Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs were fired from their Department of Public Safety positions with the Village of Bald Head Island (“the Village”), a municipality located in Brunswick County, North Carolina. Following their departures, Village employees published Plaintiffs’ termination letters and department separation affidavits which accused Plaintiffs of violating certain employee policy provisions. Plaintiffs filed suit alleging numerous claims. As relevant here, they brought defamation claims under North Carolina state law against the Village;.the Village Town Manager (“Manager”) ; and the Village Director of Public Safety (“Director”). The district court dismissed the defamation claims against the Village but found the Manager and Director liable for defamation for publishing the termination letters and separation affidavits, respectively. Defendants appealed and Plaintiffs cross-appealed as to the dismissal of the Village.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s (1) judgment against the Manager for libel per se arising from publication of the separation affidavits; (2) dismissal of all defamation claims against the Village; (3) denial of leave to amend to add the August 28, 2014 email as a third publication; (4) exclusion of the August 28 email for other purposes; (5) exclusion of Facebook posts; and (6) denial of Plaintiffs’ untimely Rule 59(e) motion seeking prejudgment interest. The court reversed the district court’s judgment against the Manager on all libel claims stemming from the publication of the termination letters for lack of actual malice. Finally, the court denied Plaintiffs’ pending motion, purportedly filed under Rule 60, “for corrections based on clerical mistakes, oversights, and omissions.” View "Thomas Cannon v. Calvin R. Peck, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Iredell-Statesville School District Board of Education (“ISSD”) and several individual defendants, alleging federal constitutional and statutory claims, as well as state law claims for negligence and negligent inflection of emotional distress arising from school officials’ mistreatment of her son.  Some of the defendants timely moved to dismiss, asserting that the state law negligence claims against them in their individual capacities were barred by public official immunity under North Carolina law.   The district court granted their motion in part and dismissed all federal claims against the appellants. But as for the state law negligence claims, it denied the school officials’ motion to dismiss. It concluded that the school officials were not entitled to public official immunity for a breach of a ministerial duty to report child abuse.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s negligence claims. The court reasoned that the school officials’ actions at issue here were discretionary. What to do when faced with allegations of a teacher mistreating her student is not a decision that can be made automatically, without regard to the administrator’s judgment.  Further, Plaintiff’s claim was against public officials, in their individual capacities, for state law negligence. For such claims, North Carolina law dictates that the plaintiff may only pierce public official immunity by “showing that the defendant-official’s tortious conduct falls within one of the immunity exceptions. Plaintiff has not satisfied this obligation because she did not allege malice, or any other piercing exception, in the amended complaint. View "R.A. v. Brady Johnson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of drivers, sued Defendants, a group of personal injury lawyers, after Defendants sought and obtained car accident reports from North Carolina law enforcement agencies and private data brokers and then sent Plaintiffs unsolicited attorney advertising material. Plaintiffs' claims were brought under the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (“DPPA”).The district court held that, although Plaintiffs have standing to bring their claims, the claim failed on the merits.The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiffs have a legally recognizable privacy interest in the accident reports. However, Defendant's conduct in obtaining the records did not constitute a violation of DPPA. Defendants obtained Plaintiffs’ personal information from the accident reports; however, Plaintiffs failed to preserve the argument that those accident reports are“motor vehicle records under DPPA. View "William Garey v. James S. Farrin, P.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this civil action served process on several of Defendants roughly a year after filing their complaint, in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m)’s 90-day time requirement for service. The district court found insufficient Plaintiffs’ efforts to establish “good cause” for the delay, and because the court understood that a showing of good cause was a condition for any extension, it dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims against these Defendants.   The Fourth Circuit concluded that the record amply supports the district court’s ruling that Plaintiffs failed to show good cause for their failure to serve Defendants within the time period provided by Rule 4(m). Nonetheless, the court vacated the district court’s order of dismissal concluding that Rule 4(m) confers discretion on district courts to extend the time period for service even when good cause has not been shown.   The court explained that it does not fault the district court for its ruling in conformance with Mendez. But in light of the court’s holding, it was necessary to vacate the district court’s dismissal of the Plaintiffs’ claims against the five health care provider Defendants and remand to allow the court to consider in the first instance the parties’ arguments as to whether the court should exercise its discretion to extend the time for serving those defendants in the circumstances of this case, even though good cause was not shown. View "Edward Gelin v. Kyle Shuman" on Justia Law

