Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs James Brooks and Donald Hamlette, corrections officers at the Correctional Unit in Rustburg, Virginia, sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the defendants unlawfully fired them for exercising their First Amendment rights to free speech. "The Supreme Court has been quite clear, . . .that 'complaints about . . . the employee's own duties' that are filed with an employer using an internal grievance procedure . . . do[ ] not relate to a matter of public concern and accordingly 'may give rise to discipline without imposing any special burden of justification on the government employer.'" The Fourth circuit therefore affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the defendants. View "Brooks v. Arthur" on Justia Law

The issue before the Fourth Circuit concerned commercial arbitration of insurance disputes in foreign tribunals. Appellant-Cross-Appellee ESAB Group, Inc. contended that South Carolina law "reverse preempts" federal law (namely, a treaty and its implementing legislation) pursuant to the McCarran-Ferguson Act. ESAB Group faced numerous products liability suits arising from alleged personal injuries caused by exposure to welding consumables manufactured by ESAB Group or its predecessors. These suits presently were proceeding in numerous state and federal courts in the United States. ESAB Group requested that its insurers defend and indemnify it in these suits. Several, including Zurich Insurance, PLC (ZIP), refused coverage. As a result, ESAB Group brought suit against its insurers in South Carolina state court. The district court then found that ZIP had the requisite minimum contacts with the forum to permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction and that the exercise of jurisdiction over ZIP was otherwise reasonable. Because it had referred to arbitration all claims providing a basis for subject-matter jurisdiction, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims. ESAB Group timely appealed the district court's exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction. ZIP filed a cross-appeal, challenging the district court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction and its authority to remand the nonarbitrable claims to state court. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit affirmed as to the district court’s exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction, and found no error in the district court's order compelling arbitration. Likewise, the Court rejected ZIP's arguments that the district court erred in exercising personal jurisdiction over it and in remanding nonarbitrable claims to state court. View "ESAB Group, Incorporated v. Zurich Insurance PLC" on Justia Law

In this case, a group of hourly-wage employees of Perdue Farms, Inc. (Perdue) filed a civil conspiracy action under 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The plaintiffs alleged that certain corporate managers of Perdue, human resources staff, and plant managers conspired to hire aliens not authorized to work in the United States in an effort to reduce labor costs. They asserted that this illegal hiring practice has caused the depression of wages paid to all hourly-wage employees at certain Perdue facilities. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs failed to allege a civil conspiracy claim upon which relief could be granted. After review, the Fourth Circuit affirmed, and held that the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action for civil conspiracy because they did not sufficiently allege a violation of two predicate RICO acts. View "Walters v. McMahen" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant G. Martin Wynn, a professional engineer with the engineering firm of Talbert & Bright, Inc., was convicted of mail fraud and wire fraud, in violation based on his performance of services to Oconee County, South Carolina, in connection with its project to extend the runway at the Oconee County Regional Airport. Instead of procuring a required permit for the runway extension project from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control ("DHEC"), Defendant cut a valid permit off of an older set of plans prepared for a previous airport project and fraudulently attached that permit to the plans for the runway extension. He then mailed the fraudulently permitted plans to Oconee County and later emailed them to the DHEC. Following his conviction, the district court sentenced Defendant to 12 months and 1 day in prison and ordered him to pay Oconee County $118,000 in restitution. On appeal, Defendant contended that the district court erred in instructing the jury on the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes and that the evidence was insufficient to convict him on the offenses had they been properly presented to the jury. He also challenged the district court’s calculation of the amount of loss found for purposes of sentencing and ordering restitution. Finding no abuse of discretion and that the evidence presented against him was sufficient to support his conviction, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United State v. Wynn" on Justia Law

South Carolina’s Spartanburg County School District Seven adopted a policy allowing public school students to receive two academic credits for off-campus religious instruction offered by private educators. The parents of two students at Spartanburg High School filed suit against the School District, alleging that the policy impermissibly endorses religion and entangles church and State in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The School District filed a motion for summary judgment, contending (1) that plaintiffs lacked standing because they were not injured by the policy, and (2) that the policy was constitutional in that it was neutrally stated and administered and that it had the secular purpose of accommodating students’ desire to receive religious instruction. Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that that the purpose and primary effect of the School District’s policy was to promote Christianity. The district court rejected the school district’s standing argument but agreed with it on the merits and, accordingly, granted summary judgment to the School District. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit affirmed: "[the Court saw] no evidence that the program has had the effect of establishing religion or that it has entangled the School District in religion. As was the General Assembly and School District’s purpose, the program properly accommodates religion without establishing it, in accordance with the First Amendment." View "Moss v. Spartanburg Cty. Sch. Dist. 7" on Justia Law

