Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision ordering him removed and denying his motion for reconsideration. The court held that the IJ and the BIA did not err in determining that petitioner was convicted of a "particularly serious crime" rendering him ineligible for withholding of removal under the Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(8), and the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The court also held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Because petitioner was convicted of a state crime involving a controlled substance, the court lacks jurisdiction to review questions of fact underlying the present order denying him deferral of removal. Therefore, the court does not have jurisdiction to consider the merits of his claims for deferral or removal under the CAT. The court dismissed in part, and denied in part, the petitions for review. View "Hernandez-Nolasco v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Senegal, challenged the denial of a continuance or administrative closure of his removal proceedings so he could receive a mental health evaluation. Petitioner was deemed removeable after he pled guilty to three counts of second-degree assault following a psychotic episode at his workplace. The court denied the petition for review, concluding that the IJ did not procedurally or substantively err in assessing petitioner's mental competency. In this case, petitioner had received one continuance after another and there was no defect in the proceedings. View "Diop v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitioned for review of the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's denial of his application for asylum and withholding of removal. Petitioner argued that his life would be threatened because of his membership in one of two particular social groups: (1) “Salvadorans who are former members of MS-13 and who left the gang, without its permission, for moral and religious reasons,” and (2) “Salvadorans who were recruited to be members of MS-13 as children and who left the gang as minors, without its permission, for moral and religious reasons.” The court concluded that the BIA erred by interpreting the nexus requirement too narrowly, and that petitioner successfully demonstrated that membership in his proposed social groups was at least one central reason for his persecution; the BIA failed to adequately address the record evidence in making its determination that petitioner’s proposed social groups were not cognizable; and, therefore, the court granted the petition, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for proper consideration of the cognizable social group issue. View "Oliva v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's pretermission of petitioner's application for cancellation of removal. The court found that petitioner's conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, committed against someone with whom he had a domestic relationship, renders him ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and denied the petition for review. View "Hernandez-Zavala v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, seeks review of the BIA's decision dismissing her appeal from an IJ's order of removal. At issue is the IJ's denial of petitioner's motion to suppress certain evidence and to terminate the removal proceeding. The court held that the exclusionary rule applies to egregious violations of the Fourth Amendment. The court joined the Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits and applied a totality of the circumstances test to determine the egregiousness standard. The court rejected petitioner's claim that her Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the search warrant at issue was invalid because it identified the premises as single-family home as oppose to a multi-unit dwelling. The court rejected petitioner's alternative arguments, concluding that petitioner's claims do not make out a constitutional violation, let alone an egregious one. The court held, however, that the nighttime execution of a daytime warrant violates the Fourth Amendment, absent consent or exigent circumstances. In this case, the 5:00 a.m. search of the premises violated the Fourth Amendment. The court held that, although the nighttime execution of the daytime warrant violated petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights, such violation was not egregious under the totality of the circumstances. The court rejected petitioner's remaining claims and denied the petition for review. View "Yanez-Marquez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of the Philippines, challenged the BIA's dismissal of his appeal of an IJ's order of removal and denial of his motion for reconsideration. The BIA determined that petitioner's 1990 Maryland conviction for "causing abuse to a child," qualified as an aggravated felony" under the generic crime of "sexual abuse of a minor," and he was therefore removeable. Because the least culpable conduct under the former Maryland statute prohibiting sexual abuse of a child does not necessarily qualify as the generic federal offense of “sexual abuse of a minor,” as interpreted by the BIA, the court granted the petition for review and vacated the order of removal. View "Amos v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States without inspection and without valid entry documents. The Government subsequently initiated deportation proceedings against Petitioner. Petitioner conceded her removability but sought relief from removal in the form of asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Naturalization Act. The immigration judge concluded that Petitioner had not established her eligibility for asylum. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The Fourth Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review and vacated the order of the BIA, holding that Petitioner had established her eligibility for asylum. Remanded. View "Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Ashton LeBlanc, a Louisiana resident, had a son, Robert, who was born in Nigeria in 1970. In 2001, Robert and Ashton decided to file the appropriate paperwork to have Robert declared a United States citizen. Ashton completed and submitted to his attorney a Form N-600, an application for certificate of citizenship, but the attorney instead filed a Form I-130, a petition for an adjustment of status for an alien relative. The I-130 was denied in 2007. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied the appeal. In 2011, Ashton contacted a second attorney to check on the status of Robert’s citizenship and was assured that the process was moving forward. Ashton subsequently hired his current counsel, who discovered Ashton’s previous attorney’s deficient performance. Current counsel moved to reopen the denial of the I-130 petition on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. The BIA denied the motion, concluding that Ashton failed to show due diligence after contacting the second attorney. The Fourth Circuit dismissed Ashton’s petition for review for lack of jurisdiction because the petition was from Ashton’s denied motion to reopen his visa petition, not an order of removal against Robert, and because transfer to an appropriate district court was not in the interests of justice. View "LeBlanc v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 2007, Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, was convicted of petit larceny. In 2009, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security commenced removal proceedings against Petitioner. Petitioner conceded removability but applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1), The immigration judge pretermitted Petitioner’s application and ordered her removed to El Salvador, concluding that her petit-larceny conviction rendered her ineligible for relief because it was a crime involving moral turpitude. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the BIA’s decision was based on an incorrect interpretation of section 1229b(b)(1)(C).The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the BIA’s reading of section 1229b(b)(1)(C) was a permissible interpretation of the statute, entitling the BIA’s decision to Chevron deference. View "Hernandez v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Mexican national, pled guilty to illegal entry, a misdemeanor offense. After Petitioner had served his 181-day sentence and was released, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) commenced removal proceedings against him. Petitioner conceded removability and applied for cancellation of removal, arguing that his removal would cause exceptional hardship to his three citizen children, especially his ten-year-old autistic son. The immigration judge (IJ) dismissed Petitioner’s application, concluding that Petitioner was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal because 8 U.S.C. 1101(f)(7) precludes an alien from establishing good moral character when his offense resulted in 180 days or more of confinement. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, concluding that the applicability of section 1101(f)(&) does not depend upon the type of offense, but rather, the length of incarceration. The Fourth Circuit denied in part and dismissed in part Petitioner’s petition for review, holding (1) this was not one of those “exceptionally rare” instances in which the literal application of a Congressional enactment produces truly absurd results; and (2) the Court lacked jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claim that he was not precluded from establishing good moral character. View "Tiscareno-Garcia v. Holder" on Justia Law