After suffering a retroperitoneal bleed following a diagnostic cardiac catheterization, Patient's estate ("Plaintiff") filed a medical malpractice wrongful death claim against various medical providers ("Defendants"). The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants, finding that Plaintiff failed to prove causation. More specifically, the court held that West Virginia Code Sec. 55-7B-3(b) requires a plaintiff to prove "that following the accepted standard of care would have resulted in a greater than twenty-five percent chance that the patient . . . would have survived."The Fourth Circuit reversed. The district court's interpretation of Sec. 55-7B-3(b) to require a 25% change in outcome between the chance of survival had the standard of care been followed and the chance of survival experienced due to the breach of the standard of care was in error. The court held that the correct standard requires Plaintiff to establish a greater than twenty-five percent chance of survival had Defendants followed the applicable standard of care. The court noted that, although the Supreme Court of West Virginia has not addressed this particular statute, a plain reading of the statutory language does not a 25% change in outcome. View "Janet Graham v. Sunil Dhar" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed 1983 against two nurses alleging that he was provided inadequate medical care during a health crisis he experienced while incarcerated. He was eventually sent a series of hospitals, where doctors told him a flesh-eating organism was damaging his internal organs.The first nurse was successfully served by the Marshals Service within Rule 4(m)’s 90-day period. The second nurse was not served because service was returned as “refused unable to forward.” The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s lawsuit on timeliness grounds after finding that Plaintiff’s amended complaint did not relate back under Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to his initial and timely complaint.At issue is whether the amended complaint adding Defendants is timely because it relates back to the date of the original complaint. The court found that the district court erred and the text of Rule 15(c)(1)(C) makes clear that the required “notice” and knowledge must come “within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for service.Next, the court addressed whether Defendants were provided the necessary notice within the Rule 4(m) notice period. The court ruled that Rule 15(c)’s requirements have been satisfied as to the first nurse. In regards to the second nurse, the court remanded to the district court for consideration of Plaintiff’s extension request, reasoning that the district court incorrectly believed that Plaintiff lost his chance to take advantage of Rule 15(c)’s relation-back rule. The court vacated the district court’s order granting the motion to dismiss. View "Patrick McGraw v. Theresa Gore" on Justia Law

In the course of responding to a dispute between neighbors, a Deputy fatally shot a man while he was standing inside his home holding a loaded shotgun. The personal representative of the deceased's estate (“the Estate”), subsequently brought an action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, claiming that the Deputy used excessive force in violation of the deceased’s Fourth Amendment rights, along with various related state law claims.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the following claims and remand the case for further proceedings: (1) the 1983 claim against the Deputy in his individual capacity; (2) the wrongful death claim for both compensatory and punitive damages under North Carolina law against the Deputy in his individual capacity; and (3) the claims under the Macon County Sheriff’s Office’s surety bond against the Deputy and Sheriff in their official capacities, and against Western Surety, for up to $25,000 in damages.Notably, the court found that parties’ factual disputes are quintessentially “genuine” and “material.” Assuming that a jury would credit the Estate’s expert evidence over the Deputy’s competing testimony and expert evidence, leads to the conclusion that the Deputy’s use of force was objectively unreasonable.The court affirmed the district court’s conclusions that: (1) the Estate’s Fourteenth Amendment claim fails as a matter of law; (2) Macon County’s liability insurance policy preserves the Sheriff’s Office’s governmental immunity from suit; and (3) the Estate’s claims brought directly under the North Carolina Constitution are precluded. View "Melissa Knibbs v. Anthony Momphard, Jr." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs filed suit in South Carolina state court against fourteen defendants (ten individuals and four agencies), alleging five causes of action. The circuit court reviewed five preserved issues: (1) the applicable statutes of limitations for plaintiffs' claims under the Rehabilitation Act ("RA") and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"); (2) whether the district court abused its discretion in excluding the witnesses' testimonies; (3) the plaintiffs' assertion that the district court improperly instructed the jury as to the duty owed under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act; (4) whether the district court improperly dismissed plaintiff’s RA claims; and (5) whether the court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s 1983 claims.The circuit court affirmed the district court’s decision to limit the plaintiffs' witness's testimony and further found that the court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the hybrid witness's testimony or by determining whether the defendant’s deposition had any potential to lead to admissible evidence.Further, the court found no error in the district court’s instruction or its' finding that the ADA and RA claims were subject to the South Carolina Human Affairs Law’s one-year statute of limitations. The plaintiffs failed to show reversible error as they neither pleaded nor proved any action or inaction by any individually named defendants that caused them harm. View "Johnny Timpson v. Anderson County Disabilities" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action against the defendant, claiming defamation and tortious interference. The court dismissed plaintiff's claim, finding it without merit. The court warned plaintiff's counsel that if he were to "file further inappropriate pleadings or pursue frivolous post-judgment litigation against any of these defendants, sanctions might well be justified."Ten months later, plaintiff filed another claim based on the same underlying conduct. The court dismissed plaintiff's claim and imposed sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.On appeal, the Fourth Circuit determined that the allegations in plaintiff's complaint were not frivolous and thus, did not form the basis of a Rule 11 violation. Thus, the district court abused its discretion in imposing Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff and her attorney. View "Svetlana Lokhova v. Stefan Halper" on Justia Law

Clendening sued the government for her husband’s wrongful death allegedly caused by his exposure to contaminated water and environmental toxins while stationed at the Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune in Jacksonville, North Carolina. Her complaint also asserted claims for subsequent fraudulent concealment and failure to warn relevant personnel of the severity, scope, and impact of said exposure.The district court dismissed all claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The wrongful death claims are barred under the “Feres” doctrine and the failure-to-warn claims are barred under the Federal Torts Claims Act’s “discretionary function” exception, 28 U.S.C. 2680(a). The exposure cited as the cause of Clendening’s death stemmed from the relationship between Clendening and his military service; the military’s provision of water and accommodations to its troops is clearly activity incident to service. While the failure-to-warn claim is not barred by Feres, the government had no mandatory duty to warn Clendening of his exposure after the fact. The “challenged conduct is the product of judgment or choice,” and involved a decision “based on considerations of public policy.” View "Clendening v. United States" on Justia Law