Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A flight attendant on a Delta Air Lines flight observed a 13-year-old passenger crying during turbulence and believed the man accompanying her was behaving inappropriately. Concluding that the man was sexually assaulting and trafficking the child, the attendant reported her concerns to the flight captain, who relayed the information to a station manager. The manager contacted local police, who detained and questioned the man, Nicholas Cupp, and his daughter upon landing. After investigation, police determined Cupp was the child’s father and released him without charges. Cupp later filed suit, alleging the report was false and reckless, and claimed significant emotional distress and harm to his relationship with his daughter.The case was initially filed in the Circuit Court of Newport News, Virginia, but was removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia based on diversity jurisdiction. The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing immunity under Virginia Code § 63.2-1512 for good-faith reports of suspected child abuse. The district court granted the motion, finding the immunity statute applicable even though the report was made to law enforcement rather than directly to social services, and concluded that Cupp had not sufficiently alleged bad faith or malicious intent.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed whether a nonmandatory reporter who makes a good-faith complaint of suspected child abuse to law enforcement, rather than directly to social services, is entitled to immunity under Virginia Code § 63.2-1512. Finding no controlling Virginia precedent, the Fourth Circuit certified this question to the Supreme Court of Virginia, as its answer will determine whether the district court’s dismissal should be affirmed or reversed. View "Cupp v. Delta Air Lines, Inc." on Justia Law

Three plaintiffs alleged they suffered injuries after receiving the Gardasil vaccine, which is designed to prevent certain strains of human papillomavirus. Each plaintiff experienced adverse symptoms following their Gardasil injections, but the onset of these symptoms occurred more than three years before they filed petitions for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. The plaintiffs acknowledged to the special master that their petitions were untimely and sought equitable tolling of the Vaccine Act’s limitations period.The special master in the United States Court of Federal Claims found the petitions untimely and denied equitable tolling, resulting in dismissal of the claims. The plaintiffs then filed suit against Merck & Co. and Merck Sharp & Dohme LLC in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, which was handling multi-district litigation related to Gardasil. Merck moved to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs had failed to timely pursue their remedies under the Vaccine Act. The district court dismissed the complaints, holding that the proper forum for challenging the special master’s timeliness rulings was the Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit, not the district court. The court also rejected a constitutional challenge to the process by which Gardasil was added to the Vaccine Injury Table.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Fourth Circuit held that the addition of Gardasil to the Vaccine Injury Table did not violate the Constitution. It further held that timely participation in the Vaccine Act compensation program is a prerequisite to bringing a tort suit, and that courts hearing vaccine-related tort suits may not reconsider the timeliness of a Vaccine Act petition once the special master has made a finding. The court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ complaints. View "Needham v. Merck & Company Inc." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, representing herself and a proposed class, alleged that she was exposed to ethylene oxide (EtO), a carcinogenic gas, due to emissions from a plant in South Charleston, West Virginia, operated by the defendants from 1978 to 2019. She claimed that this exposure increased her risk of developing serious diseases, necessitating ongoing medical monitoring and diagnostic testing, for which she sought compensation under West Virginia common law.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia recognized that West Virginia law allows for medical monitoring claims but held that the plaintiff lacked Article III standing because she did not have a manifest physical injury. The district court also excluded the plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Sahu, finding his testimony unreliable, and granted summary judgment to the defendants. The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s alleged injury—an increased risk of future illness—was not concrete or ripe, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that, under West Virginia law, the injury in a medical monitoring claim is the tortious exposure to a hazardous substance and the present need for medical testing, not the manifestation of disease. The court found that this injury is concrete and actual, satisfying Article III standing requirements. The Fourth Circuit also determined that the district court abused its discretion in excluding Dr. Sahu’s expert testimony, as its criticisms went to the weight, not the admissibility, of his opinions. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and exclusion of the expert, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Sommerville v. Union Carbide Corp." on Justia Law

