Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant Temitope Akinsade appealed a district court's denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, claiming that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when he plead guilty to embezzlement by a bank employee. Appellant is a Nigerian citizen who legally came to America in July 1988 at the age of seven and became a lawful permanent resident in May 2000. During his employment, Appellant cashed checks for several neighborhood acquaintances, who were not listed as payees on the checks, and deposited a portion of the proceeds from those checks into his own account. When interviewed by the FBI several months later, Appellant agreed to cooperate against the individuals for whom he cashed the checks. In early 2000, Appellant was charged with embezzlement by a bank employee. Relying on his attorney's advice that one count of embezzlement was not a deportable offense, Appellant pled guilty. The plea agreement made no mention that deportation was mandatory or even possible due to the offense. The district court sentenced Appellant to one month of imprisonment to be served in community confinement, a three-year term of supervised release, and a special assessment of $100. At sentencing, the district court recognized that Appellant's conduct was "out of character" based on his family background. The court thus gave Appellant the minimum sentence under the sentencing guidelines. Almost nine years after Appellant's conviction, immigration authorities arrested him at home and placed him in detention in Batavia, New York. After seventeen months in detention, the immigration authorities released Appellant and charged him with removability as an aggravated felon. The court held that while counsel's affirmative misrepresentations rendered his assistance constitutionally deficient under the first prong of "Strickland v. Washington," (466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)), Appellant was not prejudiced as required under Strickland's second prong. It reasoned that its admonishment of the potential for deportation during the plea colloquy cured counsel's affirmative misrepresentations. The issue before the Fourth Circuit was whether counsel's misadvice was an error of the "most fundamental character" such that coram nobis relief is required to "achieve justice." Upon review, the Court found that counsel's affirmative misrepresentations that the crime at issue was non-deportable prejudiced Akinsade. Accordingly, the Court granted the petition for writ of error coram nobis and vacated Appellant's conviction. View "United States v. Akinsade" on Justia Law

After pleading guilty to illegal reentry, Defendant Francisco Bonilla received an enhanced sentence based on a prior Texas conviction for burglary of a habitation. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in applying the enhancement because his state conviction under Texas Penal Code section 30.02(a)(3) did not satisfy the definition of generic burglary under "Taylor v. United States," (495 U.S. 575 (1990)). Upon review, the Fourth Circuit disagreed and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Bonilla" on Justia Law

Defendant, a citizen of Somalia, was convicted of unlawful wounding and grand larceny. 8 U.S.C. 1226(c) required the mandatory federal detention, without the possibility of bond, of certain deportable criminal aliens "when" those aliens were released from other custody. At issue was whether, as the district court held, defendant, a deportable criminal alien who was not immediately taken into federal custody upon his release from other custody, was exempt from section 1226(c)'s mandatory detention provision and therefore was entitled to a bond hearing. The court held that the BIA's interpretation of section 1226(c) in In re Rojas was reasonable, and must be afforded deference. Moreover, the Government's supposed failure to comply with a statutory immediacy requirement - when the statute did not specify a consequence for such noncompliance - did not bestow a windfall upon criminal aliens. Therefore, defendant remained subject to mandatory detention. View "Hosh v. Lucero" on Justia Law

Based on petitioner's conviction for an aggravated felony, the United States sought to remove him. The IJ denied petitioner's statutorily eligibility for a waiver of inadmissibility and the BIA affirmed, concluding that petitioner's post-entry adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident constituted an "admission" to the United States. Because the court found that the plain language of section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(h), did not bar an alien who adjusted post-entry to lawful permanent resident status from seeking a waiver of inadmissibility, the court granted the petition, vacated the order of removal, and remanded the case to the BIA for further proceedings. View "Bracamontes v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of falsely representing himself to be a U.S. citizen in violation of 18 U.S.C. 911 and of committing identity theft in relation to a false claim of U.S. citizenship in violation of 19 U.S.C. 1028A. At issue was what could constitute a claim of citizenship under section 911. The court held that the "cumulative context" provided a substantial foundation for the jury's conclusion of willful misrepresentation and the jury's verdict was consistent with decisions in other circuits that required a direct claim of U.S. citizenship to sustain a conviction under section 911. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Castillo-Pena" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions for willfully and knowingly making a false statement on a passport application after he prepared, signed, and submitted passport applications for his three stepsons and listed himself as the children's father. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that the Bronston literal truth defense did not entitle defendant to judgment as a matter of law; in the context of an application for a United States passport, the word "father" was not fundamentally ambiguous; the evidence was sufficient to find that defendant understood the inquiry made by the passport application as the Government itself did and answered the question posed falsely; and the district court did not err in refusing to give defendant's proposed instruction regarding the lack of statutory definition of the word "father." Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Sarwari" on Justia Law

Defendant sought relief from a sentence of 240 months in prison, imposed as a result of his illegal reentry into the United States after being removed for a conviction of an aggravated felony. On appeal, defendant raised several procedural challenges to the sentence. The court held that the sentencing court committed no procedural error because the Guidelines did not expressly prohibit the triple counting of defendant's prior record; the court did not impermissibly count defendant's extensive criminal record when it imposed the upward variance justified under the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors; the district court's upward departures were not procedurally defective; and the 240 month sentence was substantively reasonable. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Rivera-Santana" on Justia Law

Plaintiff's application for naturalization was denied by USCIS when USCIS determined that plaintiff's 2002 conviction in the District of Columbia Superior Court for distribution of cocaine in a drug-free zone qualified as an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101, which prevented plaintiff from establishing his good moral character and thus obtaining citizenship. Plaintiff contended that because his 2002 conviction was set aside under D.C. law, it had no operative effect and USCIS should not have considered it. The court held that plaintiff's conviction remained unchanged for immigration purposes despite the fact that the conviction was set aside on rehabilitative grounds. Because plaintiff's conviction was an absolute bar on obtaining citizenship, his naturalization application was properly denied. View "Phan v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of El Salvador who had been granted LPR status, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision to dismiss his appeal from an IJ's decision classifying him as an alien subject to removal under section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). The order of removal was based upon the IJ's determination that petitioner previously had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Because the court concluded that the moral turpitude provision of the INA was not ambiguous and did not contain any gap requiring agency clarification, the court held that the procedural framework established in Matter of Silva-Trevino was not an authorized exercise of the Attorney General's authority. Accordingly, the court granted the petition and vacated the BIA's decision and the order providing for petitioner's removal. View "Prudencio v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Ghana-born Petitioner James Turkson asked an immigration judge (IJ) to defer his removal from the United States because he believed that he would be tortured if returned to his native Ghana. The IJ ruled that Petitioner would likely face torture in Ghana, and therefore deferred his removal. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appealed the IJ's ruling. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals reviewed all aspects of the IJ's decision, but erred in its review of the IJ's factual findings: the BIA reviewed the case under the de novo standard of review instead of under the "clearly erroneous standard" prescribed by its governing regulations. The Fourth Circuit therefore granted Petitioner's petition for review, vacated the BIA's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Turkson v. Holder" on Justia Law