Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Immigration Law
Munyakazi v. Lynch
Petitioner, an ethnic Hutu and a native and citizen of Rwanda, seeks review of the BIA's denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court concluded that substantial evidence supports the agency’s ultimate conclusion that petitioner assisted or participated in the Rwandan genocide. Consequently, the agency correctly determined that petitioner is barred from receiving asylum or withholding of removal. Furthermore, substantial evidence supports the denial of petitioner's request for CAT protection where the record amply supports the agency’s finding that petitioner is likely to be held in civilian prison and tried in civilian courts. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "Munyakazi v. Lynch" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Immigration Law
Alvarez v. Lynch
Petitioner, a citizen of Bolivia, seeks review of the BIA's decision finding him ineligible for cancellation of removal. The BIA determined that petitioner's Virginia conviction for forging a public record pursuant to Virginia Code Ann. 18.2-168 was an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(R). The court concluded that Virginia forgery is an aggravated felony under the INA because it is a categorical match with the federal generic definition of forgery. Thus, the state and federal forgery crimes necessarily relate to one another. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review and denied the Government's request to remand as moot. View "Alvarez v. Lynch" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Immigration Law
Beltran v. Cardall
Petitioner challenged the denial of her petition for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking relief as next friend of R.M.B., her minor son. R.M.B., a native of Guatemala, is being held as an unaccompanied alien child (a UAC) by the Office of Refugee Resettlement, an agency of DHHS. The court could not say that R.M.B.’s detention is based on an erroneous application or interpretation of the UAC definition where the Office found, after conducting a home study and gathering other evidence, that petitioner was incapable of providing for R.M.B.’s physical and mental well-being. The court rejected petitioner's contention that the Office lacks authority to detain R.M.B. now that his immigration proceedings have terminated. Even after R.M.B.'s immigration proceedings concluded, the Office was not entitled to release him to anyone unless it first determined that the proposed custodian was capable of providing for his physical and mental well-being. The court rejected petitioner's substantive due process claim, concluding that the Office's determination suffices to address any substantive due process concerns and renders inapposite those decisions involving challenges to state interference with control of children by fit parents. The court concluded, however, that the district court, in denying petitioner's procedural due process claim, did not utilize the proper Mathews v. Eldridge framework. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Beltran v. Cardall" on Justia Law
Lawrence v. Lynch
Petitioner, a native and citizen of Jamaica, seeks review of the BIA's denial of his motion to reopen as untimely and denial of his request for sua sponte reopening. Determining that it has jurisdiction, the court concluded that the Board conducted an appropriate, individualized inquiry into whether petitioner exhibited reasonable diligence to warrant equitable tolling. Having articulated and applied the correct standard in reviewing petitioner's claim for equitable tolling, the court concluded that the Board did not abuse its discretion. Nor did it abuse its discretion for either of the procedural deficiencies that Lawrence asserts. Because the Board appropriately analyzed and rejected petitioner’s request for equitable tolling, the court denied petitioner's motion to reopen as untimely. As to petitioner's request for sua sponte reopening, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review how the Board exercises its sua sponte discretion. View "Lawrence v. Lynch" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Immigration Law
United States v. Lopez-Collazo
The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss an indictment charging him with illegal reentry by a deported alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326(a), (b)(2), concluding that the underlying removal order was invalid because DHS failed to explain to defendant in his native language either the removal charges against him or his right to contest the charges or obtain legal representation. The court agreed with the government that, even assuming the administrative removal proceedings were procedurally defective, defendant failed to establish prejudice. In this case, the government contends that even if DHS had provided defendant a Spanish language translation of the removal charges and his right to contest them, it would not have made a difference - he still would have been removed to Mexico. The court concluded that defendant failed to establish that his order of removal was “fundamentally unfair” under section 1326(d). Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Lopez-Collazo" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law, Immigration Law
Ndibu v. Lynch
Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, seeks review of the BIA's final order of removal affirming the IJ's conclusion that petitioner filed a frivolous asylum application and was therefore ineligible for adjustment of status. The court concluded that notice set forth in the I-589 application for asylum suffices to satisfy the requirement under 8 U.S.C. 1158(d)(4)(A) that the applicant be notified of the consequences of filing a frivolous application. Although an immigration judge is free to give an applicant additional warnings during the hearing, there is no statutory requirement that he do so. Therefore, the court rejected petitioner's contention that he did not receive adequate notice. The court rejected petitioner's remaining claims and denied the petition for review. View "Ndibu v. Lynch" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Immigration Law
Mena v. Lynch
Petitioner, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, seeks review of the BIA's decision finding him ineligible for cancellation of removal because he is an aggravated felon. The court held that, based on the court's application of the categorical approach, a conviction under the second paragraph of 18 U.S.C. 659 is not a “theft offense (including receipt of stolen property)” under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G). Therefore, the BIA erred in finding petitioner to be an aggravated felon who is ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(3). Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded for further proceedings. View "Mena v. Lynch" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Immigration Law
Oxygene v. Lynch
Petitioner, a native of Haiti, seeks review of the denial of his application for deferral or removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and the denial of his motion to reopen removal proceedings. The BIA explained in In re J-E- that, as usually defined, “specific intent” constitutes “[t]he intent to accomplish the precise criminal act that one is later charged with.” The distinction between specific and general intent rests on the mens rea related to the consequences of a wrongful act. Haiti’s detention of criminal deportees under extremely substandard conditions constitutes the challenged wrongful act both here and in In re J-E-. On the record before it, the BIA found that “Haitian prison conditions are the result of budgetary and management problems as well as the country’s severe economic difficulties,” and not part of an intentional effort to punish criminal deportees. In re J-E- requires a CAT claimant to demonstrate that the state actor who mistreats him desires to cause his severe pain and suffering, and is not merely negligent nor reckless as to the risk. Petitioner argues that a claimant should be able to satisfy this requirement by demonstrating that an official acts with knowledge to a near certainty that he will cause severe pain and suffering. The court joined the majority of its sister circuits, who have considered the issue, in deferring to the BIA's interpretation of the CAT’s intent requirement as articulated in In re J-E-. The court rejected petitioner's contention that the IJ and BIA committed legal error in following the precedent established in In re J-E- to deny his application for deferral of removal under the CAT. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the petition for review from the order denying his motion to reopen. View "Oxygene v. Lynch" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Immigration Law
Ojo v. Lynch
Petitioner, a native of Nigeria and the adopted son of a United States citizen, petitioned for review of the BIA's denial of his motion to reopen removal proceedings. At issue is the statutory phrase, “adopted while under the age of sixteen years.” 8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(1)(E)(i). The court concluded that the plain meaning of “adopted” in section 1101(b)(1)(E)(i) forecloses the BIA’s summary disregard of facially valid nunc pro tunc orders relating to adoptions conducted by the various state courts. Here, it was contrary to law for the BIA not to recognize the nunc pro tunc order in petitioner's case and thus the BIA abused its discretion in denying petitioner's motion to reopen his removal proceedings. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review. View "Ojo v. Lynch" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Immigration Law
Etienne v. Lynch
Petitioner, a native of Haiti, was ordered removed on the grounds that he is an alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony. Because the Notice of Intent, Form I-851, expressly prompts aliens to raise only factual challenges to removal, the court held that petitioner was not required to raise his legal challenge to removal in order to meet the exhaustion requirement of INA 242(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1252(d)(1). Consequently, the court has jurisdiction to consider the petition for review. On the merits, the court concluded that nothing rebuts the common-law presumption when interpreting the term “conspiracy” in the INA. Accordingly, under the categorical approach, a state-law conspiracy need not require proof of an overt act to be classified as an “aggravated felony.” Therefore, the court held that DHS properly classified petitioner’s conviction and the court denied the petition for review. View "Etienne v. Lynch" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Immigration Law