Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a citizen of the Philippines, challenged the BIA's dismissal of his appeal of an IJ's order of removal and denial of his motion for reconsideration. The BIA determined that petitioner's 1990 Maryland conviction for "causing abuse to a child," qualified as an aggravated felony" under the generic crime of "sexual abuse of a minor," and he was therefore removeable. Because the least culpable conduct under the former Maryland statute prohibiting sexual abuse of a child does not necessarily qualify as the generic federal offense of “sexual abuse of a minor,” as interpreted by the BIA, the court granted the petition for review and vacated the order of removal. View "Amos v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States without inspection and without valid entry documents. The Government subsequently initiated deportation proceedings against Petitioner. Petitioner conceded her removability but sought relief from removal in the form of asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Naturalization Act. The immigration judge concluded that Petitioner had not established her eligibility for asylum. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The Fourth Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review and vacated the order of the BIA, holding that Petitioner had established her eligibility for asylum. Remanded. View "Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Ashton LeBlanc, a Louisiana resident, had a son, Robert, who was born in Nigeria in 1970. In 2001, Robert and Ashton decided to file the appropriate paperwork to have Robert declared a United States citizen. Ashton completed and submitted to his attorney a Form N-600, an application for certificate of citizenship, but the attorney instead filed a Form I-130, a petition for an adjustment of status for an alien relative. The I-130 was denied in 2007. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied the appeal. In 2011, Ashton contacted a second attorney to check on the status of Robert’s citizenship and was assured that the process was moving forward. Ashton subsequently hired his current counsel, who discovered Ashton’s previous attorney’s deficient performance. Current counsel moved to reopen the denial of the I-130 petition on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. The BIA denied the motion, concluding that Ashton failed to show due diligence after contacting the second attorney. The Fourth Circuit dismissed Ashton’s petition for review for lack of jurisdiction because the petition was from Ashton’s denied motion to reopen his visa petition, not an order of removal against Robert, and because transfer to an appropriate district court was not in the interests of justice. View "LeBlanc v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 2007, Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, was convicted of petit larceny. In 2009, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security commenced removal proceedings against Petitioner. Petitioner conceded removability but applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1), The immigration judge pretermitted Petitioner’s application and ordered her removed to El Salvador, concluding that her petit-larceny conviction rendered her ineligible for relief because it was a crime involving moral turpitude. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the BIA’s decision was based on an incorrect interpretation of section 1229b(b)(1)(C).The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the BIA’s reading of section 1229b(b)(1)(C) was a permissible interpretation of the statute, entitling the BIA’s decision to Chevron deference. View "Hernandez v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Mexican national, pled guilty to illegal entry, a misdemeanor offense. After Petitioner had served his 181-day sentence and was released, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) commenced removal proceedings against him. Petitioner conceded removability and applied for cancellation of removal, arguing that his removal would cause exceptional hardship to his three citizen children, especially his ten-year-old autistic son. The immigration judge (IJ) dismissed Petitioner’s application, concluding that Petitioner was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal because 8 U.S.C. 1101(f)(7) precludes an alien from establishing good moral character when his offense resulted in 180 days or more of confinement. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, concluding that the applicability of section 1101(f)(&) does not depend upon the type of offense, but rather, the length of incarceration. The Fourth Circuit denied in part and dismissed in part Petitioner’s petition for review, holding (1) this was not one of those “exceptionally rare” instances in which the literal application of a Congressional enactment produces truly absurd results; and (2) the Court lacked jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claim that he was not precluded from establishing good moral character. View "Tiscareno-Garcia v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, appealed the denial of his application for asylum and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner claimed past persecution based on his membership in a political party called the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo. The IJ found that petitioner was not credible and the BIA affirmed. The court held that the rejection of petitioner's asylum application, largely on the basis of an adverse credibility finding, was not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review insofar as it challenged the denial of the application for asylum; vacated the BIA and IJ's orders with regard thereto; and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ilunga v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, who had pled guilty to arson under Maryland's arson-in-the-first-degree statute, sought review of the BIA's dismissal of her appeal from the IJ's ruling that the arson conviction qualified as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(E), and order of removal. Applying Chevron deference, the court concluded that petitioner's state arson conviction unambiguously qualifies as an aggravated felony under section 1101(a)(43)(E), and even if an ambiguity existed, the BIA's interpretation was reasonable. The court rejected as meritless petitioner's alternative arguments that the BIA should have applied the rule of lenity and that the BIA's application of Matter of Bautista was impermissibly retroactive. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Espinal-Andrades v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Honduras, sought review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal of the IJ's order of removal. The BIA determined that petitioner was removable based on his past conviction under Virginia Code 18.2-102 for the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. The court concluded, however, that the Virginia offense did not constitute an "aggravated felony," where the full range of conduct covered by the Virginia crime of "unauthorized use" does not qualify as a "theft offense," as that term has been defined by the BIA. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and vacated the order of removal. View "Castillo v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of India, petitioned for review of the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's denial of petitioner's renewed application for adjustment of status and order of removal, as well as petitioner's motion to reopen and reconsider. Joining the BIA and the Ninth Circuit, the court held that the deadline in 8 U.S.C. 1255(i) operates as a statue of repose that is not subject to equitable tolling. Therefore, the failures of petitioner's original counsel to file a timely labor certification to equitably toll the deadline under section 1255(i) is not a question the court need to consider. Because petitioner did not meet the deadline and because the deadline is a statute of repose not subject to equitable tolling, petitioner is not eligible for relief and his motion to reopen was properly denied on that basis alone. Accordingly, the court denied the petition in part and dismissed in part. View "Prasad v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an Egyptian native and citizen, was convicted in Virginia state court of grand larceny under VA. Code Ann. 18.2-95 for taking, stealing, and carrying away two pool cues valued in excess of $200 following a dispute with his opponent in a local pool league. At issue on appeal was whether petitioner's conviction constituted an aggravated felony under section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43). The court concluded that mere use of the disjunctive "or" in the definition of a crime does not automatically render it divisible. The court held that, under the court's recent decisions construing Descamps v. United States, the Virginia crime of larceny is indivisible as a matter of law. Therefore, the court concluded that the modified categorical approach has no role to play in this case and, instead, the categorical approach is applicable. Under the categorical approach, petitioner's grand larceny conviction does not constitute an aggravated felony under the INA. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, reversed the BIA's ruling otherwise, and remanded with instructions to vacate petitioner's order of removal. View "Omargharib v. Holder" on Justia Law