Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a cardiothoracic surgeon, sued another cardiothoracic surgeon, Defendant, alleging that his remarks about her performance during an aborted surgery defamed her. On summary judgment, the district court determined that Defendant’s statements—that Plaintiff “misread” or “failed to recognize” the findings on the patient’s echocardiogram before beginning surgery—were not false, as Plaintiff admitted she did not read the echocardiogram at all before operating. The district court, therefore, concluded the statements could not be actionable under North Carolina law.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the summary judgment order. The court disagreed with the district court’s appraisal on summary judgment. The court explained that to say that Plaintiff “misread” the echocardiogram presupposes that she read it in the first place, which she did not. And the defamatory sting of Defendant’s statements—that Plaintiff either lacked skill in applying her medical judgment to interpret the echocardiogram or deviated from the standard of care by failing to evaluate the echocardiogram results before operating—presents a conclusion about which the parties, and the evidence, sharply disagree. For these reasons, the district court erred in finding no dispute of material fact as to the falsity of Defendant’s statements. View "Barbara Robinson v. John Williams" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s post-trial dismissal of his case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. A jury found that AXA Equitable Life Insurance Company negligently reported false medical information about Plaintiff to an information clearinghouse used by insurance companies, causing him to become uninsurable. Despite the fact that the parties satisfied the requirements for federal diversity jurisdiction, and the fact that both parties litigated the entire case through trial under North Carolina law, the district court decided that Connecticut law applied and found itself deprived of subject-matter jurisdiction by virtue of a Connecticut statute.   The Fourth Circuit found that the district court erred and concluded that choice of law is waivable and was waived here. And even if Connecticut’s law applied, it would not have ousted federal jurisdiction. Further, the court held that the district court also erred by concluding that Connecticut’s CIIPPA divested it of subject-matter jurisdiction despite that statute affecting only choice of law rather than choice of forum. AXA’s alternative argument for affirmance based on the nature of Plaintiff’s s injury and its causation was thoroughly briefed and argued before the court, and the court found it to be without merit. But because AXA’s argument for post-trial relief challenging the number of damages was neither raised nor briefed before this court, the court remanded to the district court to consider that issue in the first instance. View "Malcolm Wiener v. AXA Equitable Life Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Appellee a middle school teacher in Pender County, North Carolina, when she was physically attacked by a special education student in her language arts class. There is no dispute that the student was known to have been violent on prior occasions. At the time of the incident involving Appellee, Appellant was the principal of the school where the attack occurred.   Appellee asserted the following five 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 claims: (1) a substantive due process claim; (2) a deliberate indifference claim; (3) a supervisory liability claim against Superintendent Hill; (4) a claim seeking personal liability against Superintendent Hill; and (5) a claim seeking personal liability against Appellant. Relevant here, the personal liability claim against Appellant alleges that Appellant knew or should have known that her actions and inactions could have led to a violation of Appellee’s constitutional rights.   The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that Appellee failed to sufficiently allege that Appellant violated her constitutional rights, thus Appellant is entitled to qualified immunity. The court explained that here, Appellee’s state-created danger claim centers on a series of alleged choices or inactions by Appellant which are far removed from TB’s physical attack on Appellee. Specifically, Appellee attempts to recast Appellant’s knowledge of TB’s prior acts of violence and creation of the staffing schedule which required Appellant to teach TB on the day of the incident -- without a second teacher in her classroom -- as affirmative acts. But Appellee fails to point to any action by Appellant which created the danger that resulted in Appellee’s injuries. View "Kimberly Burns-Fisher v. Anna Romero-Lehrer" on Justia Law

