Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Products Liability
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In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, plaintiff Carla J. Kappel, acting on behalf of her deceased ex-husband's estate and as mother to their minor children, sued LL Flooring, Inc., alleging that the company's Chinese-manufactured laminate flooring caused her ex-husband's death due to exposure to formaldehyde.The district court dismissed Kappel's wrongful death lawsuit, arguing that her claim was barred by a settlement agreement that had been reached in connection with two multidistrict litigation (MDL) actions related to LL Flooring's products. The court maintained that the deceased, Mr. Tarabus, was a class member subject to that settlement agreement and thus his claims, including any claims involving bodily injuries or death caused by the subject flooring, had been settled.On appeal, Kappel argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to make the dismissal order and that the MDL settlement agreement did not bar her wrongful death lawsuit on behalf of the children. The Court of Appeals agreed with Kappel's latter argument and held that the settlement agreement failed to resolve Kappel’s wrongful death lawsuit.The Court found that the claims in Kappel's lawsuit, which concerned the bodily injuries Mr. Tarabus experienced and the alleged causal connection between the laminate flooring and his cancer diagnosis, were materially distinct from the claims in the MDL proceedings. Notably, the settlement class representatives had twice made clear that they were not pursuing personal injury claims on a class-wide basis, and at no point did any class representative ever allege or pursue a wrongful death lawsuit.Therefore, the Court vacated the lower court's dismissal of Kappel's lawsuit and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kappel v. LL Flooring, Inc." on Justia Law

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Along with her husband, Plaintiff initiated a civil action against Ethicon, Inc. — the manufacturer and seller of the TVT mesh — and its parent company, Johnson & Johnson. Plaintiffs pursued numerous claims for relief, including a strict product liability claim alleging a design defect in the TVT, as well as a claim for negligent design thereof. Plaintiff’s husband joined in the lawsuit by suing for loss of consortium. Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit in the Southern District of West Virginia as part of a multidistrict litigation captioned (the “MDL”).   The Fourth Circuit availing itself of the privilege afforded by the State of West Virginia through the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act requested that the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia exercise its discretion to resolve the following certified question of law:Whether Section 411 of the West Virginia Pattern Jury Instructions for Civil Cases, entitled “Design Defect — Necessity of an Alternative, Feasible Design,” correctly specifies Plaintiff’s burden of proof for a strict liability design defect claim pursued under West Virginia law. More specifically, whether a plaintiff alleging a West Virginia strict liability design defect claim is required to prove the existence of an alternative, feasible product design — existing at the time of the subject product’s manufacture — in order to establish that the product was not reasonably safe for its intended use. And if so, whether the alternative, feasible product design must eliminate the risk of the harm suffered by the plaintiff or whether a reduction of that risk is sufficient. View "Judith Shears v. Ethicon, Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff KeraLink is a non-profit corporation with its headquarters in Baltimore, Maryland, and operated a network of eye banks in many states. KeraLink purchased from third-party vendors medical equipment and supplies, including “surgical packs” containing “eyewash” used to irrigate the eye tissue. KeraLink purchased the custom-designed surgical packs at issue here from defendant Stradis Healthcare, LLC (Stradis), which has its headquarters in Georgia. At issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in awarding summary judgment to Plaintiff on its claim against two suppliers of contaminated eyewash used to remove donated eye tissue for future transplant.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that under the facts presented here, neither supplier was entitled to invoke the sealed container defense, an affirmative defense reserved for only certain types of sellers. Additionally, the economic loss rule barring liability for solely economic losses in a tort claim was inapplicable because KeraLink also sought damages for injury to property, namely, the recovered eye tissue rendered unusable by the contaminated eyewash. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion under Maryland law in awarding the plaintiff prejudgment interest. View "Keralink International, Inc. v. Geri-Care Pharmaceuticals Corporation" on Justia Law

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While participating in a TASER training session, Plaintiff, Virginia Beach Police Department Officer took a break in a designated safety area. Another participant, who was engaged in a role-playing exercise, fired his TASER. Unfortunately, he missed his intended target and hit Plainitff in the eye. Plaintiff sued R.N., who oversaw the session, for negligence and Axon Enterprise, Inc., the manufacturer of TASERs and sponsor of the training program, for vicarious liability. R.N. and Axon moved separately for summary judgment and the district court granted both motions.   It determined that R.N. could only be liable for the conduct of the participant who fired the TASER if what Virginia law calls a “special relationship” existed between R.N. and Plaintiff. But it found that no such special relationship existed. And since it held that R.N. was not liable, the court also granted Axon’s motion as to Plaintiff’ vicarious liability claim. On appeal, Plaintiff insists that he has two valid negligence claims.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment on Plaintiff’s special relationship claim. As it noted, Virginia has not previously recognized a special relationship in the trainer and adult trainee context. The court saw no reversible error in the court’s interpretation of Virginia law on this issue or in its application of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. But the court agreed with Plaintiff that Virginia law permits his general negligence claim against Nelson. Thus, the court vacated the order dismissing the case and remand for proceedings on Plaintiff’s general negligence claim. View "Shawn Curran v. Axon Enterprise, Inc." on Justia Law