The Government appealed the district court's grant of Defendants-Appellees WIlliam Danielczyk and Eugene Biagi's motion to dismiss count four, paragraph 10(b) of their indictment, which alleged that they conspired and facilitated direct contributions to Hillary Clinton's 2008 presidential campaign in violation of federal election laws. The district court reasoned that in light of "Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission" (130 S.Ct. 876 (2010)), section 441b(a) of the Election Campaign Act of 1971 was unconstitutional as applied to Appellees. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the district court and reversed, finding that the lower court misapplied "Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont," (539 U.S. 146 (2003)) as the basis for its dismissal of count four. View "United States v. Danielczyk" on Justia Law

A group of local volunteer fire and rescue departments ("LFRDs") and several of their former administrative employees brought suit against Defendants Montgomery County, Maryland, the County Council, and certain county officials contending that Defendants eliminated part of their funding in retaliation for opposing to legislation supported by Defendants. The district court dismissed the LFRDs' complaint, declining to inquire into Defendants’ alleged illicit motive behind an otherwise facially valid budgetary enactment, finding that certain individual defendants were protected by legislative immunity, and concluding that because the individual Plaintiffs were not County employees, they could not bring an abusive discharge claim under state law. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit found no error nor abuse of discretion in the district court's judgment. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Kensington Volunteer Fire v. Montgomery County, Maryland" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellees Wheeling Hospital and Belmont Hospital along with other medical providers, filed this putative class action in West Virginia state court against the Ohio Valley Health Services and Education Corporation, Ohio Valley Medical Center and East Ohio Regional Hospital, (collectively, the "OV Health System Parties"), and Appellant The Health Plan of the Upper Ohio Valley, Inc. The plaintiffs sued in order to collect amounts allegedly owed to them by employee benefit plans established by the OV Health System Parties, for which The Health Plan acted as administrator. After pretrial activity, The Health Plan moved to dismiss the claims brought against it by the hospital plaintiffs pursuant to an arbitration agreement between the parties. The district court denied this motion, holding that The Health Plan had defaulted on its right to arbitrate. The Health Plan appealed. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in its determination that The Health Plan defaulted on its right to arbitrate. The Court therefore reversed the district court’s denial of The Health Plan’s motion to dismiss. View "Wheeling Hospital, Inc. v. Health Plan of the Upper Ohio Valley, Inc. " on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jane Huggins, trading as SADISCO of Maryland (SADISCO) sued Prince George’s County, Maryland and five County officials after the County shut down the salvage automobile wholesaling business operated by SADISCO on a parcel of land that SADISCO owned within the County. SADISCO’s complaint alleged one count under federal law and four counts under Maryland’s common law. The district court dismissed certain counts pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and granted summary judgment in favor of the County and officials with respect to the remaining counts. Plaintiff appealed, and after review, the Fourth Circuit found that the district court correctly rejected Plaintiff's arguments. View "Huggins v. Prince George's County, MD" on Justia Law

Centro Tepeyac a filed suit against Montgomery County, Maryland, the Montgomery County Council, the Montgomery County Department of Health and Human Services, and Marc Hansen, the acting County Counsel, challenging the constitutionality of Montgomery County Resolution No. 16-1252. In its complaint, it contended that in compelling speech, the resolution violated its free speech rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. The resolution required "limited service pregnancy resource centers," such as Centro Tepeyac, to display a sign on their premises stating (1) "the Center does not have a licensed medical professional on staff"; and (2) "the Montgomery County Health Officer encourages women who are or may be pregnant to consult with a licensed health care provider." Violation of the resolution was punishable as a "Class A civil violation." For relief, Centro Tepeyac sought a declaratory judgment that Resolution 16-1252 was unconstitutional and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against its enforcement. Applying strict scrutiny, the district court entered an order denying Centro Tepeyac’s motion for a preliminary injunction as to the first statement required by Resolution 16-1252 (regarding the medical professional on staff) and granting its motion as to the second mandated statement("the Montgomery County Health Officer encourages women who are or may be pregnant to consult with a licensed health care provider.") Montgomery County appealed the district court’s preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the second mandated statement, and Centro Tepeyac cross-appealed the district court’s denial of its motion for an injunction with respect to the first. For the reasons given in "Greater Baltimore Center for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore," (___ F.3d ___, No. 11-1111 (4th Cir. June 27, 2012)) the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s entry of a preliminary injunction and reversed its denial of the preliminary injunction requested by Centro Tepeyac with respect to the first mandated statement. The Court concluded that the goals of the "no licensed medical professional" disclosure could readily be achieved through less speech-restrictive methods. "Such methods might include a more vigorous enforcement of laws against practicing medicine without a license." View "Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery County" on Justia Law