While participating in a TASER training session, Plaintiff, Virginia Beach Police Department Officer took a break in a designated safety area. Another participant, who was engaged in a role-playing exercise, fired his TASER. Unfortunately, he missed his intended target and hit Plainitff in the eye. Plaintiff sued R.N., who oversaw the session, for negligence and Axon Enterprise, Inc., the manufacturer of TASERs and sponsor of the training program, for vicarious liability. R.N. and Axon moved separately for summary judgment and the district court granted both motions.   It determined that R.N. could only be liable for the conduct of the participant who fired the TASER if what Virginia law calls a “special relationship” existed between R.N. and Plaintiff. But it found that no such special relationship existed. And since it held that R.N. was not liable, the court also granted Axon’s motion as to Plaintiff’ vicarious liability claim. On appeal, Plaintiff insists that he has two valid negligence claims.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment on Plaintiff’s special relationship claim. As it noted, Virginia has not previously recognized a special relationship in the trainer and adult trainee context. The court saw no reversible error in the court’s interpretation of Virginia law on this issue or in its application of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. But the court agreed with Plaintiff that Virginia law permits his general negligence claim against Nelson. Thus, the court vacated the order dismissing the case and remand for proceedings on Plaintiff’s general negligence claim. View "Shawn Curran v. Axon Enterprise, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants, who were maimed in a hot air balloon accident in southeastern Pennsylvania in 2015, pursued appellate challenges to the District of Maryland’s rulings against them and in favor of T.H.E. Insurance Company (the “Insurer”) in an insurance coverage dispute. In federal court proceedings initiated in Maryland, Appellants sued certain of the Insurer’s named insureds, and a business called New Horizon Balloon Team (collectively, the “Insureds”) — for the gruesome injuries Appellants’ sustained in the balloon accident (the “damages lawsuit”). While the damages lawsuit was pending, the Insurer initiated these insurance coverage proceedings in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, naming as defendants the three Insureds, plus Appellants. The district court awarded summary judgment in favor of the Insurer’s contention with respect to a $100,000 coverage limit for each balloon passenger. The Memorandum Opinion also rejected both of Appellants’ bad faith claims. Appellants appealed those rulings.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Applying Maryland principles of res judicata in this dispute, the court was satisfied that the coverage issue presented by the Insurer in these proceedings is not barred by the settlement agreement in the damages lawsuit. As such, the court agreed with the district court that Appellants are not entitled to a summary judgment award on the coverage issue on res judicata grounds. Further, the district court thus did not err in ruling Appellants were inside the balloon’s basket at the time of their injuries. As such, Appellants were “passengers” under the Policy and Coverage B’s limit of $100,000 per passenger applies. View "T.H.E. Insurance Company v. Melyndia Davis" on Justia Law

Three independent contractors of Eastman Chemical Company were severely injured, one of them fatally, when a pump exploded during maintenance. Eastman moved to dismiss their state-law personal injury suits, contending that the contractors qualified as Eastman’s “statutory employees” under the South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Law – which would mean that workers’ compensation was their exclusive remedy and that the courts lacked jurisdiction to hear their claims.   The district court agreed that Plaintiffs were Eastman’s “statutory employees” under the workers’ compensation law and dismissed their actions. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held their cases in abeyance pending the decision of South Carolina’s Supreme Court in Keene v. CNA Holdings, LLC, 870 S.E.2d 156 (2021).   The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s ruling. The court explained that in Keene, when an employer makes a “legitimate business decision” to outsource a portion of its work, the contractors it hires to perform that work are not “statutory employees” for workers’ compensation purposes. 870 S.E.2d at 163. No party here contests that Eastman’s outsourcing of its maintenance and repair work was a “legitimate business decision.” It follows that the plaintiffs, independent contractors performing maintenance at the time of the 2016 pump explosion, were not statutory employees and may bring personal injury actions. View "Sallie Zeigler v. Eastman Chemical Company" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were injured in unspecified accidents and treated by South Carolina health care providers. Seeking to pursue personal injury lawsuits, Plaintiffs requested their medical records from the relevant providers. Those records—and accompanying invoices—were supplied by defendants Ciox Health, LLC and ScanSTAT Technologies LLC, “information management companies” that retrieve medical records from health care providers and transmit them to requesting patients or patient representatives. Claiming the invoiced fees were too high or otherwise illegal, Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against Ciox and ScanSTAT in federal district court.   