While incarcerated at a North Carolina state prison in February 2016, Manuel Moreno developed flu-like symptoms and sought medical attention. A nurse examined him and recorded slightly elevated respiration, but otherwise normal vital signs. Dr. Carol Bosholm, the on-duty physician, did not personally examine Moreno but reviewed the nurse’s notes, diagnosed sinus congestion and pharyngitis, and prescribed antibiotics. That same day, several inmates from Moreno’s housing area also reported similar symptoms, and some tested positive for influenza. Dr. Bosholm ordered Moreno and others to be quarantined for seventy-two hours, leaving general instructions for monitoring but no specific orders to check oxygen saturation or respiratory rates. Over the weekend, medical staff made routine rounds, but there is no record that Moreno’s oxygen or respiration were measured, nor that he reported worsening symptoms. By Monday, Moreno’s condition had deteriorated significantly, leading to hospitalization, a seizure, and long-term complications.Moreno filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, alleging state law medical malpractice and gross negligence, as well as a federal claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court excluded his expert’s testimony on the standard of care for the malpractice claim, finding the expert did not meet North Carolina’s requirements for such testimony. At trial, the court granted Dr. Bosholm’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on all claims, concluding Moreno failed to present sufficient evidence of causation, breach of the standard of care, or the heightened culpability required for gross negligence and deliberate indifference.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 601 required application of North Carolina’s expert competency rule for medical malpractice claims, and that Moreno’s expert was properly excluded. The court also found insufficient evidence to support the gross negligence and deliberate indifference claims, upholding judgment for Dr. Bosholm. View "Moreno v. Bosholm" on Justia Law

Georgia-Pacific LLC, a large corporation in the pulp and paper industry, acquired Bestwall Gypsum Co. in 1965, inheriting significant asbestos-related liabilities. By 2017, Bestwall faced around 64,000 pending asbestos claims, prompting Georgia-Pacific to implement a divisional merger known as the Texas two-step. This maneuver split Georgia-Pacific into two entities: Georgia-Pacific retained most assets, while Bestwall assumed the asbestos liabilities and filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy to manage these claims through a § 524(g) trust.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of North Carolina granted Bestwall's motion for an injunction to prevent asbestos claimants from pursuing claims outside the bankruptcy process. The Official Committee of Asbestos Claimants opposed this and moved to dismiss the bankruptcy case, arguing it was filed in bad faith since Bestwall was solvent. The bankruptcy court denied the motion, stating that filing for Chapter 11 to resolve asbestos claims is a valid purpose, even for solvent debtors.The Committee later moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that the Constitution does not grant jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases involving solvent debtors. The bankruptcy court rejected this argument, holding that Congress has the authority to define bankruptcy jurisdiction, which includes cases filed by solvent debtors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases involving solvent debtors because the Bankruptcy Code is a federal law, and petitions for relief under it arise under the laws of the United States. The court clarified that challenges to a debtor's eligibility for bankruptcy protection are not jurisdictional issues. View "Bestwall LLC v. Official Committee of Asbestos Claimants" on Justia Law

The case involves two companies, Skyline Tower Painting, Inc. (Skyline) and Television Tower, Inc. (TTI), which were sued by a group of plaintiffs for allegedly causing lead paint contamination in a Baltimore neighborhood. TTI owns a TV tower that was coated with lead-based paint, and Skyline was contracted to clean the tower using hydroblasting, a process that dislodged and dispersed the lead paint. The plaintiffs, who own property within a 4000-foot radius of the tower, claimed that the hydroblasting caused lead paint chips and dust to spread throughout their community, posing health risks and reducing property values.The plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit in Maryland state court, asserting claims for negligence, negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, and strict liability for an abnormally dangerous activity. The defendants removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). The plaintiffs moved to remand the case to state court, invoking CAFA’s local-controversy exception. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted the motion to remand, finding that the local-controversy exception applied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court first determined that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, despite the defendants also filing petitions for permission to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1453. The court dismissed the § 1453 petitions as unnecessary. On the merits, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the local-controversy exception to CAFA applied. The court found that more than two-thirds of the proposed class members were Maryland citizens, and that TTI, a Maryland citizen, was a significant defendant from whom significant relief was sought and whose conduct formed a significant basis for the claims. View "Skyline Tower Painting, Inc. v. Goldberg" on Justia Law

Robbie Plyler, a longtime farm worker, was injured when his leg became trapped in a running grain auger inside a grain bin on Cox Brothers Farms, resulting in the amputation of his right leg below the knee. The jury found that both Plyler and Cox Brothers Farms were negligent, but the farm had the last clear chance to avoid the injury. The jury awarded Plyler $2,000,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 for loss of consortium to his wife, Deborah. Cox Brothers Farms appealed the decision.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina denied Cox's pre-trial motions for summary judgment and its renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on Plyler’s negligence and gross negligence claims. The court also denied Cox's motion to bifurcate the trial into separate liability and damages phases and its motion to exclude testimony from Plyler’s farm safety expert.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the jury’s verdict. The court found that the district court did not err in denying Cox's motions for summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law, as there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Cox had the last clear chance to avoid Plyler’s injury. The appellate court also upheld the district court’s decision to deny Cox's motion to bifurcate the trial and to admit the expert testimony, noting that the district court provided appropriate limiting instructions to the jury regarding the use of OSHA regulations as evidence. The court concluded that the district court acted within its discretion and that there were no exceptional circumstances warranting a new trial. View "Plyler v. Cox" on Justia Law

