Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves defendants Aghee William Smith II and David Alcorn, who were convicted in the Eastern District of Virginia for their roles in fraudulent schemes that defrauded investors of millions of dollars. The schemes included marketing and selling phony investments in a dental services marketing program and fraudulent spectrum investments. The fraudulent activities primarily targeted elderly victims, resulting in significant financial losses.In the district court, Smith and Alcorn were tried together before a jury in February 2022. They raised three main issues on appeal: a joint constitutional challenge to the district court’s COVID-19 trial protocol under the Public Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment, Smith’s separate challenge to the admission of videotaped depositions under the Confrontation Clause, and Alcorn’s challenge to the imposition of supervised release conditions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court rejected Smith and Alcorn’s joint contention that the COVID-19 trial protocol violated their rights under the Public Trial Clause, finding that the protocol did not constitute a partial courtroom closure and was justified by substantial public health reasons. The court also rejected Smith’s Confrontation Clause challenge, concluding that the government had made a good faith effort to secure the witnesses’ presence at trial and that the witnesses were unavailable due to health concerns.However, the court found merit in Alcorn’s challenge regarding the imposition of supervised release conditions. The district court had failed to properly incorporate the standard conditions of supervised release during the oral pronouncement of Alcorn’s sentence, leading to a Rogers error. As a result, the Fourth Circuit vacated Alcorn’s sentences and remanded for resentencing.In summary, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Smith’s convictions and sentences, affirmed Alcorn’s convictions, but vacated Alcorn’s sentences and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of preferred stockholders in Cedar Realty Trust, sued Cedar and its directors, alleging that a series of transactions culminating in Cedar's acquisition by Wheeler Properties devalued their preferred shares. Cedar delisted its common stock and paid common stockholders, but the preferred stock remained outstanding and its value dropped significantly. Plaintiffs claimed Cedar and its directors breached contractual and fiduciary duties by structuring the transactions to deprive them of their preferential rights. They also alleged Wheeler tortiously interfered with their contractual rights and aided Cedar's breach of fiduciary duties.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the complaint. It found that the transactions did not trigger the preferred stockholders' conversion rights under the Articles Supplementary because Wheeler's stock remained publicly traded. The court also ruled that Maryland law does not recognize an independent cause of action for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. Additionally, the court held that the fiduciary duty claims were duplicative of the breach of contract claims, as the rights of preferred stockholders are defined by contract. Consequently, the claims against Wheeler failed because they depended on the existence of underlying breaches of contract and fiduciary duty.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. It held that the transactions did not constitute a "Change of Control" under the Articles Supplementary, as Wheeler's stock remained publicly traded. The court also agreed that Maryland law does not support an independent claim for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. Furthermore, the court found that the fiduciary duty claims were properly dismissed because the directors' duties to preferred stockholders are limited to the contractual terms. Finally, the claims against Wheeler were dismissed due to the absence of underlying breaches by Cedar and its directors. View "Kim v. Cedar Realty Trust, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a court-appointed receiver tasked with distributing funds recovered from a Ponzi scheme orchestrated by Kevin Merrill, Jay Ledford, and Cameron Jezierski. The scheme defrauded over 230 investors of more than $345 million. The appellants, comprising institutional and individual investors, were among the victims. The institutional investors, known as the Dean Investors, frequently withdrew and reinvested their funds, while the individual investors, known as the Connaughton Investors, invested through a third-party fund and later received settlements from that fund.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland approved the receiver's distribution plan, which used the "Rising Tide" method to allocate funds. This method ensures that no investor recovers less than a certain percentage of their principal investment, but it deducts pre-receivership withdrawals from the recovery amount. The Dean Investors objected to this method, arguing that their reinvested withdrawals should not be counted against them. The Connaughton Investors objected to the plan's "Collateral Offset Provision," which counted third-party settlements as withdrawals, reducing their distribution from the receiver.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's approval of the distribution plan. It held that the Rising Tide method without the Maximum Balance approach was appropriate, as it ensured a fair distribution to more claimants. The court also upheld the Collateral Offset Provision, reasoning that it prevented the Connaughton Investors from receiving a disproportionately higher recovery compared to other victims. The court emphasized the need for equitable distribution and the administrative feasibility of the receiver's plan. View "CCWB Asset Investments, LLC v. Milligan" on Justia Law

