Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Immigration Law
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Bryan Alexis Molina-Diaz and his wife Cony Vanessa Pasqual de Molina fled El Salvador after witnessing the murder of Cony's cousin, Jose. Bryan applied for asylum and withholding of removal, but an Immigration Judge (IJ) denied relief, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) affirmed. Bryan then moved for reconsideration and to reopen based on his prior counsel’s ineffective assistance, but the Board denied both motions.The IJ found Bryan and Cony's testimony credible but concluded that Bryan failed to show that the threats he received were on account of his family relationship rather than because he witnessed the murder. The IJ also found that Bryan did not demonstrate that the Salvadoran government was unable or unwilling to control the non-state actors (MS-13 gang members) who threatened him. The Board affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that Bryan did not establish the necessary nexus for asylum and that the government control requirement was not met.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. Bryan argued that the requirement to show the home government’s inability or unwillingness to control non-state persecutors should be abandoned following the Supreme Court's decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo. Alternatively, he argued that the IJ and Board conflated inability with unwillingness and ignored evidence about conditions in El Salvador. The Fourth Circuit rejected these arguments, holding that binding precedent requires showing the home government’s inability or unwillingness to control non-state persecutors. The court found that the IJ and Board did not conflate inability with unwillingness and that substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding of government control. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit denied the petitions for review. View "Molina-Diaz v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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Javier Chavez Dominguez, a Mexican citizen, was arrested in North Carolina in August 2022 on state drug charges. After confirming his identity and criminal history, he was charged with Illegal Reentry after Removal Subsequent to Conviction for Aggravated Felony under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a), (b)(2). Dominguez pleaded guilty and received a 48-month prison sentence followed by three years of supervised release. He appealed the sentence, presenting new arguments not raised in the district court.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina handled the initial proceedings. Dominguez faced both state and federal charges, first pleading guilty to state charges and receiving a 10 to 21-month sentence. Upon release, he was detained by ICE and later charged federally. He pleaded guilty to the federal charge without filing any motions and did not object to the presentence investigation report (PSR), which calculated his advisory Guidelines range as 30 to 37 months.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. Dominguez raised four main challenges: the classification of his 2015 Arizona conviction as an aggravated felony, the constitutionality of his prior removal proceedings, the calculation of his Sentencing Guidelines range, and the substantive reasonableness of his upward variant sentence. The court found no reversible error in the district court's decisions. It held that Dominguez's guilty plea waived his right to challenge the constitutionality of his prior removals and that the district court did not plainly err in its Guidelines calculation or in imposing the upward variant sentence. The court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "US v. Dominguez" on Justia Law

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Melvin Funez-Ortiz, a Honduran national, fled to the United States to escape violence and threats from a gang in Honduras. The gang had murdered several of his family members, shot him, and continued to threaten his family. After entering the U.S. in 2018, Funez was apprehended by immigration officials and later convicted of various offenses in Virginia. Following his imprisonment, he was transferred to immigration custody, where he applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).An immigration judge (IJ) denied Funez’s requests for asylum and withholding of removal but granted his application for deferral of removal under the CAT. The IJ found that Funez would likely be tortured by the gang with the acquiescence of the Honduran government if he were returned to Honduras. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appealed the IJ’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).The BIA reversed the IJ’s decision, concluding that the IJ’s finding that Funez could not safely relocate within Honduras was clearly erroneous. The BIA also disagreed with the IJ’s determination that the Honduran government would acquiesce to Funez’s torture, suggesting that the man in a military police uniform who threatened Funez’s family was likely a gang member rather than a government official.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision. The court found that the BIA had ignored significant evidence regarding the gang’s continued threats and activities after 2018, which could impact Funez’s ability to relocate safely within Honduras. The court also determined that the BIA improperly reweighed evidence regarding whether the man in uniform was a government official. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit granted Funez’s petition for review, vacated the BIA’s decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Funez-Ortiz v. McHenry" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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Felix Jacobo Salomon-Guillen, a native of El Salvador, entered the United States in 2009 on an O-3 visa as the spouse of Lucia Parker Salomon, a recording artist who later became a naturalized citizen. Salomon-Guillen became a permanent resident and managed his wife's music career. In 2013, he began working as a marketing director for a book publisher and engaged in a fraudulent scheme that cost the company $1.4 million. He was indicted for wire fraud, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to 18 months in prison.The government sought to remove Salomon-Guillen from the country due to his aggravated felony conviction. He conceded removability and applied for adjustment of status and an inadmissibility waiver. The immigration judge denied his applications, finding that he failed to demonstrate that his removal would cause "extreme hardship" to his wife or mother, both U.S. citizens. The judge also concluded that Salomon-Guillen did not merit a waiver or adjustment of status as a matter of discretion due to the severity of his fraud offense.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the immigration judge's decision. The BIA, with Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge Denise G. Brown participating, found that Salomon-Guillen failed to show that his wife would suffer extreme hardship if she accompanied him to El Salvador. The BIA also agreed that he did not merit a waiver or adjustment of status as a matter of discretion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the regulation allowing temporary Board members to serve six-month terms did not preclude their reappointment for additional terms. The court also found that it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's discretionary denial of the inadmissibility waiver. Consequently, the petition for review was denied in part and dismissed in part. View "Saloman-Guillen v. Garland" on Justia Law

