Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Stephen Stanko appealed the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition challenging one of his two South Carolina capital convictions and sentences. Stanko argued that his trial counsel, William Diggs, had a conflict of interest due to a pending ineffective assistance claim from a previous trial. Despite this, Stanko insisted on retaining Diggs for his second trial. The trial court held several hearings to ensure Stanko’s waiver of any conflict was knowing and voluntary. Stanko was convicted and sentenced to death. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the conviction and sentence, finding Stanko’s waiver valid.In his state post-conviction relief (PCR) petition, Stanko raised claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that Diggs’s conflict of interest and his performance during the penalty phase were constitutionally deficient. The PCR court rejected these claims, finding that Stanko had knowingly waived any conflict and that Diggs’s performance was within professional norms. Stanko’s petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of South Carolina was denied.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina reviewed Stanko’s federal habeas petition and applied the deferential standard of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The court found that Stanko’s claims were either procedurally barred or meritless under AEDPA’s standards. The court also addressed Stanko’s complaints about docket management decisions, finding no merit in one and lacking jurisdiction over the other. The district court granted summary judgment for the state and denied Stanko a certificate of appealability.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Stanko’s waiver of conflict-free counsel was valid and that the state court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of federal law. The court also found that Stanko’s ineffective assistance claims related to the penalty phase were procedurally barred and that Martinez v. Ryan did not apply to overcome the default. The court dismissed Stanko’s appeal regarding the district court’s denial of his Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration, as it lacked jurisdiction without a certificate of appealability. View "Stanko v. Stirling" on Justia Law

Willie Slocum, Jr. appealed the denial of his motion to correct, vacate, or set aside his convictions and sentences based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Slocum was indicted on two counts of drug conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846, but argued that the two charged conspiracies were actually one. He claimed that he was punished twice for the same conspiracy in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause, and that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise a double jeopardy challenge before the trial court. The district court denied his motion without ordering a response from the government or holding an evidentiary hearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that the district court erred in its decision. The appellate court determined that Slocum was indeed punished twice for a single conspiracy in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. However, the court noted that it was unclear whether trial counsel had a strategic reason for failing to raise a double jeopardy challenge. The court concluded that Slocum was entitled to an evidentiary hearing under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b) where the performance of his trial counsel could be assessed. Therefore, the court vacated the district court’s denial of Slocum’s § 2255 motion and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on Slocum’s ineffective assistance claim. View "United States v. Slocum" on Justia Law

The case involves Donald Herrington, who was charged with multiple counts of perjury, obtaining money by false pretenses, filing false or fraudulent income tax returns, failure to file an income tax return, and drug possession. Herrington chose to represent himself in court, waiving his right to counsel. He was eventually convicted on several charges and sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment. Herrington appealed his conviction, arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated and that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to bring two meritorious arguments on direct appeal.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which rejected Herrington's arguments and denied his petition. Herrington then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions. The court found that Herrington knowingly, unequivocally, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, thus affirming that aspect of the district court's decision. However, the court agreed with Herrington that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the jury was erroneously instructed on the requirements for a conviction for failure to file a tax return. The court reversed this part of the district court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to issue a writ of habeas corpus unless Herrington is afforded a new state court appeal in which he may raise this claim. View "Herrington v. Dotson" on Justia Law

A former patients of Pediatric Partners for Attention and Learning, Inc. and its founder, Dr. Joni Johnson, sued them in state court after discovering that the clinic’s in-house psychologist, Sharonda Avery, was not a licensed psychologist. The clinic and Dr. Johnson asked their professional liability insurance carrier, Medical Mutual Insurance Company of North Carolina, to defend and indemnify them in those lawsuits. Medical Mutual responded by filing a declaratory judgment action in federal court, arguing that it could rescind the policy covering Pediatric Partners and Dr. Johnson due to Dr. Johnson’s material misstatements in her insurance applications. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that Medical Mutual has no duty to indemnify or defend Dr. Johnson or Pediatric Partners under Virginia law due to material misstatements made by Dr. Johnson in her policy applications. The court affirmed the district court's decision that Dr. Johnson's misrepresentation that none of her employees had been subject to disciplinary investigative proceedings was a material misstatement, and therefore, Medical Mutual could rescind its professional liability policy covering Pediatric Partners and Dr. Johnson. View "Medical Mutual Insurance Co. of North Carolina v. Gnik" on Justia Law

This case involves Jeremy Schulman, a former shareholder at the Maryland law firm Shulman, Rogers, Gandal, Pordy & Ecker. Schulman sued insurance companies AXIS Surplus Insurance Company, Endurance American Specialty Insurance Company, and Prosight Syndicate 1110 at Lloyd’s, for breach of contract, detrimental reliance, and lack of good faith, claiming that they wrongfully denied his claim for coverage under his law firm's professional liability insurance policy. The dispute hinges on whether Schulman's indictment in a criminal case qualifies as a "claim" under his professional liability insurance policy, and whether a letter from the insurance companies promising to cover certain costs relating to a subpoena also covered costs related to the later indictment. Schulman also alleges that the insurers acted in bad faith.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, granting summary judgment to the defendants. The court held that Schulman's indictment in the criminal case did not constitute a "claim" under his professional liability insurance policy, and that the insurers' letter did not promise to cover costs related to the indictment. The court also held that Schulman's claim of bad faith could not succeed because he was not entitled to coverage under the policy and the insurers did not breach any tort duty by denying coverage. View "Schulman v. Axis Surplus Ins. Co., Inc." on Justia Law

