Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Archbishop Edward F. O'Brien, St. Brigid's Roman Catholic Congregation, Inc., and the Greater Baltimore Center for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. ("the Pregnancy Center") filed suit against the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, challenging the constitutionality of the City’s Ordinance 09-252, which required that "limited-service pregnancy centers," such as the Pregnancy Center, post signs disclaiming that they "do[ ] not provide or make referral for abortion or birth control services." The complaint alleged that the ordinance, both facially and as applied to the plaintiffs, violated the plaintiffs' free speech, free exercise, and equal protection rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, as well as the plaintiffs' rights under the Conscience Clause of Maryland's health law. The district court granted summary judgment to the Pregnancy Center on its freedom of speech count, dismissed the Archbishop and St. Brigid's as plaintiffs for lack of standing, and dismissed the remaining counts without prejudice, in view of its free speech ruling. The court held that the disclaimer required by Ordinance 09-252 is "a form of compelled speech" that "alters the course of a [pregnancy] center’s communication with a client or prospective client about abortion and birth-control" and "is based, at least in part, on disagreement with the viewpoint of the speaker." The court entered a permanent injunction barring enforcement of the ordinance. Upon review of the briefs submitted by both the parties and numerous amici briefs in this case, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the ordinance in question was not narrowly tailored to promote the City's interest so as to justify its intrusion on the Pregnancy Center's speech. View "Greater Baltimore Center for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore" on Justia Law

Having pled guilty in the District of South Carolina to eight counts of a superseding indictment, Defendant Chadrick Evan Fulks was sentenced to death. The capital sentence was imposed on his convictions of carjacking resulting in death, and kidnapping resulting in death. The federal charges in South Carolina related to the abduction and murder of Alice Donovan on November 14, 2002, in the course of a multistate crime spree engineered by Defendant and his cohort Brandon Basham, following their escape from a Kentucky jail. Three days prior to Donovan being carjacked, kidnapped, and killed, Samantha Burns suffered the same fate in West Virginia at the hands of Defendant and Basham. The district court sentenced Defendant in 2004, and on appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Defendant's sentence. The United States Supreme Court denied Defendant's petition for certiorari. Subsequently, Defendant filed a motion to vacate his conviction and sentence, and requested a new trial. The motion listed thirty-three claims for relief; the district court issued an "exhaustive" memorandum opinion and rejected each claim. Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit rejected Defendant's allegations of error by the district court and affirmed the denial of his motion. View "United States v. Fulk" on Justia Law

Deputy James Elliott stopped Defendant Sean Sowards for speeding along North Carolina’s Interstate 77 after visually estimating that Defendant's vehicle was traveling 75 mph in a 70-mph zone. Although the deputy's patrol car was equipped with radar, he had intentionally positioned his patrol car at an angle that rendered an accurate radar reading impossible. During the traffic stop, Deputy Elliott had a canine trained in drug detection, Ringo, sniff the outside of Defendant's vehicle. When the dog signaled the possible presence of a controlled substance, Deputy Elliott, along with other officers, searched Defendant's vehicle and discovered approximately 10 kilograms of cocaine. Subsequently, a grand jury charged Defendant with possession of at least 5 kilograms of cocaine with intent to distribute. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the police lacked probable cause to initiate a traffic stop based exclusively on the deupty's visual estimate --uncorroborated by radar or pacing and unsupported by any other indicia of reliability-- that Defendant's vehicle was traveling 75 miles per hour in a 70-mph zone. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit agreed and reversed the district court. View "United States v. Sowards" on Justia Law

A Virginia jury convicted Petitioner-Appellee Leon Winston of capital murder. The court, following the jury’s recommendation, sentenced him to death. Petitioner's direct appeals failed and his conviction became final, at which point he sought habeas relief in state court. The Supreme Court of Virginia denied relief, rejecting Petitioner's requests for discovery and an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner then filed a habeas petition in federal court. The district court granted him an evidentiary hearing to explore whether his trial attorneys were ineffective for failing to raise the claim under "Atkins v. Virginia" (536 U.S. 304 (2002)) that his mental retardation categorically barred imposition of a death sentence. But the court reversed course and held that it was precluded from considering any evidence adduced during the federal proceeding. Looking only to facts presented in the state habeas proceeding and conducting a deferential review of the state-court decision, the court denied Petitioner's petition for habeas relief. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit vacated in part the district court’s decision on appeal, ordering it to conduct a de novo review of Petitioner's ineffectiveness claim while entertaining the evidence offered during the federal hearing. On remand, the district court granted Winston’s petition for habeas relief and vacated his death sentence. Virginia appealed, contending that intervening Supreme Court precedent eroded the foundation of the Fourth Circuit's prior opinion in the earlier case compelling the Court to forgo de novo review and instead accord substantial deference to the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision denying habeas relief. The Fourth Circuit disagreed and found nothing in recent Supreme Court decisions that called into question its reasoning in "Winston I," which, as law of the case. Reviewing Petitioner's ineffectiveness claim de novo, the Court agreed with the district court that Petitioner established that his trial attorneys rendered deficient performance that prejudiced him. The Court therefore affirmed the district court's grant of habeas relief. View "Winston v. Pearson" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Ronald Colson pled guilty to six counts of receiving movies depicting actual female minors engaged in actual and simulated genital and oral sex with adult males, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(2). Because Defendant had a prior state conviction which the district court concluded "related to either sexual abuse or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor," the court imposed, over Defendant's objection, a 15-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. Defendant appealed his sentence, arguing that the earlier conviction did not qualify as a predicate offense under section 2252A(b)(1). He contended that the district court erred as a matter of law because his 1984 conviction did not, when considered under the categorical approach, relate to sexual abuse involving a minor. He noted that under this approach, the sentencing court must, in evaluating whether the conviction qualifies as a predicate offense, focus on the elements of the offense and the fact of conviction, taking the most benign conduct that could support a conviction. According to Defendant, because the Virginia statute under which he was convicted in 1984 arguably covered innocuous depictions of nudity, he could not be subject to a sentencing enhancement requiring a conviction that categorically relates to sexual abuse of a minor, as required by the federal enhancement statute. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Defendant misread the requirements for a conviction under the Virginia Code and read too narrowly the scope of convictions that can serve as predicate offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1). Accordingly, the Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Colson" on Justia Law

