Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The EEOC filed suit alleging that an employee retirement benefit plan maintained by the County discriminated against employees in the protected age group of 40 years of age and older, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621-634, by requiring them to pay high contribution rates than those paid by younger employees. In this interlocutory appeal, the court held that the district court correctly determined that the County's plan violated the ADEA, because the plan's employee contribution rates were determined by age, rather than by a permissible factor. The court also concluded that the ADEA's "safe harbor provision" applicable to early retirement benefit plans did not shield the County from liability for the alleged discrimination. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's award of summary judgment on the issue of liability and remanded for consideration of damages.View "EEOC v. Baltimore County, Maryland" on Justia Law

Dickenson Coal contested a citation by the Secretary of Labor for violating the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290, by failing to report an injury at one of its mines within ten days of its occurrence. The ALJ awarded summary judgment in the Secretary's favor and the Commission declined to exercise discretionary review of the ALJ's decision. Dickenson Coal petitioned for review. The court concluded that the unambiguous language of 30 C.F.R. 50.20(a) imposed an unconditional duty upon Dickenson Coal to report the injury within ten days. Dickenson Coal was not relieved of this duty when the injured person's employer timely reported the incident. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review.View "Dickenson-Russell Coal Co. v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, active and retired Baltimore police officers and firefighters who participate in a public pension plan, challenged the City's decision changing the manner in which annual increases to pension benefits are calculated. Plaintiffs claimed that the substitution of a cost-of-living adjustment for a "variable benefit" violates the members' rights under the Contract Clause and the Takings Clause. The court concluded that the members' rights under the Contract Clause were not impaired because the members retained a state law remedy for breach of contract. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgment with respect to the City's elimination of the variable benefit. The court affirmed the district court's decision upholding the remaining portions of the ordinance at issue, and vacated the district court's order dismissing the Takings Clause claim. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Cherry, Jr. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City" on Justia Law

The EEOC initiated a lawsuit against Propak more than six and one-half years after a Propak employee filed his discrimination charge. The district court granted Propak's motion for summary judgment. At issue on appeal was whether the district court abused its discretion in ordering that the EEOC pay attorneys' fees to Propak, the prevailing defendant employer. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the EEOC acted unreasonably in initiating this litigation. The court need not address the district court's alternative holding that the EEOC's continued pursuit of the litigation was unreasonable in light of the developing record in the case. The court declined to address the district court's well-reasoned fee calculation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "EEOC v. Propak Logistics, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner sought attorney's fees from Ceres for his purusit of a claim for disability benefits under section 928(a) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. 928(a). The court concluded that section 928(a)'s plain language requires fee-shifting only when an employer has paid no compensation within 30 days of receiving the official claim. In this case, Ceres voluntarily paid petitioner one week's compensation within 30 days of receiving his claim, and thereby admitting to liability for the injury for the purposes of section 928(a). Ceres met the requirement of section 928(a), moving the dispute to section 928(b). Petitioner was entitled to the services of an attorney but, under the LHWCA's fee-shifting scheme, petitioner was not entitled to have that attorney paid for by Ceres. The court held that Ceres's payment of one week's benefits at the maximum compensation rate, being directly tied as it was to petitioner's alleged injury, qualified as "compensation" within the meaning of section 928(a). Finally, the court rejected petitioner's claim that when Ceres filed a notice of controversion prior to the payment at issue, it signaled that it was controverting his claim, and by doing so, irrevocably triggered section 928(a). Accordingly, the court denied the petition View "Lincoln v. DOWCP" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former and current employees, filed suit against Columbia Farms, asserting a claim for the payment of unpaid wages, withheld in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., and the South Carolina Payment of Wages Act (S.C. Wages Act), S.C. Code Ann. 41-10-10 to -110. Plaintiffs also asserted a second claim for retaliation against them for instituting workers' compensation proceedings, in violation of S.C. Code Ann. 41-1-80. The court reversed the jury award on the S.C. Wages Act claims, concluding that those claims were preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 185, and should have been dismissed. As for the retaliation claims under S.C. Code Ann. 41-1-80, the court reversed as to 6 employees because they failed to present evidence satisfying the governing legal standards for recovery under state law. As to the retaliation claims of the remaining two employees, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Barton v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an employee of MTA for four decades, filed suit against MTA alleging various forms of discrimination after her position was terminated due to budget cuts. The court concluded that, because summary judgment was granted before plaintiff had a chance to discover facts essential to her claim, and she alleged discrimination occurring before any legislative activity, the district court's Rule 56(d) denial was an abuse of discretion. The court concluded, however, that the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's age discrimination and disability discrimination claims were barred by sovereign immunity. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "McCray v. Maryland Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

Cobra sought appellate relief from a decision of the Commission temporarily reinstating a coal miner. At issue was whether a Commission decision granting temporary reinstatement to a coal miner was immediately appealable by the coal operator under the collateral order doctrine. The court concluded that the Commission's decision failed to satisfy the requirements of the collateral order doctrine and, therefore, the collateral order doctrine did not permit an interlocutory review of the proceedings. Accordingly, the court dismissed Cobra's petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. View "Cobra Natural Resources, LLC v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Altarum, alleging that Altarum discriminated against him by wrongfully discharging him on account of disability and that Altarum failed to accommodate his disability. Plaintiff was terminated after he injured his legs on a subway platform and was on short-term disability benefits. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal of his wrongful-discharge claim. The court concluded that, under the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, and its implementing regulations, an impairment is not categorically excluded from being a disability simply because it is temporary. In this instance, the impairment alleged by plaintiff fell comfortably within the amended Acts' expanded definition of disability. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Summers v. Altarum Institute, Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Hoschar, filed suit in West Virginia state court against APCO and ICI, seeking damages for an infectious lung disease called histoplasmosis that Mr. Hoschar allegedly contracted while working as a boilermaker at one of APCO's coal-fired power plants. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's denial of their motion to remand the case to state court and the district court's grant of APCO's motion for summary judgment in favor of APCO. The court concluded that APCO has carried its burden of establishing federal subject matter jurisdiction because the record amply demonstrated that the location where APCO's officers direct, control, and coordinate APCO's activities was Columbus, Ohio. The court held that APCO did not have actual or constructive knowledge of a potential histoplasmosis risk, and therefore, APCO did not owe Mr. Hoschar a duty to guard against it. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of APCO. View "Hoschar v. Appalachian Power Co." on Justia Law