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Mohamed Lamine Kouyate, a 36-year-old native and citizen of Guinea, entered the United States on a tourist visa in 2014 due to concerns about political unrest in Guinea. He overstayed his visa and was later convicted in Maryland for identity fraud involving over $100,000, resulting in a 15-year prison sentence. Following his release on parole, the Department of Homeland Security charged him with removability for overstaying his visa. Kouyate applied for asylum, withholding of removal under the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming he would be persecuted or tortured if returned to Guinea due to his father's political notoriety.An immigration judge (IJ) denied Kouyate's applications, ruling that his identity fraud conviction constituted a "particularly serious crime," making him ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal under the INA and CAT. The IJ also denied his application for deferral of removal under the CAT, finding insufficient evidence that he would likely be tortured if returned to Guinea. The IJ noted that the political climate in Guinea had changed, and Kouyate's fears were speculative and based on generalized concerns of violence.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Kouyate's appeal, deeming his challenge to the IJ's particularly serious crime ruling waived and affirming the IJ's denial of deferral of removal under the CAT. The BIA agreed with the IJ's assessment that Kouyate's fears were speculative and not supported by sufficient evidence of a particularized risk of torture.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed both the IJ's and BIA's decisions, finding no reversible error. The court upheld the BIA's determination that Kouyate had not exhausted his administrative remedies regarding the particularly serious crime ruling and affirmed the denial of deferral of removal under the CAT, concluding that substantial evidence supported the BIA's decision. The petition for review was denied. View "Kouyate v. Garland" on Justia Law