Former co-pastors of the Greater Salem Church in North Carolina Defendants-Appellants Anthony and Harriet Jinwright appealed their convictions and sentences arising from a tax evasion scheme in which they omitted millions of dollars in taxable income from their jointly filed returns. Defendants raised a variety of challenges on appeal. Finding each contention to be without merit, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "US v. Jinwright" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Waterford Investment Services, Inc. appealed the district court’s ruling that it must arbitrate certain claims that a group of investors brought before the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). The investors alleged in their FINRA claims that they received bad advice from their financial advisor, George Gilbert. The investors named Gilbert, his current investment firm, Waterford, and his prior firm, Community Bankers Securities, LLC (CBS), among others as parties to the arbitration. In response, Waterford filed this suit asking a federal district court to enjoin the arbitration proceedings and enter a declaratory judgment that Waterford need not arbitrate the claims. The district court, adopting the recommendations of a magistrate judge, concluded that because Gilbert was an "associated person" of Waterford during the events in question, Waterford must arbitrate the investors' claims. Upon review of the matter, the Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that Gilbert was inextricably an "associated person" with Waterford, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in adopting the magistrate judge's opinion. View "Waterford Investment Services v. Bosco" on Justia Law

In August 2004, Plaintiff-Appellant Gwyniece Hutchins, a letter carrier with the United States Postal Service, stepped on an improperly fitted manhole cover maintained by the Town of Ninety Six, South Carolina. The manhole cover flipped up, and Plaintiff fell into the manhole, sustaining serious injuries. Because she was injured in the course of her duties as a United States Postal Service employee, she filed a claim for workers’ compensation under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA). The Department of Labor’s Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs accepted Plaintiff's claim as covered by FECA and paid her lost wages and medical benefits. In 2007, Plainitff accepted an offer of judgment arising from a South Carolina state court action that she brought against the Town. The Department of Labor asserted that it was entitled to recover a portion of that judgment. Plaintiff opposed the Department of Labor's assertion, arguing that the Town was not a "person" under 5 U.S.C. sections 8131 and 8132 and that if 5 U.S.C. section 8131 was construed to allow such a claim, it would be unconstitutional. The Office of Workers' Compensation rejected Plaintiff's arguments and determined that the Department of Labor was entitled to reimbursement. Plaintiff paid the sum but appealed the Office of Workers’ Compensation's decision to the Employees' Compensation Appeals Board. The Appeals Board affirmed. Because the Fourth Circuit agreed with the Department of Labor that the Town qualified as a "person other than the United States," the Court upheld the district court's determination that Plaintiff reimburse the Department of Labor from her judgment. View "Hutchins v. U.S. Department of Labor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a discrimination claim against her former employer under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., for denying her a reasonable accommodation following her foot surgery. The district court dismissed her case after concluding she had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies by not filing her proposed accommodation with the EEOC. The court held that plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies under the circumstances and reversed the district court's judgment. View "Sydnor v. Fairfax County, Virginia" on Justia Law

Relator brought a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729 et seq., alleging that appellees defrauded the United States Department of Education by knowingly making fraudulent claims by engaging in various non-economic transactions to inflate their loan portfolios eligible for Special Allowance Payments (SAP), a federal student loan interest subsidy. The district court granted appellees' motions to dismiss on the ground that they were "state agencies" and therefore not subject to suit under the FCA as interpreted in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens. Because the district court did not employ the arm-of-the-state analysis in determining whether each of the appellees was a state agency subject to suit under the FCA, the court vacated its judgment and remanded the case for the court to apply this analysis in the first instance. View "US ex rel. Jon H. Oberg v. Kentucky Higher Ed., et al." on Justia Law