Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Kevin Morrison, a resident of Maryland, was born in Jamaica and cannot read or write English. He filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") asserting that Appellee Randstad terminated his employment pursuant to a requirement that its employees read and write English. Two years later, in an amended charge, Morrison asserted that the literacy policy violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) because he has a learning disability. In investigating Morrison’s charges, the EEOC served an administrative subpoena on Randstad, which Randstad resisted, in part. When the EEOC sought judicial enforcement of its subpoena, the district court denied relief. "Once a charge has placed the Commission on notice that a particular employer is (or may be) violating Title VII or the ADA in a particular way, the Commission may access 'virtually any material that might cast light on the allegations against the employer.'" The question was whether and to what extent these materials were "relevant" to the EEOC’s investigation of Morrison’s charges. The district court concluded that none of the requested materials were relevant. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court’s application of an unduly strict standard of relevance amounted to legal error, leading to an abuse of discretion. Applying the correct standard, with deference to the EEOC’s assessment of relevance, the Court concluded that all of the EEOC’s requested materials fell within the broad definition of relevance applicable to EEOC administrative subpoenas, and that the district court’s rejection of the EEOC’s alleged factual nexus "crossed the line" into an assessment of the merits of Morrison’s claim. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "EEOC v. Randstad" on Justia Law

After pleading guilty to illegal reentry, Defendant Francisco Bonilla received an enhanced sentence based on a prior Texas conviction for burglary of a habitation. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in applying the enhancement because his state conviction under Texas Penal Code section 30.02(a)(3) did not satisfy the definition of generic burglary under "Taylor v. United States," (495 U.S. 575 (1990)). Upon review, the Fourth Circuit disagreed and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Bonilla" on Justia Law

The government initiated civil commitment proceedings against Respondent-Appellee Sean Francis. The government certified that Respondent, who had numerous criminal convictions based on his repeated conduct of placing threatening and obscene telephone calls, was a "sexually dangerous person." After an evidentiary hearing, the district court determined that Respondent was not eligible for commitment because the government failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent would have serious difficulty refraining from sexually violent conduct if released. On appeal, the government argued that the district court erred by failing to make necessary factual findings regarding Respondent's prior sexually violent conduct and by failing to determine whether Respondent suffered from a qualifying mental condition under the relevant statutes. After reviewing the record, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, because the court appropriately considered the elements required for civil commitment and did not clearly err in determining that the government failed to meet its burden of proving that Respondent was a sexually dangerous person. View "United States v. Francis" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Jermaine Mobley pled guilty to possession of a prohibited object in prison. The sentencing court thereafter found Defendant to be a career offender under section 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines and imposed a sentence of thirty-seven months. On appeal, Defendant challenged his sentence, maintaining that the court erred in ruling that his offense of conviction constituted a crime of violence for purposes of the career offender sentencing enhancement of the Guidelines. The Fourth Circuit rejected Defendant's contention and affirmed his sentence. View "United States v. Mobley" on Justia Law

Appellant David Michael Worley appealed his 100-month sentence for (methamphetamine manufacture and distribution) and special conditions imposed on supervised release, arguing that the sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable and that the district court abused its discretion by failing to explain its imposition of the conditions. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the 100-month sentence, but reversed the district court's imposition of special conditions one, six, and fourteen. Accordingly the case was remanded for further proceedings on all remaining special conditions. View "United States v. Worley" on Justia Law

Over thirty-five years ago, the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS), working with local sponsors, devised a project to provide watershed protection, flood prevention, and recreation along the Lost River Subwatershed. In 1974, the NRCS issued an environmental impact statement relating to the project, and since that time, three dams and most of the land treatment measures have been completed. After preparing a supplemental environmental impact statement in 2009, the NRCS issued a record of decision that eliminated one of the remaining dams from the project and authorized construction of the final dam for the added purpose of providing water supply. Appellants, seven individuals who alleged that their land will be adversely affected by this final dam's construction, filed this action contending that the NRCS failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). They appealed the district court's order granting Appellees' motion for summary judgment. Because the Fourth Circuit determined that the NRCS complied with the procedures mandated by the NEPA and took a hard look at the project's environmental effects, the Court affirmed. View "Webster v. USDA" on Justia Law