While representing a client, Jane Roe , Appellant attorney John Doe engaged in settlement negotiations with the University of Maryland Medical System (UMMS). The negotiations between Doe and UMMS proceeded poorly. Among other things, Doe also made any settlement between Roe and UMMS contingent on his personal receipt of an additional $25 million that would effectuate his retention by UMMS as a private consultant of sorts. A grand jury indicted Doe, charging him with attempted extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 1951 and 1952. Shortly thereafter—at the government’s request—the grand jury issued multiple subpoenas duces tecum to the lawyers and firms that assisted in Doe’s representation of Roe—and in the formation of the alleged extortion scheme. Doe and Roe moved to quash the subpoenas. That court then granted in part a subsequent motion filed by the government to compel production. Doe and Roe now appealed asking the court to reverse the district court’s orders first denying their motions to quash and then compelling production.The Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal as to Doe for lack of appellate jurisdiction and otherwise affirmed. The court held that it lacks jurisdiction to consider Doe’s arguments given the Supreme Court’s effective narrowing of the Perlman doctrine. The court otherwise affirmed discerning no reversible error and ordered the parties must proceed to comply with the disputed subpoenas duces tecum in accordance with the district court’s order compelling production and this opinion. View "In re: Grand Jury 2021 Subpoenas" on Justia Law

Law firm Halscott Megaro, P.A. (“Halscott Megaro” or “the firm”) sued former clients and their guardians (collectively “former clients”), seeking to recover unpaid legal fees and expenses. A district court dismissed the action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court took judicial notice of a North Carolina State Bar Disciplinary Hearing Commission (“Commission”) decision that found the firm’s lead partner misled the former clients and engaged in other unethical conduct. The court then held the firm was precluded from relitigating issues decided by the Commission. It held that Halscott Megaro failed to plausibly plead claims for which relief could be granted. Halscott Megaro appealed, arguing the district court improperly considered matters outside the pleadings and failed to accept its allegations and all reasonable inferences from them as true in concluding that the Commission’s decision as to its lead partner bound the law firm.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed and held that the district court committed no reversible error in granting the former clients’ motion to dismiss or in denying the law firm’s motion for recusal. The court wrote that it agreed with the district court’s conclusion that the Commission was acting in a judicial capacity when it entered its discipline order against Megaro. The court also agreed that Megaro received a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues and due process protections. Further, the court held that the firm’s allegations of impartiality were not related to any particular facts, sources or statements. A presiding judge is not required to recuse himself simply because of unsupported or highly tenuous speculation. View "Halscott Megaro, P.A. v. Henry McCollum" on Justia Law

Attorney and his law firm, Pesner Kawamato Conway, P.C. (collectively, Conway), appealed the district court’s order rejecting the bankruptcy court’s report and recommendation to enjoin Smith Development, Inc.’s legal malpractice suit against Conway and to impose sanctions for violating the Barton doctrine and the automatic stay.   The Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal, finding that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because the district court’s decision rests on the abstention principles. The court explained that Conway suggests the district court had no authority to enter an abstention order because, under Barton, the district court itself lacked jurisdiction over Smith Development’s malpractice claims. However, the court wrote that this argument fares no better than the first. Barton concerns subject-matter jurisdiction over a separate action, not jurisdiction over the proceedings in which a party seeks Barton protection in the first place. And even if the court accepted the argument’s doubtful premise, it fails on its own logic because the bankruptcy court issued a report and recommendation to the district court, thereby authorizing the district court to rule on the matter. Further, the court found that even if it recognized a narrow exception to Section 1334(d)’s clear jurisdictional bar, the district court’s order would not fall within it. View "Martin Conway v. Smith Development, Inc." on Justia Law

The district court held defendant in contempt after finding him in violation of a consent order limiting his participation in the mortgage industry. The district court ordered the disgorgement of over half-a-million dollars of defendant's contemptuous earnings.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's contempt decision, holding that the district court cited several proper reasons for holding defendant in contempt. However, the district court based its disgorgement sanction on an erroneous legal interpretation of the terms of the underlying consent order. Accordingly, the court vacated the disgorgement order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Klopp" on Justia Law

In this case, a federal jury found that the defendant properties were subject to civil forfeiture. The jury found that each property derived from the proceeds of a health care fraud and money laundering scheme committed by Dr. Mert Kivanc - the son of Turan and Duygu Kivanc (Claimants). The court concluded that the district court correctly denied Claimants' motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations; the district court did not err in denying Claimants' motions to permit Turan and Dr. Kivanc to testify remotely from Turkey; the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Dr. Kivanc's statements and two documents at issue; the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give Claimants' proposed jury instructions; and Dr. Kivanc's statements and transfer of defendant properties to Claimants and money to Turan were sufficient evidence of his intent to conceal his unlawful activities to withstand Claimants' Rule 50 motion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Kivanc" on Justia Law