Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Kenneth and Anita Wolke Brooks purchased 85 acres of land in Georgia for $1.35 million, subdivided it, and granted a conservation easement on a 41-acre parcel to Liberty County. They claimed a $5.1 million charitable deduction on their tax returns for this easement. The IRS disallowed the deductions for 2010, 2011, and 2012, citing non-compliance with the Internal Revenue Code and regulations, and imposed accuracy-related penalties for gross valuation misstatements.The Brookses challenged the IRS's notice of deficiency in the United States Tax Court. The Tax Court upheld the IRS's disallowance of the deductions and the imposition of penalties. The court found that the Brookses failed to provide a contemporaneous written acknowledgment of the donation, did not submit an adequate baseline report to Liberty County, and misrepresented their basis in the property. The court also found that the valuation of the easement was grossly overstated.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Tax Court's decision. The court held that the Brookses did not meet the statutory requirements for a charitable deduction due to the lack of a proper contemporaneous written acknowledgment and an inadequate baseline report. The court also agreed with the Tax Court's finding that the Brookses' valuation of the easement was speculative and unsupported, justifying the 40 percent penalty for gross valuation misstatements. The court concluded that the Tax Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the IRS Civil Penalty Approval Form into evidence despite its late disclosure. View "Brooks v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

The case involves United Therapeutics Corporation (UTC), a biotechnology company, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The dispute centers on the interpretation of a tax provision that coordinates two tax credits: the research credit and the orphan drug credit. The Commissioner claimed that UTC disregarded one of the provision’s two commands, improperly reducing its tax liability by over a million dollars. UTC argued that the relevant half of the coordination provision lost effect in 1989 and has been moribund since.The United States Tax Court disagreed with UTC's argument. The court interpreted the statute’s terms by reference to their ordinary meaning, giving effect to the full coordination provision. The court rejected UTC's argument that changes to the tax law since its enactment rendered part of the coordination provision ineffective. The court also disagreed with UTC's interpretation of two regulations it relied on for support.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the tax court's decision. The appellate court agreed with the tax court's interpretation of the coordination provision according to its ordinary meaning. The court also found that the tax court correctly rejected UTC's arguments based on the interpretation of predecessor statutes and regulations. The court concluded that the tax court correctly resolved the case in favor of the Commissioner. View "United Therapeutics Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Patrick Sutherland was convicted of three counts of filing false tax returns and one count of obstructing an official proceeding. He managed several insurance businesses and routed his international transactions through a Bermuda company, Stewart Technology Services (STS), which he claimed was owned and controlled by his sister. However, evidence showed that Sutherland managed all its day-to-day affairs. Between 2007 and 2011, STS sent Sutherland, his wife, or companies that he owned more than $2.1 million in wire transfers. Sutherland treated these transfers as loans or capital contributions, which are not taxable income, while STS treated them as expenses paid to Sutherland. Sutherland did not report the $2.1 million as income on his tax returns. In 2015, a federal grand jury indicted Sutherland for filing false returns and for obstructing the 2012 grand jury investigation. The jury found Sutherland guilty on all charges.Sutherland appealed his convictions, but the Court of Appeals affirmed them. He then filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition to vacate his obstruction conviction and a petition for a writ of error coram nobis to vacate his tax fraud convictions. The district court denied both petitions without holding an evidentiary hearing. Sutherland appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Sutherland failed to show how the proffered testimony from his brother and a tax expert would have undermined his obstruction conviction. The court also found that Sutherland had not demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel and thus could not show an error of the most fundamental character warranting coram nobis relief. View "United States v. Sutherland" on Justia Law

The case involves Donald Herrington, who was charged with multiple counts of perjury, obtaining money by false pretenses, filing false or fraudulent income tax returns, failure to file an income tax return, and drug possession. Herrington chose to represent himself in court, waiving his right to counsel. He was eventually convicted on several charges and sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment. Herrington appealed his conviction, arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated and that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to bring two meritorious arguments on direct appeal.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which rejected Herrington's arguments and denied his petition. Herrington then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions. The court found that Herrington knowingly, unequivocally, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, thus affirming that aspect of the district court's decision. However, the court agreed with Herrington that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the jury was erroneously instructed on the requirements for a conviction for failure to file a tax return. The court reversed this part of the district court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to issue a writ of habeas corpus unless Herrington is afforded a new state court appeal in which he may raise this claim. View "Herrington v. Dotson" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Ronald Lee Morgan, who filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in North Carolina. Morgan owned a home jointly with his wife as tenants by the entirety. He sought to exempt this home from the bankruptcy estate to the extent of his outstanding tax debt to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). However, the bankruptcy court disallowed the exemption. Morgan's wife did not jointly owe the debt to the IRS and did not file for bankruptcy. The trustee of the bankruptcy estate objected to Morgan's claim for an exemption, arguing that under North Carolina state law, tenancy by the entireties property is generally exempt from execution by creditors of only one spouse, but this rule does not apply to tax obligations owing to the United States.The bankruptcy court sustained the trustee's objection, and on appeal, the district court affirmed this decision. Morgan then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, arguing that for his IRS debt to override the entireties exemption, the IRS must have obtained a perfected tax lien on the property prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition.The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. The court concluded that Morgan's interest in his home as a tenant by the entirety is not "exempt from process" under "applicable nonbankruptcy law." The court rejected Morgan's argument that the IRS must have actually obtained a lien prior to the bankruptcy filing, stating that the absence of a judgment or lien has no bearing on the hypothetical issue of whether the debtor's interest would be exempt from process. The court also dismissed Morgan's contention that the IRS must perfect a lien against his property before he filed for bankruptcy. The court concluded that nothing in the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Craft limits its holding to instances where the IRS has perfected a tax lien against the property. View "Morgan v. Bruton" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Chamber of Commerce and three other trade associations sued to stop the enforcement of a new state tax in Maryland known as the Digital Advertising Gross Revenues Tax Act. The law requires large technology companies to pay a tax based on gross revenue they earn from digital advertising in the state. The plaintiffs alleged that the Act violates the Internet Tax Freedom Act, the Commerce Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the First Amendment. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed three of the counts as barred by the Tax Injunction Act, which prevents federal courts from stopping the collection of state taxes when state law provides an adequate remedy. The court dismissed the fourth count on mootness grounds after a state trial court declared the Act unconstitutional in a separate proceeding. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the first three counts, but vacated the judgment to the extent it dismissed those counts with prejudice, ordering that the dismissal be entered without prejudice. The appellate court also vacated the dismissal of the fourth count and remanded for further proceedings, as the plaintiffs' First Amendment challenge to the Act's prohibition on passing the tax onto consumers was not moot. View "Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Lierman" on Justia Law