The issue presented in this appeal was whether the right recognized in "Padilla v. Kentucky," (130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010)) is a new right that has been made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review so as to enable Defendant-Appellant Shahzad Mathur to file a timely motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate his guilty plea for drug trafficking. When Defendant, an alien residing in the United States, pled guilty in 2007 to conspiracy to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine in 2008 and received a sentence of 20 years' imprisonment, his lawyer failed to advise him of the immigration-related consequences of his plea, such as possible deportation, telling him "not to worry" about such consequences. After pleading guilty, however, the Department of Homeland Security initiated deportation proceedings against Defendant based on his plea. Almost three years after his conviction, the Supreme Court handed down Padilla, and relying on that decision, Defendant filed a section 2255 motion seeking to vacate his plea. The district court denied Defendant's motion, finding it untimely. It concluded that Padilla was not to be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that Defendant's 2255 motion was barred by the one-year statute of limitations in 2255(f). View "United States v. Mathur" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant-Appellant Albert Burgess, Jr. of two felonies involving the receipt and possession of materials depicting minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. The district court sentenced Burgess to a term of 292 months' imprisonment, and to supervised release for life. The district court also ordered that Burgess pay, among other things, restitution of $305,219.86 under the Mandatory Restitution for Sexual Exploitation of Children Act for losses suffered by "Vicky," a child victim portrayed in pornographic material in Burgess' possession. Burgess challenged both his convictions and sentences on appeal. The Fourth Circuit affirmed his convictions and all aspects of his sentences, except the district court's award of restitution to the victim. Because the district court did not make specific findings regarding the elements of restitution, the Court vacated the restitution award and remanded the case to the district court for a calculation of the loss Burgess proximately caused the victim. View "United States v. Burgess" on Justia Law

In this direct appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, the Fourth Circuit addressed a question of first impression in the circuit courts of appeal: in light of the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, codified in Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act ("BAPCPA"), how is the "household" size of a debtor seeking bankruptcy relief to be calculated under Chapter 13. Petitioner Tanya Johnson filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 13; upon receiving notice of Petitioners motion for confirmation of the plan, Petitioner's ex-husband objected because he felt the plan overstated Petitioner's household size and monthly expenses. As a result, the ex-husband maintained that Petitioner's disposable monthly income was insufficient to make payments to two unsecured loans for which he and Petitioner were jointly liable. In examining the parties' dispute, the bankruptcy court observed that the Code does not define "household," there was no binding precedent on point, and that other bankruptcy courts followed three different approaches to define that term. Finding no error in the bankruptcy court's method of calculating the Petitioner's household size based on how many individuals operate as an "economic unit" with the Petitioner, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's order denying the Petitioner's motion for confirmation with leave to amend the Debtor's "disposable income calculation and plan to reflect the household size [of five]." View "Johnson v. Zimmer" on Justia Law

Appellants, eleven inmates in the custody of the Virginia Department of Corrections (DOC), brought this action against members of the Virginia Parole Board in their official capacities. The Inmates contended the Board adopted policies and procedures with respect to parole-eligible inmates imprisoned for violent offenses that violated the Due Process and Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States Constitution. Most notably, they asserted that the Board implemented an unwritten policy of denying parole to persons incarcerated for violent offenses. The district court granted Appellees' motion to dismiss the complaint, and the Inmates appealed. Because the Fourth Circuit agreed that the complaint failed to set forth sufficient facts to establish a plausible entitlement to relief under either a due process or ex post facto theory, the Court affirmed. View "Burnette v. Fahey" on Justia Law