Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s new orders on damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs in his suit against American Airlines (“AA”) pursuant to the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act ("USERRA"). Plaintiff challenged the district court’s determination as to the equivalence of the position as the basis for its reassessed damages as well as the methods by which the district court calculated the new costs and fees award.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s award. The court wrote that the sole factual determination before the district court on remand was whether the position AA offered to Plaintiff on October 22 was equivalent to his escalator position as a line pilot. Section 4313(a)(3)(A) instructs that the alternative position must be one the individual is “qualified to perform” and which is “equivalent in seniority, status, and pay.” The court explained that district courts are best positioned to make factual determinations concerning warranted damages and the need for costs and fees.   Here, the court held that Plaintiff’s arguments fail to convince the court of the clear error in the district court’s determination as to the equivalence of the position AA offered. Further, the district court’s total award in attorneys’ fees based on these calculations does not constitute an abuse of discretion. The court employed the proper methodology: It calculated the lodestar by multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably expended, appropriately considering the relevant factors. Ultimately, Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that any aspect of the district court’s fee award determination constitutes an abuse of its broad discretion. View "Thomas Harwood, III v. American Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were fired from their Department of Public Safety positions with the Village of Bald Head Island (“the Village”), a municipality located in Brunswick County, North Carolina. Following their departures, Village employees published Plaintiffs’ termination letters and department separation affidavits which accused Plaintiffs of violating certain employee policy provisions. Plaintiffs filed suit alleging numerous claims. As relevant here, they brought defamation claims under North Carolina state law against the Village;.the Village Town Manager (“Manager”) ; and the Village Director of Public Safety (“Director”). The district court dismissed the defamation claims against the Village but found the Manager and Director liable for defamation for publishing the termination letters and separation affidavits, respectively. Defendants appealed and Plaintiffs cross-appealed as to the dismissal of the Village.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s (1) judgment against the Manager for libel per se arising from publication of the separation affidavits; (2) dismissal of all defamation claims against the Village; (3) denial of leave to amend to add the August 28, 2014 email as a third publication; (4) exclusion of the August 28 email for other purposes; (5) exclusion of Facebook posts; and (6) denial of Plaintiffs’ untimely Rule 59(e) motion seeking prejudgment interest. The court reversed the district court’s judgment against the Manager on all libel claims stemming from the publication of the termination letters for lack of actual malice. Finally, the court denied Plaintiffs’ pending motion, purportedly filed under Rule 60, “for corrections based on clerical mistakes, oversights, and omissions.” View "Thomas Cannon v. Calvin R. Peck, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that his employer, the Alexandria Fire Department, intentionally discriminated against him because of his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq. After Plaintiff saw white colleagues on other Fire Department shifts receive internships before him, he believed that the Fire Department was violating its placement practice and delaying his promotion because he is Black. The Fire Department explained that the first-come, first-served practice is shift-specific. The district court granted Defendant’s summary judgment motion.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling holding that Plaintiff offered no evidence to prove that the Fire Department’s explanation—which is supported by its practice—is pretextual. The court explained that to establish the fourth element of his prima facia case, an inference of unlawful discrimination, Plaintiff claimed that the Fire Department had a practice of placing applicants with the first available field training officer regardless of shift, but the Department placed three later-certified white firefighters into the program ahead of him. However, the Fire Department’s evidence supports its claim that it places interns with training officers on a first-come, first-served basis within each shift. The court found that Plaintiff’s evidence only shows that he misunderstood the Fire Department’s internship placement practice. View "Micheall Lyons v. City of Alexandria" on Justia Law

Defendant operates an acute care facility as well as a vocational and career-training program intended to help individuals facing barriers to employment find jobs. Disabled individuals who complete the program are eligible for job placement, possibly as janitors for Social Security Administration facilities. The Union sought to represent all janitors; however, Defendant objected, claiming that the janitors have a "rehabilitative" relationship and not an employment relationship. The NLRB determined the janitors are statutory employees. After a vote, the Union passed, but Defendant refused to recognize it.The Fourth Circuit held that the Board's determination that the janitors were statutory employees was supported by the evidence. Thus, the NLRB had jurisdiction to certify the Union and, by refusing to acknowledge the Union, Defendant violated labor laws. View "Sinai Hospital of Baltimore, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s decision granting summary judgment to the Acting Secretary of the Navy (the “Navy”) on her employment retaliation claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. Sec 621, (“ADEA”). The district court awarded judgment after concluding that Plaintiff failed to exhaust certain claims because they were not raised in her Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) charge. It also rejected her remaining retaliation claims.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision granting summary judgment to the Acting Secretary of the Navy (“the Navy”). The court first reasoned that Plaintiff’s claims are without merit because she is procedurally barred from pursuing her claims of exclusion from the CPI Team and the Navy’s alleged failure to promote her because she did not raise them at the administrative level.   Further, even if Plaintiff had administratively exhausted her CPI Team and failure-to-promote claims, the court held it would reach the same result because she failed to plead them in her Amended Complaint.  Third, the district court also correctly determined that Plaintiff’s remaining retaliation claim was unsustainable because there is no direct evidence of retaliation as part of her lateral realignment.  Finally, Plaintiff points to only one alleged comment over six years, which did not amount to evidence of “recurring retaliatory animus.” View "Cathy Walton v. Thomas Harker" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former Federal Public Defender, was subject to sexual harassment by a supervisor. After attempting to pursue her administrative remedies, Plaintiff claimed she was constructively discharged and resigned. Plaintiff then filed claims under the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses, as well as under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1985(3) and 1986, against various executive and judicial officers. The district court dismissed all of Plaintiff's claims based on her failure to state a claim and Defendant's sovereign immunity.The panel held that Plaintiff's Due Process claim sufficiently plead a deprivation of her property interests, but failed to plead a deprivation of her liberty interest. The panel also held Plaintiff's Equal Protection claim adequately plead sex discrimination; however, her claims under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1985(3) and 1986 failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Finally, the court determined that Plaintiff could only pursue back-pay benefits from all Defendant's named in their official capacity and that all Defendant's named in their individual capacity were entitled to dismissal under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Thus, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Caryn Strickland v. US" on Justia Law

