Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case involved a widow's claim for survivors' benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), 30 U.S.C. 901-944, as amended by the the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, Section 1556, 124 Stat. 119, 260. The PPACA amendments revived Section 422(l) of the BLBA, 30 U.S.C. 932(l), which provided that an eligible survivor of a miner who was receiving benefits at the time of his death was automatically entitled to survivors' benefits without having to establish that the miner's death was due to pneumoconiosis. Relying on an amended section 932(l), the Benefits Review Board, ruled that the miner's widow was entitled to survivors' benefits. On appeal, petitioner raised a variety of constitutional and statutory challenges to the PPACA's restoration provision. The court held that because retroactive application of amended Section 932(l) was hardly arbitrary or irrational, petitioner's substantive due process argument was unavailing. Because amended Section 932(l) merely required petitioner to pay money - and thus did not infringe a specific, identifiable property interest - the Takings Clause was not applicable. The court also held that the miner's widow was derivatively entitled to survivors' benefits pursuant to Section 932(l). Finally, because petitioner made its contention, that 30 U.S.C. 901, 921(a), and 922(a)(2) prevented the miner's widow from receiving automatic survivors' benefits, for the first time at oral argument, the court held that it was waived. Accordingly, the judgment of the Board was affirmed. View "West Virginia CWP Fund v. Stacy" on Justia Law

Plaintiff applied for Social Security disability insurance benefits and an ALJ denied the claim, noting that plaintiff failed to provide an opinion from his treating physician. When plaintiff requested review of his claim by the Appeals Council, he submitted a letter from his treating physician detailing the injuries and recommending significant restrictions on plaintiff's activity. The Appeals Council made this letter part of the record but denied plaintiff's request for review. Thus, the ALJ's decision denying benefits became the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. Plaintiff appealed, contending that the Appeals Council erred by failing to articulate specific findings justifying its denial of his request for review. The court rejected the argument and held that the Appeals Council need not explain its reasoning when denying review of an ALJ decision. But because in this case the court could not determine if substantial evidence supported the denial of benefits, the court reversed and remanded.

Plaintiffs, 72 Iraqis who were seized in Iraq by the U.S. military and detained at various locations throughout Iraq, commenced this action against L-3 Services, a military contractor, alleging that L-3 Services' employees and military personnel conspired among themselves and with others to torture and abuse them while they were detained and to cover up that conduct. L-3 Services filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on numerous grounds and the district court denied the motion. The court reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss this case for the reasons given in Al-Shimari v. CACI International. The court held that plaintiffs' state law claims were preempted by federal law and displaced by it, as articulated in Saleh v. Titan Corp.

Plaintiffs, four Iraqi citizens, who were seized by the U.S. military in the Iraq war zone and detained by the military in Abu Ghraib prison, near Baghdad, commenced this tort action against a civilian contractor retained by the military to assist it at the prison in conducting interrogations for the purpose of obtaining intelligence. Plaintiffs alleged that while they were detained, the contractor's employees and military personnel conspired among themselves and with others to torture and abuse them and to cover up that conduct. The contractor filed a motion to dismiss on numerous grounds and the district court denied the motion. On appeal, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case. The court held that the plaintiffs' state law claims were preempted by federal law and displaced by it, as articulated in Saleh v. Titan Corp.

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's dismissal of his negligence action against defendant where plaintiff alleged that his injuries were proximately caused by the negligence of defendant, a private contractor of the Army. The district court dismissed plaintiff's negligence claim because it was barred by the political question doctrine, or in the alternative, preempted by the combat activities exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq. The court affirmed the judgment on the basis that an adjudication of plaintiff's claim against defendant would necessarily implicate a political question, where the court would be obliged to evaluate military decisions in a combat theatre, which the federal courts lacked jurisdiction to decide. Accordingly, the court did not reach the FTCA preemption issue and vacated that aspect of the district court's opinion.

Appellants filed a class action, alleging that defendant, a chemical manufacturer, sold thiodiglycol (TDG) to Saddam Hussein's Iraqi regime, which then used it to manufacture mustard gas to kill Kurdish enclaves in northern Iraq during the late 1980's. At issue was whether appellants have alleged viable claims under the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), 28 U.S.C. 1350, or the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. 1350. The court held that the TVPA excluded corporations from liability. The court also held that the ATS imposed liability for aiding and abetting violations of international law, but only if the attendant conduct was purposeful. Appellants, however, have failed to plead facts sufficient to support the intent element of their ATS claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).

Plaintiffs, citizens and residents of China, alleged that they were injured by melamine-contaminated infant formula in China. Defendant, among others, manufactured and distributed the contaminated products exclusively to China. At issue was the district court's forum non conveniens dismissal. The court held that defendant carried its burden and showed that plaintiffs could obtain a remedy for their injuries either from the Chinese courts or a fund established by the Chinese government to compensate the children and families affected by contaminated infant formula (the Fund). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that China was an adequate alternative forum and the district court did not err by weighing the public and private interest factors, finding that China was a more convenient forum in which to adjudicate the dispute. Accordingly, the district court's forum non conveniens dismissal was not an abuse of discretion.

Petitioner appealed the decision of the U.S. Department of Labor's Benefits Review Board (BRB) affirming an ALJ's award of disability benefits, two hearing aids, and attorney's fees to respondent pursuant to the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. 901-950. Plaintiff contended that the ALJ contravened Supreme Court precedent by failing to adhere to the burden of proof as established in Director, OWCP v. Greenwich Collieries. The court agreed with plaintiff and reversed the BRB's decision, holding that the BRB committed a clear error of law when it affirmed the ALJ's decision and order, relying on its own precedent rather than the controlling law set forth in Greenwich Collieries.

In this appeal, accounting firm Bryan Brothers sought coverage under a professional liability insurance policy issued by Continental Casualty Company for liability arising from illegal acts of a former Bryan Brother's employee. Under the policy, it was a condition precedent to coverage that no insured had knowledge, prior to the inception of the policy, of an act that was reasonably likely to become the basis for a claim. The court held that because Bryan Brothers had such knowledge, the claims at issue were not covered. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Continental Casualty Company.

An officer shot an unarmed man wanted for failure to pay child support, when he started running away. In an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the parties stipulated that the officer intended to use his Taser rather than his gun. The district court granted him summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The Fourth Circuit reversed, analyzing the shooting as a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment and applying an objective standard of reasonableness. The use of force could be viewed by a jury as objectively unreasonable. The officer knew he carried his Taser in the holster on his thigh, about a foot lower than the holster on his hip; he knew that the gun weighed twice what the Taser weighed; and he knew that the Taser had a thumb safety that the gun did not have. The shooting was not a split-second decision; well-established precedent prohibits shooting suspects who pose no significant threat of death or serious physical threat. A reasonable jury could also find that the officer was grossly negligent and not protected by the Maryland Tort Claims Act, Md. Code State Govt, 12-101.