Petitioners opened brokerage accounts with Stifel, Nicolaus & Company, managed by Coleman Devlin. Dissatisfied with Devlin's performance, they filed for arbitration with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), alleging negligence, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent supervision, and violations of state and federal securities laws. After nearly two years of hearings, the arbitration panel ruled in favor of Stifel and Devlin without providing a detailed explanation, as the parties did not request an "explained decision."Petitioners moved to vacate the arbitration award in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, arguing that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law, including federal securities law. The district court denied the motion, stating that the petitioners failed to meet the high standard required to prove manifest disregard of the law. The court noted that the petitioners were essentially rearguing their case from the arbitration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that the Supreme Court's decision in Badgerow v. Walters requires an independent jurisdictional basis beyond the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) itself for federal courts to have jurisdiction over petitions to vacate arbitration awards. Since the petitioners did not provide such a basis, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court emphasized that claims of manifest disregard of federal law do not confer federal-question jurisdiction. View "Friedler v. Stifel, Nicolaus, & Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff contends that First Connecticut Bancorp, Inc. and its directors violated the securities laws by misleading shareholders like him about the true value of their shares ahead of a stock-for-stock merger. To comply with Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Plaintiff claims, First Connecticut needed to disclose specific cashflow projections—and particularly an earlier, rosier set of projections—in the proxy statement, it circulated to investors. The district court granted First Connecticut’s motion for summary judgment, holding that Plaintiff hadn’t shown that (1) the cash-flow projections were material; (2) their omission caused him any economic loss, or (3) the directors acted negligently in approving the proxy statement.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff’s evidence doesn’t establish that he or any other shareholder suffered an economic loss because the cash-flow projections weren’t in the proxy statement. So the district court correctly granted summary judgment on this basis as well. Further, the court reasoned that Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act provides that “controlling persons” can be vicariously liable for violations of the securities laws. But a claim “under Section 20(a) must be based upon a primary violation of the securities laws,” and the court agreed that Plaintiff has established no such violation here. View "Selwyn Karp v. First Connecticut Bancorp, Inc." on Justia Law

The Employees’ Retirement System of the City of Baton Rouge and Parish of East Baton Rouge represents the class of persons and entities who acquired shares of common stock in MacroGenics, Inc. (“MacroGenics”) between February 6, 2019, and June 4, 2019 (the “Class Period”). Plaintiffs initiated an action against MacroGenics, its president and CEO, and its senior vice president and CFO (collectively “Defendants”) for alleged violations of sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Rule 10b–5, and sections 11, 12(a), and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933. In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that after purchasing MacroGenics’ stock, they experienced economic harm proximately caused by Defendants’ material misrepresentations, misleading statements, or omissions concerning MacroGenics’ clinical trial drug, Margetuximab. The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss after concluding that Plaintiffs had failed to sufficiently allege any actionable misrepresentations or omissions that would give rise to Defendants’ duty to disclose and that most of Defendants’ statements were also immunized from suit.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate any materially false, misleading representations or omissions in Defendants’ statements. Because Plaintiffs’ Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) claims are inextricably intertwined with the alleged misstatements and omissions raised under their Exchange Act claims, their Securities Act claims cannot prevail. Further, because Plaintiffs have failed to plead a primary violation of the Securities Act, they have consequently failed to plead a Section 15 violation View "Employees' Retirement System of the City of Baton v. Macrogenics, Inc." on Justia Law