The district court dismissed the complaint and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that South Carolina law gives patients a right to obtain copies of their medical records, while capping the fees “a physician, or other owner” may bill for providing them. However, the statutory obligations at issue apply only to physicians and other owners of medical records, not medical records companies. View "Tammie Thompson v. Ciox Health, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s dismissal of his amended complaint filed against Cable News Network (“CNN”) alleging defamation and false light invasion of privacy. Plaintiff challenges the district court’s finding that his amended complaint failed to cure deficiencies identified in his initial pleading. He and his counsel also appealed the court’s award of fees, expenses, and costs and the court’s inherent authority based on a finding that the amended complaint “unreasonably multiplied the proceedings.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that Plaintiff’s amended complaint failed to state a claim of either defamation or false light invasion of privacy. But the court vacated the district court’s award of sanctions, finding that the court abused its discretion in awarding them where the record does not support a finding that Plaintiff or his counsel filed the amended complaint in bad faith.   The court explained that CNN reiterated that the proceedings were multiplied by the filing of a nearly-identical Amended Complaint that did nothing to cure the deficiencies, and this bad faith conduct warranted sanctions. Thus, the district court, having received a written argument on both the procedural and substantive issues, ruled on the request without further briefing or a hearing. In light of these facts, and where there were ample opportunities to object, the court wrote it cannot conclude that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to consider the sanctions request without a formal motion. Further, the record does not support a finding that Plaintiff and his counsel undertook the effort to amend the complaint and to survive CNN’s motion to dismiss in bad faith. View "Derek Harvey v. CNN" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is an inmate at United States Penitentiary (“USP”) Hazelton who filed a pro se civil action in United States district court alleging violations under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) for denied and delayed medical care of his chronic illnesses. Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Following the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, the district court denied Plaintiff’s IFP motion on the grounds that he did not meet the “imminent danger of serious physical injury” exception. Plaintiff now appealed to the Fourth Circuit.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded. The court explained that a plain reading of the statute requires that litigants allege sufficient specific facts to demonstrate a nexus between the claims presented and the imminent danger alleged. Here, both parties agree that it is a “commonsense requirement that a prisoner’s allegation of imminent danger must relate to their underlying claims.” Moreover, the Government concedes that “a fairly traceable relationship exists between Plaintiff’s alleged imminent danger and the claims set forth in his FTCA complaint, as they both arise from his allegations of delay and denial of medical treatment.” Plaintiff has passed this threshold because he alleged that the prison’s continued denial and delay in providing medical treatment are directly causing his worsening physical and medical conditions which present an imminent danger of serious physical injury.   Finally, the court remanded writing that the district court did not have access to Defendant’s medical records and, thus, did not have a complete record to determine whether Defendant satisfied the “imminent danger” exception based on the court's clarified standard. View "Marc Hall v. US" on Justia Law

The United States Government seized $69,940.50 in cash from Plaintiff’s car. Plaintiff and his girlfriend challenged the seizure, claiming that the cash was not subject to forfeiture. To forfeit the seized cash, the Government bore the burden of establishing a connection between the cash and the illegal activity—in this case, illegal drug trafficking. The district court, in granting summary judgment, found that the facts painted a picture that definitively established that the cash was drug money.   The Fourth Circuit reversed finding that the record is unclear regarding whether a reasonable jury might well decide that the painting of these facts shows the cash came from drug trafficking. The court explained that summary judgment in a forfeiture proceeding is like summary judgment in any other civil case. Applying those standards correctly ensures that the Government must prove its case before depriving citizens of their private property based on an allegation of wrongdoing. Here, the Government has the burden of proof. The Government lacks any direct evidence of a drug transaction or involvement in the drug trade beyond Plaintiff’s possession of a single marijuana blunt and medical marijuana cards. The Government would have the court rely on its own inferences from its circumstantial evidence, which the court may not do. View "US v. Dereck McClellan" on Justia Law