Four inmates at the Buckingham Correctional Center in Dillwyn, Virginia, commenced this action pro se against agents of the IRS, alleging that the IRS unlawfully denied them all or part of their COVID-19 stimulus payments. The complaint alleged that the IRS was categorically denying payments to inmates on account of their incarcerated status. The four inmates contended that the IRS had “violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection of the law,” and they sought an injunction requiring the IRS to disburse the proper payments to them. The four inmates filed a motion to amend it by adding five additional inmates with the same claims. The three inmates whose claims were severed from the original action filed these appeals, challenging the legal and factual underpinnings of the district court’s order. They contend that the district court erred both in applying Section 1915(b)(1) as they were not proceeding in forma pauperis and in making factual findings that were not supported by the record.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the court’s order severing Plaintiffs’ claims and its order denying amendment and remanded. The court explained that Section 1915(b)(1), by its explicit terms, is restricted to in forma pauperis actions. The court wrote that because Plaintiffs here did not proceed in forma pauperis, the court should not have construed Section 1915(b)(1) and applied it to them, and it was an error to have done so. View "Aaron Ellis v. Daniel I. Werfel" on Justia Law

Clary Hood, Inc. (“Hood, Inc.”), a South Carolina corporation engaged in land excavation and grading, with revenue of $44 million in 2015 and $69 million in 2016, paid its CEO a $5 million bonus in both of those years, deducting the payments on its income tax returns as reasonable business expenses under 26 U.S.C. Section 162(a)(1). The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) contended that the bonuses were excessive, with the excess amount actually representing a disguised payment of dividends from profits, which could not be deducted. The Tax Court mostly agreed with the IRS and determined that Hood, Inc. could only deduct roughly $3.7 million for 2015 and $1.4 million for 2016 as reasonable amounts for total compensation to its CEO. Accordingly, it assessed tax deficiencies for both years in the total amount of roughly $1.96 million, as well as a penalty for 2016 in the amount of $282,398.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s findings with respect to the amount of reasonable deductions and consequent tax deficiency but vacated the imposition of the penalty. The court explained that because the record indicates that Hood, Inc. anticipated remedying Mr. Hood’s past under compensation in installments over multiple years and discussed that plan with its tax advisors, who approved it as reasonable, the court concluded that the Tax Court’s finding regarding the reasonable-cause defense for the 2015 tax year should also have applied to the 2016 tax year. Further, Hood, Inc. used a consistent methodology to determine the amount of Mr. Hood’s bonuses for both 2015 and 2016 with the advice of independent accountants. View "Clary Hood, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

The IRS audited Plaintiff's and erroneously determined he owed tax for 2013 when he had actually overpaid. Plaintiff sought a timely 2012 tax refund based on the discovered miscalculation. Plaintiff claimed that, in the same envelope, he also requested a refund for the 2013 tax year, although the IRS claims it did not receive the 2013 refund request. Ultimately, the IRS awarded Plaintiff the requested 2012 refund, but denied the 2013 refund based on Plaintiff's failure to provide a timely request.Plaintiff sought enforcement of his 2013 refund, which the district court denied. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that Plaintiff failed to meet the required elements of the Mailbox Rule but plausibly alleged physical delivery of his refund request. Thus, the Fourth Circuit reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Stephen Pond v. US" on Justia Law

When the ACA’s mandate and SRP were still in effect, a husband and wife (“Taxpayers”) did not maintain the minimum insurance coverage required by the ACA. The taxpayers did not include their $2409 SRP when they filed their 2018 federal tax return. The Taxpayers filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection in the Eastern District of North Carolina. The IRS filed a proof of claim for the unpaid SRP and asserted that its claim was entitled to priority as an income or excise tax under Section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Taxpayers objected to the government’s claim of priority. The bankruptcy court granted the objection, concluding that, for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, the SRP is a penalty, not a tax, and therefore is not entitled to priority under Section 507(a)(8). The government appealed to the district court, which affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision. The district court held that even if the SRP was generally a tax, it did not qualify as a tax measured by income or an excise tax and thus was not entitled to priority. The government thereafter appealed.   The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court concluded that that the SRP qualifies as a tax under the functional approach that has consistently been applied in bankruptcy cases and that nothing in the Supreme Court’s decision in NFIB requires the court to abandon that functional approach. Because the SRP is a tax that is measured by income, the government’s claim is entitled to priority under 11 U.S.C. Section 507(a)(8)(A). View "US v. Fabio Alicea" on Justia Law