The Securities and Exchange Commission sued Defendant for trading Corporate Executive Board, Inc. (“CEB”) stock using inside information. The Commission alleged that Defendant aggressively traded CEB stock after he received inside information about a potential merger from co-Defendant, Defendant’s brother-in-law and CEB’s Corporate Controller. At trial, Defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a)1 at the conclusion of the Commission’s case. He argued the Commission failed to present evidence that co-Defendant possessed inside information about the merger at the time Defendant began the relevant trading. And if co-Defendant had no such information at that time, Defendant contended, co-Defendant could not have passed it on to Defendant The district court agreed and granted judgment for Defendant.   The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained the right to a trial by jury is enshrined by the Seventh Amendment. And the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that juries, not judges, decide cases so long as there is evidence from which a reasonable decision can be made. Here, evidence existed from which a reasonable jury could infer that Defendant engaged in prohibited insider trading beginning on December 9, 2016. View "SEC v. Christopher Clark" on Justia Law

This securities fraud lawsuit arises from a series of statements made by K12, Inc., and two of its executives over the spring and summer of 2020. Plaintiffs, a class of K12 shareholders who acquired stock during that time, allege that the statements fraudulently misrepresented the state of K12’s business, thereby artificially inflating the cost of their shares. To survive dismissal under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), however, they must plead a “strong inference” of scienter, which requires establishing an inference of fraud to be “cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference.”   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs claims because Plaintiffs do not satisfy the “heightened pleading instruction”. The court explained by including the language of “we believe,” the statement reflected not an incontestable fact but an individual perspective. The statement was couched as opinion, not as fact. While it is true that the prefatory clause contains an embedded assertion—that K12 is “an innovator in K-12 online education”— plaintiffs do not seriously contest this point. Nor do Plaintiffs deny, in more than conclusory fashion, that K12 “actually holds” its stated belief. Finally, Plaintiffs fail to show that K12’s opinion omitted necessary context. The company’s opinion was not simply emitted into the ether. It was made within the framework of a 10-K filing, where investors could have parsed the ample disclosures at their fingertips before succumbing to K12’s stated view. View "James Boykin v. K12, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant challenged the district court’s disgorgement order against him and Owings Group, LLC, the entity he founded and controlled. Together, Defendant, Owings, and three codefendants perpetrated a fraudulent scheme in violation of federal securities laws. After Defendant consented to an entry of judgment, the court ordered him to disgorge $681,554 and imposed a monetary penalty in the same amount.Defendant argued that the disgorgement order violates Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936 (2020) and that the district court erroneously premised the associated monetary penalty on joint-and-several liability. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s disgorgement order and its monetary penalty.The court explained that it agreed with the district court that Defendant and Owings were “partners engaged in concerted wrongdoing". The court wrote that Owings’s conduct in the scheme generated its ill-gotten gains—and Defendant controlled that conduct. Further, the district court didn’t order a joint-and-several penalty. It ordered a penalty equal to Defendant's disgorgement, which happened to be joint and several.Finally, the court concluded that it found no abuse of discretion. Though the district court didn’t explicitly discuss Defendant's financial situation, it’s clear to the court that the district court considered it, along with the remaining factors. The district court understood that all the defendants were insolvent but decided that Defendant's substantially more serious role in the scheme warranted a penalty all the same. View "SEC v. Mark Johnson" on Justia Law

Following a data breach targeting servers owned by Defendant, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant violated federal securities laws by omitting material information about data vulnerabilities in their public statements.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint, finding that the investors did not adequately allege that any of Defendant’s statements were false or misleading when made.The court explained that to state a claim under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must first allege a “material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant.” However, not all material omissions give rise to a cause of action. Here, Plaintiffs focus on statements about the importance of protecting customer data; privacy statements on Defendant's website; and cybersecurity-related risk disclosures. The court found that Plaintiffs failed to allege that any of the challenged statements were false or rendered Defendant's public statement misleading. Although Defendant could have disseminated more information to the public about its vulnerability to cyberattacks, federal securities law does not require it to do so. View "Construction Laborers Pension Trust Southern CA v. Marriott International, Inc." on Justia Law