Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The district court held Early Education in contempt and awarded Rainbow School $60,000, plus attorney's fees and costs, after Early Education violated the terms of a consent judgment and permanent injunction. The Fourth Circuit affirmed and held that the district court did not clearly err in finding multiple violations of the injunction; Early Education's violations harmed the Rainbow School; and the district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding damages and attorney's fees and costs. The court dismissed Early Education's appeal from the order requiring it to undergo an audit based on lack of appellate jurisdiction. The court held that the question of whether Early Education should initially pay for an audit was neither inextricably linked nor a necessary precursor to the issues presented in the appeal from the district court's prior order, which made a determination of contempt and had nothing to do with paying for an audit. View "Rainbow School, Inc. v. Rainbow Early Education Holding LLC" on Justia Law

The district court held Early Education in contempt and awarded Rainbow School $60,000, plus attorney's fees and costs, after Early Education violated the terms of a consent judgment and permanent injunction. The Fourth Circuit affirmed and held that the district court did not clearly err in finding multiple violations of the injunction; Early Education's violations harmed the Rainbow School; and the district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding damages and attorney's fees and costs. The court dismissed Early Education's appeal from the order requiring it to undergo an audit based on lack of appellate jurisdiction. The court held that the question of whether Early Education should initially pay for an audit was neither inextricably linked nor a necessary precursor to the issues presented in the appeal from the district court's prior order, which made a determination of contempt and had nothing to do with paying for an audit. View "Rainbow School, Inc. v. Rainbow Early Education Holding LLC" on Justia Law

BMG filed suit against Cox, alleging copyright infringement, seeking to hold Cox contributorily liable for infringement of BMG's copyrights by subscribers to Cox's Internet service. On appeal, Cox argued that the district court erred in denying it the safe harbor defense and incorrectly instructed the jury. The Fifth Circuit held that Cox was not entitled to the safe harbor defense under section 512(a) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 17 U.S.C. 512(a), because it failed to implement its policy in any consistent or meaningful way. The court held that the district court did erred in charging the jury as to the intent necessary to prove contributory infringement. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "BMG Rights Management v. Cox Communications" on Justia Law

This case arose out of competition in the market for software used to manage and analyze large and complex datasets. SAS filed suit against WPL, alleging that WPL breached a license agreement for SAS software and violated copyrights on that software. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment finding WPL liable for beach of the license agreement, holding that the contractual terms at issue were unambiguous and that SAS has shown that WPL violated those terms. The court vacated the portion of the district court's ruling on the copyright claim and remanded with instructions to dismiss it as moot. View "SAS Institute, Inc. v. World Programming Ltd." on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Agadir in Grayson O's trademark and unfair competition action. Grayson O sells products designed to protect hair from heat during styling, and owns a federal trademark registration for the mark "F 450." The Fourth Circuit found that Grayson O's mark was both conceptually and commercially weak; even if "450" was a separable, dominant part of Grayson O's mark, given the many other differences between Grayson O's and Agadir's marks, the district court correctly concluded that the marks were not similar; Grayson O failed to demonstrate that Agadir had an intent to infringe; and Grayson O failed to present evidence of actual confusion. View "Grayson O Company v. Agadir International" on Justia Law

HPA filed suit against Lessard, Clark, Penrose, and Northwestern, alleging that the design, development, ownership, and construction of Two Park Crest, an apartment building in McLean, Virginia, infringed HPA’s architectural copyright embodied in Grant Park, a condominium building in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants, primarily because no reasonable jury could find that the Grant Park and Two Park Crest designs are substantially similar. The court concluded that the district court did not err in considering expert reports where the reports were were sworn to in declarations; at bottom, HPA failed to carry its burden of identifying a specific similarity between the Two Park Crest design and the protected elements of its Grant Park design; because HPA failed to present nonconclusory evidence that the designs are extrinsically similar, the court rejected HPA’s claim that the district court failed to credit its extrinsic-similarity evidence; and the court rejected HPA's claims that the district court misapplied relevant copyright law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Humphreys & Partners Architects v. Lessard Design, Inc." on Justia Law