Former employees of Nationwide Motor Sales Corporation sued the company and its owners (collectively, Nationwide) in district court, alleging fraudulent payment practices that reduced employees’ sales commissions and final paychecks. Nationwide produced its Employee Handbook’s provision requiring arbitration. The employees contended that the arbitration agreement is invalid because Nationwide retains the right to change, delete, or modify the policies. The district court denied Nationwide’s motion to compel arbitration, finding the Arbitration Agreement illusory due to the Modification Clause   Applying Maryland law, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, reasoning that the promise to arbitrate was illusory because, on the agreement’s signature page, the employer retained the right to amend or abolish the agreement without notice to the employees. Further, in reviewing the plain meaning of the Acknowledgement Receipt “as a whole,” it is clear that the Modification Clause applies to the Arbitration Agreement. View "Michael Coady v. Nationwide Motor Sales Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued his former employer, the Maryland Military Department, and related entities, alleging that they discriminated against him on the basis of race in violation of Title VII 42 U.S.C. Sections 2000e to 2000e-17. The district court dismissed Holloway’s complaint for failure to state a claim.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim and reversed the dismissal of his unlawful termination and retaliation claims. The court reasoned that to state a claim for unlawful termination, a Title VII plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to raise a plausible inference that his employer discharged him because of his race. Here, Plaintiff alleged facts crucial to raise the inference of a Title VII violation “above a speculative level.”   Next, Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee “because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under Title VII. The court held that Plaintiff’s claim passes muster at the pleading stage.   However, the court held that Plaintiff failed to state a claim that he was subject to an abusive or hostile work environment based on his race or protected activity. The court rejected Plaintiff’s contention that one episode of yelling and pounding the table is sufficiently severe or pervasive to establish an abusive environment. View "Charles Holloway v. State of Maryland" on Justia Law

AirFacts, Inc. sued a former employee for breaching several provisions of his employment agreement and misappropriating trade secrets. After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of the employee on all counts. On Airfacts first appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed. On remand, the district court found for the employee again. Airfacts filed a second appeal.The Fourth Circuit first held that AirFacts had abandoned all its contract claims except one alleging that defendant breached the employment agreement’s noncompete clause, which the court then rejected. AirFacts argued that defendant misappropriated its trade secrets by taking the flowcharts and proration documents. The circuit court found that defendant breached the employment agreement, but only immaterially because there’s no evidence his conduct harmed or prejudiced AirFacts. Thus, because AirFacts has failed to prove it suffered any harm from the defendant’s breaches, the district court did not err by awarding only nominal damages on these claims. The court further found there is no evidence that the defendant took confidential information with him. Finally, the court remanded the case back to the district court to decide what AirFacts deserves in reasonable royalty damages. View "AirFacts, Inc. v. Diego De Amezaga" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. 1981, alleging that the school board discriminated against him on the basis of race in refusing to hire another teacher in the drama department to assist him with tech work in connection with his staging of student performances or, alternatively, in refusing to provide him with additional compensation for the tech work that he performs. Plaintiff also alleged that the school board discriminated against him on the basis of race when compensating him for his "extra-duty" work in connection with other events at the high school.The Fourth Circuit concluded that plaintiff failed to allege plausibly that the school board's failure to pay him a Theater Technical Director Supplement constituted race-based employment discrimination. While the court agreed that it was error for the district court to consult the School of the Arts' website in determining whether the complaint properly alleged that the School of the Arts was an appropriate comparator, the court concluded that the error was harmless. The court also concluded that no reasonable jury could have returned a verdict for plaintiff on his discrimination claim based on the denial of assistance. Finally, the court agreed with the district court that plaintiff did not provide a valid comparator for purposes of supporting this racial discrimination claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of a portion of the complaint for failing to state a claim. In regard to the remaining claims, the court granted the school board's motion for summary judgment based on plaintiff's failure to present sufficient evidence to support his claims. View "Tabb v. Board of Education of the Durham Public Schools" on Justia Law