutory rape for conduct that occurred in 2008, admitting to engaging in a sexual act with a minor. He did not disclose this conduct on his naturalization application. Years later, a federal grand jury indicted him for naturalization fraud, alleging he knowingly concealed his criminal history to obtain citizenship.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment for unconstitutional preindictment delay, finding he had not shown actual prejudice from the delay. The court also denied his motion to suppress evidence of his state guilty plea, ruling that he could not collaterally attack the validity of his state conviction in federal court except for a deprivation of counsel, which did not apply here. At trial, the court limited the testimony of the defendant’s expert witness regarding his cognitive abilities, excluding certain opinions about his capacity to understand the application question. The jury convicted the defendant, finding he knowingly made a false statement, and the court sentenced him to six months in prison and revoked his citizenship.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fourth Circuit held that the defendant failed to demonstrate substantial actual prejudice from the preindictment delay, that the district court properly refused to suppress the state guilty plea, and that while the limitation of the expert’s testimony was error under recent Supreme Court guidance, the error was harmless given the other evidence presented. The conviction and sentence were therefore affirmed. View "US v. Palmer" on Justia Law