Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Dolores Ortega-Cordova, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States without inspection in 2002. In 2012, he was arrested in Norfolk, Virginia, and charged with solicitation of prostitution under Virginia Code § 18.2-346(B). He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 90 days’ imprisonment, with 86 days suspended, and fined. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him. Ortega-Cordova conceded removability but applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Ortega-Cordova’s application, finding him ineligible for cancellation of removal because his conviction for solicitation of prostitution was deemed a crime involving moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). The IJ relied on the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) long-standing position that prostitution-related offenses are morally turpitudinous. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, noting that Ortega-Cordova failed to prove that solicitation of prostitution is no longer considered morally reprehensible by society.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and upheld the BIA’s decision. The court concluded that solicitation of prostitution under Virginia law categorically involves moral turpitude because it debases a moral norm against treating sex as a commercial transaction. The court rejected Ortega-Cordova’s arguments that societal views on prostitution are evolving and that the statute criminalizes consensual conduct between adults. The court also dismissed his procedural arguments, including the claim that the BIA abused its discretion by not referring his case to a three-member panel. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit denied Ortega-Cordova’s petition for review. View "Ortega-Cordova v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves Raymond Sefakor Yao Azumah, a Ghanaian national who was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 2010. After a trip to Ghana in 2014, Azumah was deemed inadmissible due to an intervening embezzlement conviction. Despite this, the government paroled Azumah into the country and initiated removal proceedings against him. These proceedings were later dismissed, and Azumah applied for citizenship. However, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services denied his application, arguing that Azumah was statutorily ineligible because he was not “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” upon his return to the United States in 2014. The district court affirmed this denial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the lower court's decision. The court noted that Azumah was indeed “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” at all relevant times, including 2010, 2014, and when he sought citizenship, because he had the status of a legal permanent resident of the United States. The court did not interpret the agency regulation to impose upon Azumah the additional burden of showing that he was “lawfully admitted” rather than paroled when he returned to the United States in 2014. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Azumah v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services" on Justia Law

The case involves an American citizen and her noncitizen husband who sued two U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) officials, alleging that USCIS unreasonably delayed adjudicating a waiver application the husband submitted two years prior. The plaintiffs argued that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Mandamus Act granted subject-matter jurisdiction over their claims. The district court dismissed their claims, concluding that language in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that denies courts jurisdiction over suits based on agency “decisions or actions” also bars suits over agency inaction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, but for different reasons. The appellate court found that the district court erred in interpreting the INA's jurisdictional bar to include agency inaction. However, the court concluded that no statute or regulation requires USCIS to adjudicate the husband’s waiver application, and therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims. The court noted that while the delay in adjudication was stressful for the plaintiffs, their complaint should be addressed to the political branches, as the court lacked jurisdiction to order the relief sought. View "Lovo v. Miller" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Virginia Garcia Cortes, a Mexican citizen, sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision affirming an Immigration Judge's denial of her application for cancellation of removal. The Immigration Judge and Board of Immigration Appeals denied Garcia Cortes’s application on the basis that she failed to make the requisite showing under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) that her removal would impose “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” on her daughter.The Immigration Judge found that Garcia Cortes satisfied the first three statutory eligibility requirements for cancellation of removal. However, he rejected Garcia Cortes’s request after concluding that she could not satisfy the fourth statutory requirement—whether her removal would impose “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” on a family member who was an American citizen or lawful permanent resident. The Immigration Judge ordered that Garcia Cortes either voluntarily leave the country or be removed. Garcia Cortes appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“the Board”). A divided three-member panel of the Board adopted and affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that the facts as found by the Immigration Judge do not support a determination that Garcia Cortes’s daughter would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if Garcia Cortes was removed. However, because the Immigration Judge failed to consider key portions of a therapist’s letter that was central to Garcia Cortes’s argument, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Garcia Cortes v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves Elsy and Isai Diaz-Hernandez, siblings from El Salvador who illegally entered the United States and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. They claimed that they had suffered harm or fear of harm in El Salvador from their maternal uncle, who abused them to avenge his earlier deportation from the United States, for which he blamed their mother. The Immigration Judge (IJ) found that revenge was not a central reason for the uncle’s abuse of Elsy and Isai but at most a “tangential reason.” The IJ concluded that Elsy and Isai failed to establish the required nexus between their harm and a protected ground and therefore the requirements for either asylum or withholding of removal.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision and dismissed the appeal. The BIA rejected the petitioners’ argument that the evidence showed that their relationship to their mother was “at least one central reason” for the uncle’s abusive behavior against them. The BIA noted that the IJ’s finding that the petitioners failed to demonstrate the necessary nexus between the harm and a protected ground was “a classic factual question,” and after reviewing the facts, concluded that the IJ did not clearly err.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied the petitions for review, concluding that substantial evidence supported the agency’s finding that the petitioners failed to establish the requisite nexus between the harm they feared and their family tie. The court also rejected their argument that the BIA applied the wrong standard for assessing whether they met their burden to prove the required nexus with respect to their withholding of removal claims. View "Diaz-Hernandez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Gilfredo Lopez-Sorto, a Salvadoran native and former gang member, sought review of an order by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) decision denying him deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Lopez-Sorto, who had been a lawful permanent resident in the U.S. since 1982, was convicted of second-degree murder and other charges in 1995, and served 26 years in prison. Upon his release, he was transferred to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody and removal proceedings were initiated against him. He did not challenge his removability, but sought deferral of removal under the CAT, fearing torture if deported to El Salvador due to his gang-related tattoos and criminal record.The IJ concluded that Lopez-Sorto had not established that he would more likely than not be tortured if he returned to El Salvador, and ordered his removal. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision. Lopez-Sorto appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, arguing that the IJ and BIA used the wrong legal standard to evaluate his claim, failed to aggregate his various asserted risks of torture, and ignored his experts’ testimony.The Fourth Circuit disagreed with Lopez-Sorto's arguments. It found that the IJ and BIA had applied the correct legal standard, properly aggregated the asserted risks of torture, and did not ignore the expert witnesses' testimony. The court therefore denied the petition for review. View "Lopez-Sorto v. Garland" on Justia Law

