Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2013, Smith began working with DEA as a subcontractor in the geospatial intelligence program. Smith has a disability that adversely affects her mobility; she was granted accommodations. In 2015, Smith was authorized to work remotely 50 percent of the time. Through 2017, Smith received positive performance reviews. Smith’s position did not change in 2016 when CRSA became the prime contractor. In 2017, Quinn, DEA’s Acting Deputy Assistant Administrator became dissatisfied when Smith was unable to answer questions about the Program. Quinn directed that Smith begin reporting to DEA headquarters. Smith lobbied to maintain her remote work arrangement. DEA officials did not respond to Smith’s request but, because of parking and transportation problems, Smith intermittently continued to work remotely despite notification that she was not authorized to do so. DEA concluded it could not grant the request; the CSRA contract did not expressly provide for remote work and DEA’s building lease limited the issuance of parking passes to employees. DEA alleges that it developed concerns about Smith’s technical skills and performance.DEA officials retrieved the equipment that supported Smith’s remote access and revoked Smith’s security clearance. CSRA terminated the Consultant Agreement. Smith sued, alleging disability discrimination and retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 791, against DEA, and violations of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12101, against CSRA. The district court rejected the claims on summary judgment.The Fourth Circuit affirmed as to Smith’s disability discrimination claim but vacated as to her retaliation claim. Smith was an independent contractor and not a CSRA employee. DEA was not required to offer Smith a remote work accommodation and its failure to do so was not a refusal to accommodate but Smith established a prima facie case of retaliation. View "Smith v. CSRA, Inc." on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's order denying plaintiff's motion seeking to recover reasonable attorney's fees, costs, and expenses from Montgomery County. Plaintiff's case stems from her action against the county for failure to reasonably accommodate her disability. The district court held that plaintiff is not eligible for such an award because she is not a "prevailing party" under 29 U.S.C. 794a(b).In this case, plaintiff won a jury verdict that found the county liable for discrimination and entitled plaintiff to equitable relief—at least until the county capitulated by transferring her to a call center called MC 311. The court thought that this case is more like Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970), and concluded that plaintiff is not a prevailing party because she catalyzed the county to change its behavior by filing a lawsuit; rather, she is a prevailing party because she proved her claim to a jury before the county capitulated by transferring her to MC 311. The court noted that its holding is narrow, and that it would be unjust to hold that plaintiff did not prevail simply because the county's timely capitulation rendered unnecessary equitable relief that she would have otherwise been entitled to. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Reyazuddin v. Montgomery County, Maryland" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against FCI and its owners, alleging claims under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The district court entered judgment on the WARN Act claim in favor of plaintiffs and on the FLSA claim in favor of FCI. While FCI's appeal was pending, plaintiffs sought to dismiss the appeal because FCI had failed to post the appeal bond ordered by the district court.The Fourth Circuit declined to exercise its discretion to dismiss the appeal after considering the facial invalidity of the bond and prejudice to the parties. On the merits, the court concluded that the district court erred in determining that FCI was an "employer" covered by the WARN Act. The court explained that FCI employed fewer than 100 employees on August 6, 2018, and is therefore not an "employer" whose shutdown activities are covered by the WARN Act. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment on the WARN Act claim. View "Schmidt v. FCI Enterprises LLC" on Justia Law

Tecnocap petitioned for review of the Board's decision affirming an ALJ's finding that the company engaged in several unfair labor practices in violation of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The Board cross-petitioned for enforcement of the order.The Fourth Circuit denied the petition for review and granted the cross-petition for enforcement as to the partial implementation of the last, best and final offer without reaching a good faith impasse and locking out union members in support of a demand that was a permissive subject of bargaining; granted the petition for review and denied the cross-petition for enforcement as to direct dealing; denied the petition for review and granted the cross-petition for enforcement as to Tecnocap's discouragement of union membership in how it undertook the lockout; and remanded for the Board to determine the effect the court's limited grounds for enforcing its order has on the remedies it ordered and for entry of a remedial order that is consistent with the court's decision. View "Tecnocap, LLC v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit held that "job sharing" a single full-time position with a willing partner does not qualify as a reasonable accommodation that an employer must provide under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The court explained that, if the job share in question did not exist at the time it was proposed as an accommodation, the ADA does not require the employer to create the new position to accommodate a disabled employee.In this case, the court concluded that providing plaintiff with the job share position with another employee was not a reasonable accommodation required by the ADA—not because the position was not "vacant" but because the position she sought did not exist. Therefore, summary judgment should have been granted to Sanofi on plaintiff's failure-to-accommodate claim on this ground. Furthermore, because plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence of a reasonable accommodation, Sanofi cannot separately be liable for failing to engage in the interactive process. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Sanofi. View "Perdue v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC" on Justia Law