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Hussein Ahmed Mouns, a native of Ethiopia and citizen of Yemen, has been in the United States since 1996. He applied for asylum and withholding of removal in 1997, which were denied by an immigration judge in 1999 and affirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in 2002. Mouns filed motions to reopen his proceedings in 2003 and 2004 to pursue asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), which were denied by the BIA in 2003 and 2005. In 2020, Mouns filed a third motion to reopen based on changed country conditions in Yemen, citing the ongoing civil war and potential persecution due to his religion and imputed political opinion.The BIA denied Mouns’s 2020 motion to reopen, applying the stringent standard from In re Coelho, which requires the movant to show that the new evidence would likely change the result of the case. Mouns requested reconsideration, arguing that the BIA should have used the less burdensome "reasonable likelihood" standard from In re L-O-G-. The BIA denied reconsideration, reaffirming the use of the Coelho standard without addressing the L-O-G- standard.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision. The court found that the BIA abused its discretion by not following its own precedents, which limit the Coelho standard to cases with special, adverse considerations. The court noted that the BIA did not identify any such considerations in Mouns’s case and should have applied the "reasonable likelihood" standard. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit granted Mouns’s petition for review, vacated the BIA’s decision denying reconsideration, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mouns v. Garland" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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Hanumant Joshi, an Indian national, entered the U.S. on a student visa in 2015. Diagnosed with severe mental illnesses, including depression and schizoaffective disorder, Joshi experienced multiple involuntary hospitalizations both in the U.S. and India. In India, he was forcibly hospitalized several times, subjected to unknown medications, and underwent electroconvulsive therapy (ECT). Joshi claimed that his half-brother and cousins were behind these institutionalizations to gain control over his inheritance.The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Joshi's claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The IJ found Joshi's asylum application untimely and determined that his institutionalizations were legitimate medical treatments rather than persecution. The IJ also concluded that Joshi's relatives were motivated by greed, not by his mental illness, and thus did not establish the required nexus to a protected ground. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that Joshi did not demonstrate past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution and that his treatment did not constitute torture.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the BIA's decision. The court found substantial evidence supporting the BIA's determination that Joshi's involuntary hospitalizations and ECT were legitimate medical interventions, not persecution. The court also agreed that Joshi's relatives' actions were motivated by a desire for his property, not his mental illness, failing to establish the necessary nexus for asylum. Consequently, the court denied Joshi's petition for review, affirming the denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. View "Joshi v. Garland" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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Isai Rivas Dubon, a native and citizen of Honduras, entered the United States without inspection in January 1999 and was ordered removed in May 2000. However, the removal order was never executed, and Dubon remained in the country. After successfully adjusting his status, he became a lawful permanent resident and applied for naturalization in August 2020. During the application process, Dubon disclosed a 2019 arrest for violating a domestic violence protection order, which was later dismissed. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) interviewed Dubon in March 2021 but took no further action for 14 months, prompting Dubon to file a lawsuit in federal district court under 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) in June 2022.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina remanded Dubon’s naturalization application to USCIS, instructing the agency to decide within 15 days. The court found that USCIS had a valid reason for the delay due to Dubon’s outstanding removal order, which was terminated in August 2022. USCIS denied Dubon’s naturalization application six days after the remand, citing his 2019 arrest as a disqualifying factor for demonstrating "good moral character." Dubon appealed the district court’s remand order, arguing that the agency had not shown good cause for its delay.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and granted the government’s motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that a remand order under 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) is neither a final decision nor appealable under the collateral order doctrine. The court emphasized that such remand orders are interlocutory and do not end the litigation on the merits, thus falling outside the scope of appealable orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The court concluded that Dubon’s interest in having his application decided by the district court rather than USCIS did not justify an immediate appeal. View "Dubon v. Jaddou" on Justia Law

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Dolores Ortega-Cordova, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States without inspection in 2002. In 2012, he was arrested in Norfolk, Virginia, and charged with solicitation of prostitution under Virginia Code § 18.2-346(B). He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 90 days’ imprisonment, with 86 days suspended, and fined. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him. Ortega-Cordova conceded removability but applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Ortega-Cordova’s application, finding him ineligible for cancellation of removal because his conviction for solicitation of prostitution was deemed a crime involving moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). The IJ relied on the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) long-standing position that prostitution-related offenses are morally turpitudinous. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, noting that Ortega-Cordova failed to prove that solicitation of prostitution is no longer considered morally reprehensible by society.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the BIA’s decision. The court concluded that solicitation of prostitution under Virginia law categorically involves moral turpitude because it debases a moral norm against treating sex as a commercial transaction. The court rejected Ortega-Cordova’s arguments that societal views on prostitution are evolving and that the statute criminalizes consensual conduct between adults. The court also dismissed his procedural arguments, including the claim that the BIA abused its discretion by not referring his case to a three-member panel. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit denied Ortega-Cordova’s petition for review. View "Ortega-Cordova v. Garland" on Justia Law

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The case involves Raymond Sefakor Yao Azumah, a Ghanaian national who was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 2010. After a trip to Ghana in 2014, Azumah was deemed inadmissible due to an intervening embezzlement conviction. Despite this, the government paroled Azumah into the country and initiated removal proceedings against him. These proceedings were later dismissed, and Azumah applied for citizenship. However, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services denied his application, arguing that Azumah was statutorily ineligible because he was not “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” upon his return to the United States in 2014. The district court affirmed this denial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the lower court's decision. The court noted that Azumah was indeed “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” at all relevant times, including 2010, 2014, and when he sought citizenship, because he had the status of a legal permanent resident of the United States. The court did not interpret the agency regulation to impose upon Azumah the additional burden of showing that he was “lawfully admitted” rather than paroled when he returned to the United States in 2014. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Azumah v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services" on Justia Law