Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After individuals associated with Occupy Columbia were removed by law enforcement from a 24-hour per day protest on the grounds of the South Carolina State House, Occupy Columbia filed suit against defendants, including the Governor, seeking injunctive relief and damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the South Carolina Constitution, and South Carolina's common law. The court granted in part and denied in part. On appeal, defendants sought review of the district court's denial of qualified immunity to defendants. The court affirmed, concluding that Occupy Columbia has alleged a violation of a clearly established First Amendment right - the right to protest on State House grounds after 6:00 p.m. in the absence of a valid time, place, and manner restriction. View "Occupy Columbia v. Haley" on Justia Law

John and Jane Doe appealed the district court's order holding them in civil contempt for refusing to comply with grand jury subpoenas. The Does are the targets of a grand jury investigation in the district court seeking to determine whether they used secret Swiss bank accounts to conceal assets and income from the IRS and the Treasury Department. Because the court found that the records at issue met all the requirements of the required records doctrine, the Fifth Amendment privilege was inapplicable and the Does could not invoke it to shield themselves from the subpoenas' commands. Because the Does' Fifth Amendment privilege was not implicated, the court need not address their request for immunity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Under Seal" on Justia Law

Relators filed suit under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729-33, against Purdue. The district court dismissed the action on res judicata grounds because it gave preclusive effect to the court's decision in United States ex rel. Radcliffe v. Purdue Pharma L.P. Although the court rejected relators' assertion that Radcliffe was a jurisdictional dismissal, the court nonetheless agreed that the district court erred by giving Radcliffe preclusive effect. Because the Release executed by Mark Radcliffe did not bar non-signatories from proceeding against Purdue, the judgment enforcing the Release could not bar such claims. Accordingly, the court erred by dismissing this action as barred by principles of res judicata. The court also concluded that the pre-2010 version of the Act's public disclosure bar, 31 U.S.C. 3730(e)(4), applied in this case. Because the district court has not made the factual findings necessary to determine whether the public-disclosure bar precluded this action, the court must remand to the district court for discovery and further proceedings. View "US ex rel. Steven May v. Purdue Pharma L.P." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant under, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violation of plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights after defendant, a deputy sheriff, arrested plaintiff for withholding information about possibly rabid animals. On appeal, defendant challenged the judgment of damages plus attorney's fees entered against her in the section 1983 proceeding. The court concluded that, by securing a warrant that lacked adequate evidentiary support, defendant infringed plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right to be free from capricious arrest and this constitutional right was clearly established. Therefore, defendant could not shield herself from damages liability by invoking qualified immunity. Because the district court overstated plaintiff's degree of success, it erred in not making an attorney's fee award that would properly reflect her success in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the verdict of damages but vacated the attorney's fee award, remanding for an award of $100,000, exclusive of costs. View "McAfee v. Boczar" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentences and convictions for one count of securities fraud, one count of wire fraud, and two counts of money laundering. Defendant's convictions stemmed from his operation of a $35 million Ponzi scheme called Black Diamond Capital Solutions. The court affirmed defendant's two fraud convictions but reversed his two money-laundering convictions because the transactions prosecuted as money laundering constituted essential expenses of his underlying fraudulent scheme. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Simmons" on Justia Law

Petitioner, born in El Salvador, applied for special rule cancellation of removal under section 203 of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2160, 2196. Petitioner subsequently sought review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal of the IJ's adverse credibility determination and denial of relief. The BIA determined that petitioner's admitted participation in a civil patrol, coupled with the government's evidence of human rights violations that occurred during the time and in the place that petitioner patrolled, was sufficient to trigger his burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the persecutor bar did not apply. The court held that the record contained evidence sufficient to trigger petitioner's burden, and the court agreed with the BIA and the IJ that petitioner did not meet his burden. Therefore, the court denied the petition for review. View "Pastora v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a native and citizen of India, sought review of USCIS's denial of her application for naturalization. The district court granted summary judgment to USCIS finding that plaintiff was ineligible for naturalization because she had not been lawfully admitted for permanent residence, and that she failed to demonstrate good moral character. The court found that plaintiff failed to show that she was legally entitled to the grant of the LPR status she received and concluded that she was not lawfully admitted for permanent residence. Therefore, plaintiff was ineligible for naturalization and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on this ground. Accordingly, the court affirmed as to that portion of the district court's judgment. Because a failure to satisfy any one of the statutory prerequisites rendered an applicant ineligible for naturalization, the district court's finding of moral character was not essential to its grant of summary judgment. Accordingly, the court vacated that portion of the district court's judgment addressing plaintiff's good moral character. View "Injeti v. USCIS" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against RAC after entering into a rental agreement with RAC for a wooden trundle bed and mattress infested with bedbugs. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's order compelling arbitration of their breach of warranty claim under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. 2301 et seq. Relying on regulation promulgated by the FTC under its authority to interpret the Act, plaintiffs argued that RAC could not require binding arbitration as part of a consumer warranty. The court concluded that the district court erred in holding that the FTC regulations contained no ban on binding arbitration. However, the FTC arbitration ban simply did not apply to plaintiffs' rental agreement with RAC. Because plaintiffs have not linked RAC's warranty to any sale, they failed to establish the existence of a written warranty under FTC regulations. Accordingly, the binding arbitration clause was enforceable and the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Seney v. Rent-a-Center, Inc." on Justia Law

Respondent appealed the district court's civil commitment of him as a sexually dangerous person under 18 U.S.C. 4248. The court concluded that respondent, as a D.C. offender, was in the custody of the BOP of purposes of section 4248 certification as a sexually dangerous person. The court also concluded that respondent waived the argument that section 4248(d) required his release to the District of Columbia. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Savage" on Justia Law

After a deputy sheriff broadly publicized the corrupt and unlawful practices occurring in the Office of the Sheriff, the Sheriff terminated his employment. A jury awarded $1.1 million in favor of the deputy on his claim of retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights. At issue was whether the district court erred in failing to grant qualified immunity to the Sheriff. The court found that the district court was right to conclude that the Sheriff violated the deputy's First Amendment right. The court concluded that it was clearly established at the time that an employee's speech about serious governmental misconduct was protected. Accordingly, the court held that the district court did not err in failing to grant qualified immunity to the Sheriff and affirmed the judgment. View "Durham v. Jones" on Justia Law