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Sardis was attempting to adjust a container containing a garage door hood on a forklift when the wood slat constituting the container’s handhold broke off, causing him to fall off a ladder rack and hit his head on the pavement nine feet below. He died two weeks later. His estate sued, alleging that ODC was negligent in designing the container’s handholds, and had a duty to warn foreseeable users of the container to not rely on the handholds for pulling it. The estate offered Sher Singh, Ph.D., a packaging design engineer, as its sole expert on design defects and Michael Wogalter, Ph.D., who described himself as an expert on “human factors,” as the sole expert on failure to warn. The court rejected “Daubert” challenges to both experts. The jury rendered a $4.84 million verdict.The Fourth Circuit reversed. The district court abdicated its critical gatekeeping role to the jury and admitted Singh’s and Wogalter’s “irrelevant and unreliable” testimony without engaging in the required Rule 702 analysis. Without that testimony, the estate offered insufficient admissible evidence as a matter of law to prevail on any of the claims. Even if an expert provides relevant testimony as to how an allegedly defective product breached a governing industry standard (which Singh did not), that says nothing about whether the expert reliably opined that said breach caused a plaintiff’s harm. Wogalter’s testimony was incompatible with the governing Virginia “reason to know” standard. View "Sardis v. Overhead Door Corp." on Justia Law

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After he was diagnosed with nasal cancer, plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging that they produced the lumber that his father used in his woodshop and are liable to him for damages because they failed to warn his father that wood dust causes cancer. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants, concluding that during the exposure period, defendants did not have a duty to warn plaintiff's father that wood dust causes cancer because that fact was not known at the time as part of the "state of the art," i.e., the level of knowledge reached.The Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court properly determined from the record that the state of the art did not indicate that wood dust causes cancer until 1995, a few years after the exposure period at issue ended, and thus defendants had no duty to warn plaintiff's father of any risk of cancer during that period. The court rejected plaintiff's contention that the district court established an Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) litmus test to the exclusion of other relevant evidence. Rather, the district court appropriately identified and relied on the state of the art as represented by studies collected and evaluated by experts in the field. View "Lightfoot v. Georgia-Pacific Wood Products, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of various claims of certain plaintiffs in an action against Ford for an alleged defect in plaintiffs' purchase or lease of vehicles manufactured between 2002 and 2010. At issue were the district court's Daubert decision addressing plaintiffs' proof of their defect theory.The court held that the district court properly considered appropriate factors and did not abuse its discretion in excluding the opinions of plaintiffs' experts based on their lack of relevance and reliability; plaintiffs failed to show that the district court made a clearly erroneous factual finding or error of law by excluding their expert witnesses; and because plaintiffs could not prove their theory of defects, they failed to meet the essential element of causation. View "Belville v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

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The Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in denying plaintiffs' motion to remand their case to state court and deciding Bayer's motion to dismiss in an action seeking damages for violations of North Carolina tort and products liability law. The court held that plaintiffs' action did not fall within the small class of cases in which state law claims may be deemed to arise under federal law for purposes of conferring federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgments and remanded with instructions that the action be remanded to North Carolina state court. View "Burrell v. Bayer Corp." on Justia Law

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Lipitor, a pharmaceutical drug, is prescribed to lower patients’ “bad” cholesterol and triglycerides. Plaintiffs, more than 3,000 women, claim that they developed diabetes as a result of taking Lipitor. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the lawsuits for pretrial proceedings. The parties agreed on four bellwether cases. Plaintiffs enlisted general experts, to testify that there was a causal association between Lipitor and diabetes; specific experts, to testify that Lipitor proximately caused the onset of diabetes in the bellwether plaintiffs; and an expert biostatistician, who concluded that taking Lipitor led to a statistically significant increased risk of diabetes. Plaintiffs also sought to introduce internal Pfizer emails, information from Lipitor's labeling, a statement in Lipitor's FDA New Drug Application, and information from the Lipitor website. Citing Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the court excluded the opinions of the statistician; the general causation expert, except relating to a specific dosage; and the specific causation opinions. The rulings left the plaintiffs without their bellwether cases, limited to a subset of patients who had taken an 80 mg dose. The court issued show-cause orders asking whether any plaintiff could submit evidence that would enable her claim to survive summary judgment given prior rulings. Some plaintiffs submitted evidence showing only that they were not diabetic before taking Lipitor, that they were diagnosed with diabetes after taking Lipitor, and that they lacked certain risk factors that might make them especially likely to develop the disease. After the court rejected the evidence, the plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued that the cases ought to be returned to their transferor district courts for individual resolution on the issue of specific causation. The Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. View "Plaintiffs Appealing Case Management Order 100 v. Pfizer, Inc." on Justia Law

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After sustaining serious internal injuries in a personal watercraft (PWC) accident, plaintiff filed suit against the manufacturers of the PWC (Yamaha). On appeal, plaintiff argued that the district court erred in requiring expert testimony on her claims and in failing to conduct an appropriate Daubert analysis before excluding her expert's testimony. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded the expert's inadequate warning opinion and the district court properly concluded that the PWC's warnings were adequate as a matter of law. In this case, plaintiff based her claims of strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranties on theories of warning and design defects. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Yamaha on all claims because the record was devoid of admissible evidence on either theory of defect. View "Hickerson v. Yamaha Motor Corporation, U.S.A." on Justia Law