Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, born in El Salvador, applied for special rule cancellation of removal under section 203 of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2160, 2196. Petitioner subsequently sought review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal of the IJ's adverse credibility determination and denial of relief. The BIA determined that petitioner's admitted participation in a civil patrol, coupled with the government's evidence of human rights violations that occurred during the time and in the place that petitioner patrolled, was sufficient to trigger his burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the persecutor bar did not apply. The court held that the record contained evidence sufficient to trigger petitioner's burden, and the court agreed with the BIA and the IJ that petitioner did not meet his burden. Therefore, the court denied the petition for review. View "Pastora v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a native and citizen of India, sought review of USCIS's denial of her application for naturalization. The district court granted summary judgment to USCIS finding that plaintiff was ineligible for naturalization because she had not been lawfully admitted for permanent residence, and that she failed to demonstrate good moral character. The court found that plaintiff failed to show that she was legally entitled to the grant of the LPR status she received and concluded that she was not lawfully admitted for permanent residence. Therefore, plaintiff was ineligible for naturalization and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on this ground. Accordingly, the court affirmed as to that portion of the district court's judgment. Because a failure to satisfy any one of the statutory prerequisites rendered an applicant ineligible for naturalization, the district court's finding of moral character was not essential to its grant of summary judgment. Accordingly, the court vacated that portion of the district court's judgment addressing plaintiff's good moral character. View "Injeti v. USCIS" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of China, petitioned for review of the BIA's order dismissing her appeal from the IJ's order finding her ineligible for asylum, withholding of removal, or deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The IJ determined that petitioner's testimony was not credible and that she had not provided sufficient evidence to prove that she was the victim of a forced abortion. The BIA agreed with the IJ's decision in all pertinent parts. The court concluded that the agency's finding was supported by substantial evidence and was not manifestly contrary to law. Therefore, the court affirmed the denial of petitioner's claim for asylum and for protection under the CAT. Petitioner also failed to meet the more stringent burden of proof required to qualify for withholding of removal. Further, the court concluded that petitioner's argument, that her due process rights were violated by the IJ's decision allowing the government to submit supplemental evidence after the merits hearing, was without merit. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Lin v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of India, petitioned for review of the BIA's order affirming the IJ's order of removal. Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident (LPR), was deemed an inadmissible arriving alien upon his return from a 17-day overseas trip. At issue was whether 8 U.S.C. 1101, as amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), still allowed for the case-by-case analysis of an alien's intent under Rosenberg v. Fleuti when determining whether the alien was "seeking an admission" for purposes of removal proceedings. Under Fleuti, LPRs were permitted to take "innocent, casual, and brief" trips abroad without having to seek readmission. The court joined its sister circuits and held that, based on the plain text of the statute, the Fleuti doctrine did not survive IIRIRA's enactment. Accordingly, upon petitioner's entry into the country from India, he was "seeking admission into the United States" and was subject to removal because of his criminal history. The court reached the same result pursuant to principles of administrative deference under Chevron. The court rejected petitioner's remaining claims and denied the petition for review. View "Othi v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, an Estonian-born citizen of Russia, petitioned for review of the BIA's order denying her untimely motion to reopen removal proceedings. The court held that when a petitioner failed to meet the statutory deadline to file a motion to reopen her immigration case, equitable tolling was appropriate only when (1) the Government's wrongful conduct prevented the petitioner from filing a timely motion; or (2) extraordinary circumstances beyond the petitioner's control made it impossible. In this case, petitioner simply misunderstood the accurate, but limited, advice given by a USCIS officer and then ignored two warnings from her attorney that she needed to file a motion to reopen her immigration case within the statutory time limit. Accordingly, petitioner failed to satisfy either criteria for equitable tolling and the court denied the petition for review. View "Kuusk v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the BIA's order denying his application for cancellation of removal on the ground that he failed to meet the continuous physical presence requirement of 8 U.S.C. 1229b. The BIA has held that, pursuant to In re Romalez-Alcaide, an alien's continuous physical presence terminated when he voluntarily departed the United States under threat of removal. The court concluded that, in light of the fact that section 1229b was silent as to whether an alien's voluntary departure under threat of removal terminated his continuous physical presence in the country, the BIA's interpretation of the statute was reasonable. The court concluded that petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving that he was eligible for relief and denied the petition for review. View "Garcia v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the Board, the County Sheriff, and two deputy sheriffs, alleging that the deputies violated her Fourth Amendment rights when, after questioning her at her workplace, they arrested her on an outstanding civil warrant for removal issued by ICE. The court concluded that the deputies did not seize plaintiff until one of the two deputies gestured for her to remain seated while they verified that the immigration warrant was active; the civil immigration warrant did not provide the deputies with a basis to arrest or even briefly detain plaintiff; the individual defendants were immune from suit because at the time of the encounter neither the Supreme Court nor the court had clearly established that local and state law enforcement officers could not detain or arrest an individual based on a civil immigration warrant; and qualified immunity did not extend to municipal defendants. Therefore, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Santos v. Frederick County Board" on Justia Law

In this pre-enforcement challenge to a package of immigration laws known as Act 69, the district court preliminarily enjoined certain sections of the Act on preemption grounds. On the merits, the court concluded that the district court was correct to enjoin Sections 4(A) and (C) because they criminalized actions that Congress has, as a policy choice, decided were a civil matter. The court also concluded that Sections 4(B) and (D) created an obstacle to the smooth functioning of federal immigration law, improperly placed in the hands of state officials the nation's immigration policy, and stripped federal officials of the authority and discretion necessary in managing foreign affairs. Accordingly, the court concluded that these sections, along with Sections 5 and 6(B)(2), were all preempted by federal law and, therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction. View "United States v. State of South Carolina" on Justia Law

Defendant, a citizen of El Salvador, pled guilty to possession of a concealed dangerous weapon and possession of marijuana in 2004, in violation of Maryland law. In 2008, defendant was found guilty of driving without a valid license. Two years later, defendant pled guilty to assault in the second degree and was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement shortly after sentencing. In 2011, defendant pled guilty to unlawful reentry after removal. The parties disputed whether defendant's 2004 probation-before-judgment disposition triggered a four-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(D). The court held that diversionary dispositions arising from guilty pleas - including defendant's probation before judgment disposition at issue here - constituted predicate convictions under section 2L1.2(b)(1)(D). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Medina" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Afghanistan, petitioned for review of the BIA's final order of removal, contending that the BIA erred when it ruled that his Maryland second-degree assault conviction was for a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16, and thus an "aggravated felony" under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F) that triggered his removability. The court concluded that the Attorney General failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that petitioner's assault conviction necessarily rested on facts identifying his second-degree assault offense as a type of assault that qualified as a crime of violence. Consequently, the Attorney General had not met his burden of proving petitioner's removability as an aggravated felon. Therefore, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA's order of removal, and remanded to the BIA with instructions to reinstate petitioner's asylee status. View "Karimi v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law