Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Cobra sought appellate relief from a decision of the Commission temporarily reinstating a coal miner. At issue was whether a Commission decision granting temporary reinstatement to a coal miner was immediately appealable by the coal operator under the collateral order doctrine. The court concluded that the Commission's decision failed to satisfy the requirements of the collateral order doctrine and, therefore, the collateral order doctrine did not permit an interlocutory review of the proceedings. Accordingly, the court dismissed Cobra's petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. View "Cobra Natural Resources, LLC v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n" on Justia Law

These appeals concerned whether Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were exempt from the payment of state and local taxes imposed on the transfer of real property in Maryland and South Carolina. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac claimed that they were exempt from such transfer taxes under 12 U.S.C. 1723a(c)(2) and 1452(e) respectively. The district courts in Maryland and South Carolina rejected the Counties' claims, concluding that the general tax exemptions applicable to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, while not applicable to real property taxes, did cover real property transfer taxes, thus making a distinction between property and transfer taxes. The district courts also concluded that Congress acted within its Commerce Clause power. The court held that the real property exclusions from the general tax exemptions of section 1723a(c)(2) and 1452(e) did not include transfer and recordation taxes; in the absence of a particular constitutional right that would trigger heightened scrutiny, the court held that a congressional exemption from state taxation under the Commerce Clause was subject to rational-basis review; Congress could exempt Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from state and local transfer taxes, even though they were collected in the context of interstate transactions, because the taxes could substantially interfere with or obstruct the constitutionally justified missions of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in bolstering the secondary mortgage market; and the Counties' remaining arguments for finding the statutory tax exemptions unconstitutional were rejected. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district courts. View "Montgomery County, Maryland v. Federal National Mortgage Assoc." on Justia Law

Defendant moved to dismiss an indictment charging him with one count of traveling in interstate commerce and knowingly failing to update his sex offender registration in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2250. Defendant argued that his plea of nolo contendere to attempted sexual battery in Florida state court did not qualify as a conviction within the meaning of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C. 16911 et seq. The court concluded that the district court correctly found defendant's plea of nolo contendere with adjudication withheld constituted a conviction for the purposes of SORNA because it resulted in a penal consequence. View "United States v. Bridges" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction of five felony counts relating to the sale of counterfeit prescription drugs. Defendant sought to introduce evidence establishing a gray market for prescription pills to argue that some of the pills that police seized from him could be genuine. The court concluded that the district court did not err in barring cross-examination regarding gray market evidence where there was no connection to the knowledge element and consequently no relevance; defendant cannot use the privilege against self-incrimination as a means to free himself from the basic rules of relevancy; if the evidence were relevant, the district court did not commit reversible error by directing the evidence to defendant's case-in-chief; and, in the alternative, the gray market evidence should be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. The court also held that, viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, the evidence sufficiently established defendant's knowledge and, therefore, defendant's sufficiency argument failed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Shauaib Zayyad" on Justia Law

NCUC challenged incentives granted by FERC to VEPCO to encourage investment in transmission infrastructure projects. The court held that FERC properly exercised its broad discretion in declining to apply the 2010 policy change in its Rehearing Order and in evaluating VEPCO's application for incentives. Accordingly, the court granted FERC's grant of incentives to VEPCO under section 219 of the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 824s(c). View "North Carolina Utilities Comm'n v. FERC" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction of a firearm offense, contending that the evidence discovered during a traffic stop should have been suppressed at trial because the traffic offense for which he was cited - leaving a vehicle standing such that it obstructs traffic - did not apply to the road on which he had stopped his car. The court rejected this argument, concluding that closely related traffic law barred the conduct for which defendant was cited. The court rejected defendant's argument challenging the exclusion of prior police misconduct where the district court's decision to exclude the evidence was neither arbitrary nor irrational. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Williams, IV" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of three counts of filing false income tax returns. Defendant was subsequently denied habeas relief but the district court granted him a certificate of appealability (COA) on his Sixth Amendment challenge. The court concluded that the district court did not err in finding that defendant failed to establish that his trial counsel's representation was anything other than objectively reasonable where counsel's decision not to call certain witnesses was a reasonable strategic decision. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Dehlinger" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of El Salvador, requested that the Attorney General withhold removal under 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3). Petitioner claimed that as a former member of the violent Mara Salvatrucha gang (MS-13), he is a member of a particular social group and that he would be killed if sent back to El Salvador because he renounced his membership in MS-13. The court concluded that petitioner's proposed particular social group of former MS-13 members from El Salvador was immutable for withholding of removal purposes in that the only way that petitioner could change his membership in the group would be to rejoin MS-13. Accordingly, the court held that the BIA erred in its ruling on immutability and reversed and remanded. The court affirmed the district court's denial of relief under the Convention Against Torture because it was not supported by sufficient evidence. View "Martinez v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Altarum, alleging that Altarum discriminated against him by wrongfully discharging him on account of disability and that Altarum failed to accommodate his disability. Plaintiff was terminated after he injured his legs on a subway platform and was on short-term disability benefits. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal of his wrongful-discharge claim. The court concluded that, under the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, and its implementing regulations, an impairment is not categorically excluded from being a disability simply because it is temporary. In this instance, the impairment alleged by plaintiff fell comfortably within the amended Acts' expanded definition of disability. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Summers v. Altarum Institute, Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action suit challenging the legality of the toll charged by the MWAA for use of the Dules Toll Road. The district court dismissed the complaint on numerous grounds. The court concluded that plaintiffs' claims were barred neither by the standing requirement of Article III nor the prudential restrictions the court has recognized on its own judicial power; under the Elizabeth River Crossings OpCo, LLC v. Meeks framework, the tolls charged for passage on the Dules Toll Road are user fees, not taxes, under Virginia law; and therefore, their collection by the MWAA did not run afoul of the Virginia Constitution and did not violate the due process rights of motorists. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint. View "Corr v. Metropolitan Washington" on Justia Law