KeraLink International, Inc. operates a network of eyebanks and purchased surgical packs containing eyewash from Stradis Healthcare, LLC. The eyewash, supplied by Geri-Care Pharmaceuticals Corporation, was contaminated, rendering corneal tissue unusable. KeraLink sued Stradis and Geri-Care for strict products liability, and both were held jointly and severally liable for $606,415.49 plus prejudgment interest. Stradis sought indemnification from Geri-Care, claiming Geri-Care's primary culpability as the apparent manufacturer of the eyewash.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland awarded summary judgment to KeraLink on its strict products liability claim against both Stradis and Geri-Care. The court rejected the sealed container defense asserted by both defendants. Stradis then sought implied indemnification from Geri-Care, arguing that its liability was secondary. The district court agreed, granting Stradis summary judgment for indemnification but denied Stradis' request for attorneys' fees incurred in defending against KeraLink's suit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in awarding Stradis implied indemnification against Geri-Care. The court found that Geri-Care's conduct as the apparent manufacturer of the contaminated eyewash was primarily culpable, while Stradis' conduct was secondary. The court also upheld the district court's denial of Stradis' request for attorneys' fees, citing the American Rule, which generally precludes the recovery of attorneys' fees as compensatory damages unless authorized by statute, rule, or contract. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in all respects. View "Geri-Care Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Stradis Healthcare, LLC" on Justia Law

Amanda Watts received two vaccines, Pneumovax 23 and Boostrix, at a CVS Pharmacy in 2017. She claimed that both vaccines were negligently administered in the same improper location on her arm, leading to a chronic pain condition. However, CVS is immune from suit for the administration of Boostrix under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986. Consequently, Watts's complaint focused solely on the alleged negligence in administering Pneumovax.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted summary judgment to CVS, finding that Watts presented no evidence from which a jury could determine that her injury was caused by the Pneumovax vaccine rather than the Boostrix vaccine. The court also struck an errata sheet submitted by Watts's expert, Dr. Akhil Chhatre, which attempted to amend his deposition testimony to suggest that both vaccines contributed to Watts's injury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit agreed that Watts failed to provide evidence to establish that her injury was caused by the Pneumovax shot, as required to overcome CVS's immunity for the Boostrix shot. The court noted that both of Watts's experts could not definitively attribute her injury to the Pneumovax vaccine alone. The court also upheld the district court's decision to strike Dr. Chhatre's errata sheet, which materially altered his original testimony.The Fourth Circuit concluded that without evidence to separate the effects of the two vaccines, a jury could only speculate on the cause of Watts's injury. Therefore, Watts could not satisfy the causation element of her negligence claim, and the summary judgment in favor of CVS was affirmed. View "Watts v. Maryland CVS Pharmacy, LLC" on Justia Law

E.R., the appellant, filed a complaint against the Beaufort County School District, alleging that the district failed to respond appropriately to her reports of sexual abuse and harassment while she was a student. E.R. claimed she was sexually assaulted by three male students and subsequently bullied and harassed by other students. Despite reporting these incidents to school officials, she alleged that no appropriate action was taken.The case was initially filed in South Carolina state court, asserting claims under Title IX and state law for negligence and gross negligence. The school district removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss it, arguing that the claims were untimely under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (SCTCA), which has a two-year statute of limitations. The district court agreed, applying the SCTCA's statute of limitations to both the Title IX and state law claims, and dismissed the case as it was filed more than two years after E.R. turned 18.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the appropriate statute of limitations for Title IX claims is the state's general personal injury statute of limitations, not the SCTCA's two-year period. The court reasoned that Title IX claims should borrow the statute of limitations from the most analogous state law cause of action, which in this case is the general personal injury statute. Since South Carolina's general personal injury statute of limitations is three years, E.R.'s claims were timely.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of E.R.'s complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "E.R. v. Beaufort County School District" on Justia Law