After plaintiff, a York County Sheriff's Office (YCSO) employee, disclosed confidential information about an ongoing investigation into an inmate's death to his wife, who worked at a local news station, and then lied to internal investigators about the disclosure, defendant terminated plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff filed suit against defendant under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that he was fired in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights. The district court ruled in favor of plaintiff, but the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded. On remand, the district court concluded that plaintiff's speech was not protected speech after applying the proper standard. The district court found the speech in question caused a reasonable apprehension of disruption in the YCSO and that defendant's interest in avoiding such a disruption outweighed plaintiff's circumstantially diminished First Amendment interest. Plaintiff appealed, challenging the district court's balancing of the parties' interests.The Fourth Circuit afforded diminished weight to plaintiff's First Amendment interest and concluded that it was outweighed by defendant's reasonable apprehension of disruption. In this case, plaintiff acted on limited and unconfirmed information when disclosing confidential details, and did so knowing that an investigation into the incident was underway, making no effort whatsoever to proceed through the chain of command or any law enforcement channel. Furthermore, the record reveals a reasonable apprehension of disruption in the YCSO, particularly considering plaintiff's speech propelled a frenzy of media attention about unconfirmed facts related to the inmate's death. The court explained that the disruption ballooned into separate internal investigation into the unauthorized disclosure, undercutting manpower and resources to continue the ongoing investigation into the incident. Accordingly, plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim failed and the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Billioni v. Bryant" on Justia Law

Industrial hired Roberts as a diver’s assistant. Roberts received and acknowledged the company handbook, which included a policy, requiring that all complaints of sexual harassment be reported to the CEO, Glenn. Roberts’ supervisor, Rhyner repeatedly called Roberts “gay,” made sexually explicit and derogatory remarks toward him, and physically assaulted Roberts at least twice. Roberts complained to Rhyner’s supervisor, to another supervisor, Neal, who witnessed some of Rhyner’s conduct, and to the company’s Human Resources Manager (wife of the CEO) but did not complain directly to Glenn. Rhyner was not disciplined or counseled; the harassment continued. Roberts was involved in a work-related accident in which he suffered burns. Later, Roberts was on an assignment when Neal removed him from the site for being “disruptive and acting erratic,” working in the wrong area, and wearing earbuds. Glenn contends that he terminated Roberts based on the two safety incidents.Roberts sued, alleging same-sex sexual harassment and retaliation under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000(e). The Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the company on Roberts’ retaliation claim, but vacated summary judgment on his sexual harassment claim. A plaintiff may prove same-sex harassment where the plaintiff was perceived as not conforming to traditional male stereotypes. A reasonable jury could conclude that Roberts was subjected to conduct based on his sex and that the conduct was unwelcome, sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of his employment, and was imputable to Glenn Industrial. Roberts did not establish a causal relationship between his protected activity and his termination. Glenn did not have actual knowledge of Roberts’ complaints and there was a lack of temporal proximity between Roberts’ last complaint and his termination. View "Roberts v. Glenn Industrial Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a whistleblower-retaliation complaint under 42 U.S.C. 5851 after the NRC rejected his applications for promotions. Petitioner is an NRC employee who made disclosures to Congress and the NRC's Inspector General regarding health and safety risks at a nuclear power plant. The ALJ dismissed the case because the United States had not waived sovereign immunity for such whistleblower actions against the NRC, and the ARB affirmed.After determining that it had jurisdiction over the petition, the Fourth Circuit denied the petition for review, agreeing with the ARB that Congress has not waived sovereign immunity for complaints against the NRC. In this case, petitioner failed to make the necessary affirmative showing of waiver with the required unequivocal expression. The court explained that the lesson in its recent decision in Robinson v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 917 F.3d 799 (2019), is that the substantive and remedial provisions of a statute may not be coextensive. The court concluded that there is no doubt that the NRC is bound by the prohibitions of section 5851, but that fact alone is simply insufficient to form the basis of an unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity. View "Peck v. U.S. Department of Labor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, the City of Newport News, alleging that it failed to accommodate his disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Plaintiff alleged that the City concluded that he could not perform the essential functions of his job as a detective and then offered him the options of either retiring early or accepting reassignment to a civilian position he did not want. Plaintiff reluctantly retired.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City, concluding that it is generally inappropriate for an employer to unilaterally reassign a disabled employee to a position the employee does not want when another reasonable accommodation exists that would allow the disabled employee to remain in their current, preferred position. The court clarified that it did not hold that an employer can never reassign an employee when there exists a reasonable accommodation that will keep the employee in their current and preferred position. This broad question was not before the court. Nor should this opinion be read in any way to restrict the ability of employers and employees to agree to a voluntary transfer. Rather, the court simply reiterated that reassignment is strongly disfavored when an employee can still do their current job with the assistance of a reasonable accommodation, and that reassignment should therefore be held "in reserve for unusual circumstances." View "Wirtes v. City of Newport News" on Justia Law

After defendant pleaded guilty to forced labor, in violation of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), the district court sentenced defendant to 120 months' imprisonment and ordered him to pay restitution of roughly $273,000, representing unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation computed under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). In this case, defendant forced the victim to work at his restaurant over 100 hours per week without pay from 2009 to 2014.The Fourth Circuit vacated the award of restitution and concluded that the district court erred in failing to include liquidated damages under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 216(b), for when minimum wages and overtime compensation have not been paid as required, in the restitution award. At bottom, the court concluded that the value of the victim's labor as guaranteed under the minimum wage and overtime guarantees of the FLSA includes liquidated damages provided by the FLSA. The court explained that this fulfills defendant's obligation to compensate the victim for the full amount of the victim's losses, which includes the full value of his labor. Accordingly, the court remanded for recalculation of the restitution award. View "United States v. Edwards" on Justia Law