Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In a contract dispute between BAE and Korea, BAE sought a declaratory judgment that it had not breached any contractual obligation to Korea and a permanent injunction barring Korea from prosecuting its suit against BAE in Korean courts. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of BAE's requested declaration, but refused to issue a permanent injunction. The court held that the BAE-Korea agreement's permissive forum selection clause provided no basis for dismissing this action; Korea was not immune from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act; the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) structure shields a U.S. contractor, such as BAE, from liability; enforcement of the BAE-Korea agreement would undermine the control the United States retained in all FMS transactions over price; because the U.S. government retained control over price in an FMS transaction, a foreign state generally has no cause of action — against anyone — if the price demanded by the U.S. government increases over time; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying BAE's petition for a permanent anti-suit injunction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "BAE Systems Technology v. Republic of Korea's Defense Acquisition Program Admin." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Wells Fargo, alleging that the foreclosure sale of his house was invalid under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA), 50 U.S.C. 3953(a), 3953(c), which requires a lender to obtain a court order before foreclosing on or selling property owned by a current or recent servicemember where the mortgage obligation "originated before the period of the servicemember's military service." The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Wells Fargo, holding that plaintiff's mortgage obligation originated when he was in the Navy, it was not a protected obligation under section 3953(a), and his later enlistment in the Army did not change that status to afford protection retroactively. View "Sibert v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an Army Reservist and fifth grade teacher, filed suit against the Board. Plaintiff claimed that she was improperly reemployed in violation of Section 4313 of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4313, because her mental state rendered her unqualified, and the Board’s allegedly hostile work environment triggered or exacerbated her disability. Plaintiff was reemployed by the Board after her deployment, but eventually terminated based on her deficient performance. The Board later discovered that plaintiff was disabled due to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The district court granted summary judgment to the Board. The court affirmed the judgment because Section 4313 cannot serve as a basis for claims involving acts occurring after reemployment, and because plaintiff has no available remedies. View "Butts v. Prince William County School Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against two former members of the North Carolina Army National Guard, Adjutant General William E. Ingram, and Lieutenant Colonel Peter von Jess, alleging that defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiff claimed that defendants, motivated by revenge, directed other service members to monitor plaintiff’s email messages, which he sent while serving on active duty in Kuwait, and to forward incriminating messages to von Jess. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants based on the justiciability doctrine in Mindes v. Seaman. Mindes provided a four-factor test for reviewability of claims based on internal military affairs. The court acknowledged that defendant now renounces any claim for equitable relief and affirmed the district court's judgment on the basis of the military abstention doctrine set forth in Feres v. United States. In this case, plaintiff's alleged injuries arose out of activity incident to his service where he was on active duty, deployed in a war zone, and used a computer system set up by the DOD for military personnel deployed at Camp Doha. View "Aikens v. Ingram, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1350, against former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and other federal officials allegedly involved in his detention as a suspected terrorist. Plaintiff was determined to be an "enemy combatant" but was eventually released to his native country of Algeria. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 28 U.S.C. 2241(e)(2). View " Ameur v. Gates" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, foreign nationals, alleged that they were tortured and otherwise mistreated by American civilian and military personnel while detained at Abu Ghraib. CACI, a corporation domiciled in the United States, contracted with the United States to provide private interrogators to interrogate detainees at Abu Ghraib. Plaintiffs alleged that CACI employees instigated, directed, participated in, encouraged, and aided and abetted conduct towards detainees that clearly violated federal and international law. The court concluded that the Supreme Court's decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. does not foreclose plaintiffs' claims under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. 1350, and that the district court erred in reaching a contrary conclusion. In light of Kiobel, the court held that plaintiffs' claims "touch and concern" the territory of the United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application of the Alien Tort Statute. Because the court was unable to determine whether the claims presented nonjusticiable political questions, the court did not reach the additional issue of the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' common law claims. The court vacated the district court's judgment with respect to all plaintiffs' claims and remanded. View "Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc." on Justia Law

Relators filed suit in district court asserting claims arising from a Direct Procurement Method (DPM) scheme. The DOD instituted the International Through Government Bill of Lading program to govern transoceanic moves, while relying on the DPM to contract for transport strictly on the European continent. These appeals and cross-appeals were taken from final judgments, entered in accordance with Rule 54(b), in two qui tam actions consolidated for litigation in district court. The court concluded that relator possessed standing to sue for civil penalties while bypassing the prospect of a damages award and, therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in his favor; the court reversed and remanded to the extent that the district court denied relator discovery of any penalties; and the court vacated the district court's ruling in favor of the United States so that it could conduct further proceedings on what remained of the government's FCA claim and reentered judgment as appropriate. View "United States ex rel. Kurt Bunk v. Gosselin World Wide Moving" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), alleging that the Army was negligent and therefore liable for an Army Specialist's sexual assault against plaintiff. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the government, concluding that plaintiff failed to establish that the sexual assault was foreseeable under North Carolina law, and thus the Army did not breach a duty owed to plaintiff as landlord of Fort Bragg; the Army did not have a special relationship with the assailant for purposes of an FTCA claim; the government did not breach a voluntarily assumed duty to plaintiff; and, because discovery would serve no purpose, it was not error for the district court to reach the merits of plaintiff's claim at this stage of the litigation. The court also concluded that, although the government's ability to control a tortfeasor must be independent of the tortfeasor's status as a government employee, knowledge of the tortfeasor's propensity for violence or criminal history did not, per se nullify an FTCA claim. Accordingly, the district court's dismissal on this alternative basis was erroneous. View "Durden v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, current and former members of the armed forces, brought suit against defendants, two former Secretaries of Defense, alleging that they were victims of rape and sexual misconduct by fellow servicemembers during their military careers. Plaintiffs sought money damages pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. The court held that no Bivens action will lie where special factors counsel hesitation in creating an implied right of action and special factors clearly counsel hesitation in implying a cause of action for injuries arising out of military service. The court concluded that judicial abstention was the proper course in this case pursuant to Chappell v. Wallace, United States v. Stanley, and Feres v. United States. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. View "Cioca v. Rumsfeld" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City. The district court held that plaintiff's claims under the Uniform Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. 4301-35, were barred by the four-year federal "catch-all" statute of limitations. The court held that section 1658(a) applied to plaintiff's claims because the language of that section unambiguously applied to civil actions arising under laws which, like USERRA, were enacted after December 1, 1990, and USERRA's successor statute did not apply retroactively. The court also held that plaintiff did not file this action within four years of its accrual, notwithstanding his tolling arguments. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Baldwin v. City of Greensboro" on Justia Law