DRI filed suit against LIA and Ashley under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), alleging that an advertisement placed in a trade magazine by Ashley, and two statements made by the director of LIA's research laboratory, which ran in articles in the same publication, were false and misleading. On appeal, DRI challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment for LIA and Ashley on DRI's false advertising claim. The court agreed with the district court that DRI failed to substantiate a claim that the Ashley Ad is either literally false or impliedly false; that DRI failed to provide sufficient support for a false advertising claim with respect to the director’s statement in the Gunin Article; and that DRI failed to provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the director's statement in the Andrews Article was a false or misleading representation of fact. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Design Resources, Inc. v. Leather Indus." on Justia Law

Devin Copeland, a musician, filed suit under the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. 101 et seq., against Justin Bieber and Usher Raymond IV, alleging that three recorded songs by defendants, each titled "Somebody to Love," infringe upon Copeland's copyright over his own, earlier song of the same name. On appeal, Copeland challenged the dismissal of his claim. The district court concluded that no reasonable jury could find that Copeland's song and defendants' songs sufficiently similar to give rise to liability for infringement. At issue was whether the songs at issue, assessed from the perspective of the intended audience - here, the general public - and taking into account their “total concept and feel,” are sufficiently intrinsically similar to give rise to a valid infringement claim. After listening to the Copeland song and the Bieber and Usher songs as wholes, the court concluded that their choruses are similar enough and also significant enough that a reasonable jury could find the songs intrinsically similar. Further, the choruses of the Copeland song and the Bieber and Usher songs are sufficiently important to the songs’ overall effect that they may be the basis for a finding of intrinsic similarity. The court declined to reach Copeland’s other arguments. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Copeland v. Bieber" on Justia Law

McAirlaids filed suit against Kimberly-Clark for trade-dress infringement and unfair competition under section 32(1)(a) and 43(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 15 U.S.C. 1114(1)(a) and 1125(a), and Virginia law. McAirlaids produces "airlaid," a textile-like material composed of cellulose fiber. McAirlaids fuses shredded cellulose fiber ("fluff pulp") through a patented embossing process that produces a "pixel" pattern for its absorbent products. McAirlaids filed suit against Kimberly-Clark after Kimberly-Clark began using a similar dot pattern on its GoodNites bed mates, an absorbent product manufactured in a manner different from McAirlaid's pads. On appeal, McAirlaids appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Kimberly-Clark. The court concluded that McAirlaids has presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding the functionality of its pixel-pattern. In particular, deciding whether McAirlaid's embossing pattern affects the quality of its pads requires weighing evidence and making credibility determinations. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "McAirlaids, Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp." on Justia Law

Swatch is the owner of three U.S. registrations for the mark SWATCH and for materials bearing that mark. Beehive produces and sells watch bands and faces under the mark SWAP. On appeal, Swatch challenged the district court's denial of its opposition to Beehive's trademark application and dismissal of its related claims for federal, state, and common law trademark infringement, trademark dilution, and unfair competition. The district court held that the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board's (TTAB) determinations were supported by substantial evidence; found facts based on evidence not presented to the TTAB under its authority under 15 U.S.C. 1071(b)(3); concluded that there was no likelihood of confusion between the two marks and likelihood that SWAP would dilute SWATCH; dismissed Swatch's infringement and unfair competition claims as a matter of law; and concluded that Beehive's mark was registrable because it was not merely descriptive. The court concluded that the district court properly reviewed Swatch's dilution-by-blurring claim entirely de novo; the district court also decided Swatch's trademark infringement and unfair competition claims, which were not before the TTAB, de novo; and, although the district court stated that it would apply an impermissible hybrid review to its likelihood of confusion and strength-of-the-mark analyses, there were more than sufficient facts recited in its opinion to support its findings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Swatch AG v. Beehive Wholesale, LLC" on Justia Law