Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, police officers for the Town of Mocksville, filed suit alleging that the Town and others violated plaintiffs' First Amendment rights when plaintiffs were terminated for speaking out about corruption and misconduct at the Mocksville Police Department. The court concluded that the evidence demonstrated that plaintiffs acted as private citizens on a matter of undisputed public concern by privately reaching out to the Governor's Office about suspected corruption and misconduct. Such actions cannot be considered as part of plaintiffs' daily professional activities. Further, it was clearly established law at the time that speech about serious misconduct in a law enforcement agency is protected. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment to Defendants Cook and Bralley. View "Hunter v. Mocksville, NC" on Justia Law

HI petitioned the BRB's decision upholding the ALJ's grant of Ricky Eason's claim for temporary partial disability under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. 901-950. The court agreed with the Director that the LHWCA’s statutory framework supports his construction of the LHWCA and nothing in Potomac Electric Power Co. [PEPCO] v. Dir., OWCP precludes reclassification of a scheduled permanent partial disability to a temporary total disability. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded to the BRB to enter an order dismissing Eason's claim. View "Huntington Ingalls Indus. v. Eason" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the University under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., for discriminatory termination based on gender, retaliatory termination, and the creation of a hostile work environment. At issue was the effect of the Supreme Court’s decision in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v.Nassar on what Title VII retaliation plaintiffs must show to survive a motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the McDonnell Douglas framework, which already incorporates a but for causation analysis, provides the appropriate standard for reviewing plaintiff’s claim. Applying this framework, the court found that summary judgment in favor of the University is not warranted on plaintiff's retaliation claim where a reasonable jury could conclude from plaintiff's evidence that the University's proffered justifications were not its real reasons for firing her and that the University's actual reason for firing her was to retaliate against her complaining about sexual harassment and for her subsequent complaints of ongoing retaliation. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to plaintiff's retaliation claim. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's gender-based discrimination claim and hostile work environment claim. View "Foster v. Univ. of Maryland Eastern" on Justia Law

In this putative class action, plaintiffs are a class of black steel workers who allege endemic racial discrimination at a South Carolina plant owned by Nucor. At issue was whether the workers have presented a common question of employment discrimination through evidence of racism in the workplace. In light of the Supreme Court's opinion in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the district court on remand refused to certify the class. The court held that the district court has for a second time erred in refusing to certify the workers’ class, where (1) statistics indicate that promotions at Nucor depended in part on whether an individual was black or white; (2) substantial anecdotal evidence suggests discrimination in specific promotions decisions in multiple plant departments; and (3) there is also significant evidence that those promotions decisions were made in the context of a racially hostile work environment. The court concluded that the district court fundamentally misapprehended the reach of Wal-mart and its application to the workers' promotions class. Accordingly, the court vacated in part and remanded for recertification of the class. View "Brown v. Nucor Corp." on Justia Law

Under the “fifteen-year presumption” of the Black Lung Benefits Act, if a claimant has at least fifteen years of underground coal mine employment and a qualifying respiratory or pulmonary disability, a rebuttable presumption arises that he is entitled to benefits. After working for more than twenty-one years in underground coal mines, most recently for Petitioner, Respondent suffered a totally disabling respiratory impairment for purposes of the Act. Respondent filed this claim for benefits under the Act. The administrative law judge (ALJ) reviewing his claim applied the fifteen-year presumption, concluded that Petitioner failed to rebut that presumption, and awarded black lung benefits. The Fourth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review and affirmed the ALJ’s finding that Petitioner had failed to rebut the fifteen-year presumption, holding that the ALJ’s determinations were supported by substantial evidence. View "Hobet Mining, LLC v. Epling" on Justia Law

Page Bender Jr. worked as an underground coal miner for twenty-one years and suffered from a totally disabling respiratory condition. Bender filed a claim for black lung benefits. An administrative law judge (ALJ) applied to Bender’s claim the rebuttable presumption of total disability due to pneumoconiosis, under which the burden shifted to the coal mine operator to disprove Bender’s entitlement to benefits. The ALJ awarded black lung benefits to Bender based on the ALJ’s conclusion that the operator had failed to rebut the presumption by showing that Bender’s pneumoconiosis did not in any way contribute to his disability. The Benefits Review Board affirmed. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the Department of Labor acted within its regulatory authority in requiring the coal mine operator to show, where Bender met the statutory criteria for the presumption, that “no part of the miner’s respiratory or pulmonary total disability was caused by pneumoconiosis”; and (2) the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. View "W. Va. CWP Fund v. Bender" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a deputy clerk at a courthouse in New Hanover County, North Carolina, was assigned to provide customer service at the courthouse front counter. Plaintiff requested to be assigned to a role with less direct interpersonal interaction, believing that her alleged social anxiety disorder hindered her ability to perform her job. Three weeks later, Plaintiff’s employer terminated her. Plaintiff sued her employer, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer. The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred by resolving disputed facts in favor of the movant and improperly resolved factual issues at the summary judgment stage in contravention of well-settled law. Remanded for trial. View "Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts" on Justia Law

The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) operates the Metrorail and Metrobus systems in Washington, D.C., Maryland, and Virginia and employs a police force, the Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD). The Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) is the bargaining agent for MTPD officers. WMATA fired two MTPD officers, but the Board of Arbitration overturned both discharges and ordered WMATA to reinstate the officers. WMATA reinstated the officers, but as a result of their initial terminations, the officers lost the certifications to serve as police officers in Maryland. Consequently, WMATA discharged the officers for a second time. The FOP filed this action in federal court on behalf of each officer, alleging that WMATA failed to comply with the arbitration awards. The district court granted summary judgment for the FOP. The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding (1) WMATA’s decision to terminate the officers for a second time did not violate the earlier arbitration awards; and (2) the officers’ grievances belonged before the Board of Arbitration, not a federal court. View "Fraternal Order of Police v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth." on Justia Law

Freeman, a provider of integrated services for expositions, conventions, and corporate events, performed credit and criminal background check policies on job applicants, which excluded applicants whose histories revealed certain prohibited criteria. The EEOC alleged that these background checks had an unlawful disparate impact on black and male job applicants. The district court granted summary judgment to Freeman after excluding the EEOC's expert testimony as unreliable under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Thus, the EEOC failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, where the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert testimony as unreliable based on the sheer number of mistakes and omissions in the expert's analysis. The court declined to consider whether the district court erred in limiting the time period in which the EEOC could seek relief, as any error in this regard was inconsequential in light of the expert's pervasive errors and utterly unreliable analysis. The court declined to reach any other issues in the district court's opinion. View "EEOC v. Freeman" on Justia Law

After SouthPeak, a video game publishing company, terminated its CFO after she raised concerns about a misstatement on one of the company's filings with the SEC, a jury found that the company and two of its top officers violated the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. 1514A(a). The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the retaliatory discharge claims are subject to the four-year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. 1658(a), and not the two-year limitations period under section 1658(b)(1); the administrative complaint in this case satisfies the exhaustion requirement; and emotional distress damages are available under the statute. The court rejected SouthPeak's claims regarding perceived inconsistencies in the verdict where the district court did not commit any error. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's decision as to attorneys' fees. View "Jones v. Southpeak Interactive Corp." on Justia Law