David Orlando Marquez Cruz, a Salvadoran national and lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted of attempted second degree child sexual abuse under Washington, D.C., law. The conviction stemmed from a sexual relationship he had with a fifteen-year-old child. Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security charged him with removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) on the grounds of being a noncitizen convicted of a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment, and as an aggravated felon. Cruz denied that he was removable and requested that his removal be cancelled as a matter of discretion.The immigration judge found Cruz removable based on his conviction of a crime of child abuse, but dismissed the aggravated felony removal charge. The judge declined to cancel Cruz’s removal and ordered him removed. Cruz appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), challenging the immigration judge’s finding that his D.C. conviction qualified as a crime of child abuse. The BIA agreed with the immigration judge and dismissed the appeal. Cruz then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for review.The Fourth Circuit held that Cruz’s conviction for attempted second degree child sexual abuse under D.C. law qualifies as a removable crime of child abuse. The court rejected Cruz’s arguments that a crime of child abuse under the INA does not cover attempts and that statutes imposing strict liability as to a victim’s age cannot satisfy the mens rea requirement because they do not require a culpable mental state. The court concluded that a crime of child abuse requires a culpable mens rea and an actus reus of conduct that either injures a child or creates a sufficiently high risk that a child will be harmed. The court denied Cruz's petition for review. View "Marquez Cruz v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves six non-citizens who were indicted for illegally reentering the U.S. following their prior removal, a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. They moved to dismiss their indictments on the ground that § 1326 is unconstitutional because it was enacted with a racially discriminatory purpose. The district court rejected their argument, finding that they had not shown racial discrimination was a motive for enacting § 1326.The defendants argued that the 1929 Act, which was one of § 1326’s predecessor offenses, was enacted with racial animus against Mexican and Central American immigrants, and this animus carried forward to the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA” or “1952 Act”) which enacted § 1326. The district court disagreed, stating that even if the 1929 Act had racist motivations, the case for racial bias with respect to the 1952 Act and § 1326 was much weaker, as they were focused on economic factors, labor market factors, and national security factors.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that the defendants had not shown that § 1326 violates the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment because it was enacted with a racially discriminatory purpose. The court found that the defendants had not carried their burden of showing that racial bias against Mexican and Central American immigrants was “a motivating factor” for Congress when it enacted § 1326 in 1952. View "United States v. Sanchez-Garcia" on Justia Law

The case involves Saleh Shaiban, a Yemeni national who entered the U.S. in 1999 using a false passport and B-2 visitor visa. He was eventually granted asylum in 2006. He subsequently applied for adjustment of status to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), which was denied on terrorism grounds. Shaiban appealed the decision but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over his appeal and dismissed it.Shaiban initially applied for asylum in December 2000, but his application was denied in 2002. He appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which also dismissed his appeal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit remanded his case to a new Immigration Judge for a de novo hearing, which resulted in his asylum grant.In 2008, Shaiban applied for permanent residence. USCIS put his case on hold in 2013 due to terrorism-related grounds of inadmissibility under the Immigration and Nationality Act. In 2018, USCIS denied his application after determining that his participation in certain Yemeni organizations qualified as terrorist activities.Shaiban filed a suit under the Administrative Procedures Act to compel adjudication of his application for permanent residence. He argued that the government was collaterally estopped from denying his application since his previous asylum grant had determined that the terrorism bar did not apply. However, the district court granted the government’s motion for summary judgment, leading to Shaiban’s appeal to the Fourth Circuit.The Fourth Circuit declared that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Shaiban's case, pointing to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, which identifies when courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review claims from noncitizens, and 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b), which states that the decision to adjust the status of a noncitizen granted asylum lies in the discretion of the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General of the United States. The court determined that the plain language of the statutes and the Supreme Court’s precedential interpretation in Patel v. Garland led to the conclusion that the court did not have jurisdiction over Shaiban’s appeal. View "Shaiban v. Jaddou" on Justia Law

Carlos Gomez-Ruotolo, a native citizen of Venezuela, was brought to the United States in 2001 and became a lawful permanent resident. He was convicted twice in Virginia for crimes involving minors: once for attempted sexual battery and another for electronic solicitation of a minor. Based on these convictions, he was found removable as a noncitizen convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude and was denied relief by the Board of Immigration Appeals. Gomez-Ruotolo appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, arguing that his crimes were not morally turpitudinous and that he should receive protection against removal under the Convention Against Torture.The court disagreed. It held that attempted sexual battery and electronic solicitation of a minor both involved moral turpitude, thus making Gomez-Ruotolo deportable under immigration law. The court also affirmed the agency's decision to deny Gomez-Ruotolo protection under the Convention Against Torture, agreeing that he had not shown he was more likely than not to face torture in Venezuela. Therefore, the court denied Gomez-Ruotolo's petition for review. View "Gomez-Ruotolo v. Garland" on Justia Law