Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a naturalized United States citizen, received advice from counsel in 2010 that because of his newly obtained citizenship, his guilty plea to a narcotics offense would not subject him to deportation. However, Defendant's citizenship was revoked in 2016. In 2018, Defendant received a Notice to Appear informing him that he would be removed from the country because his 2010 conviction was an aggravated felony. Upon receiving that notice, he filed a collateral attack upon his 2010 guilty plea under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255. The district court found that Defendant’s 2018 petition was untimely under Sec. 2255(f)(4).The court reasoned that Sec. 2255 petitions must typically be filed within one year of the date “on which the judgment of conviction becomes final.” But petitions based on facts that arise after a conviction becomes final must instead be filed within one year of “the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.Defendant testified that his Alexandria-based attorney told him in 2016 that his conviction was an aggravated felony. The court found that notice alone triggered Sec. 2255(f)(4)’s limitations period. Second, even setting aside that admission, the nature of Defendant’s sentencing proceedings on July 8, 2016, put him on inquiry notice that his 2010 conviction was an aggravated felony. Therefore, the court held that the district court correctly dismissed the petition as untimely. View "US v. Jose Nunez-Garcia" on Justia Law

Nadella Corporation bought a ship, the MV Falcon Carrier, for scrap from Falcon Carrier Shipping Limited. Unbeknownst to Nadella, the ship was encumbered by a $368,000 debt. To recover that debt, the debt holder “arrested” Nadella’s new ship. Nadella then tried to recover that debt from the ship’s seller Falcon Carrier Shipping. Newbrook Shipping—the owner of those two ships arrested by Nadella—sued Nadella in South Africa and was considering another lawsuit in Nevis. Newbrook applied in Maryland federal court for an ex parte order under Sec. 1782 authorizing discovery from Nadella’s purported parent company, Global Marketing Systems. The district court rejected discovery for the speculative “proceeding” in Nevis but then granted the full application.On appeal, Global Marketing argues that the district court substantively erred in granting the entire application and approving service of process. The court stated that Sec. 1782 identifies four mandatory conditions that must be satisfied before an application can be granted. Here, the last condition, that the evidence sought must be “for use” in a foreign proceeding, is not fully satisfied.The court held that Section 1782 gives litigants access to federal courts to obtain discovery for use in international litigation. But that access is not unlimited. The district court erred by granting the full application when it held the speculative proceeding in Nevis did not provide a basis for Sec. 1782 discovery. The court remanded for the district court to consider Global Marketing’s arguments. View "In re: Application of Newbrook" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were the subjects of an unconstitutional search. Relying on the fruits of that search, prosecutors obtained grand jury indictments against Plaintiffs. After a court suppressed the evidence and dismissed the criminal charges against Plaintiffs, they sued the state trooper who conducted the search under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs' claim, reasoning that their 1983 claim was based on an unconstitutional search and seizure of property and accrued at the time of the search. Thus, because Plaintiffs filed suit more than two years after the search the 1983 claim is time-barred.Plaintiffs argued that, even if a Fourth Amendment search claim typically accrues at the time of the search, this particular search claim did not accrue until the charges against them were dismissed because the claim “necessarily threatens to impugn” their prosecutions. Plaintiffs argue that a favorable-termination accrual rule is required anytime a 1983 claim “necessarily threatens to impugn” a prosecution. The court disagreed, finding that the accrual date is based on the nature of the constitutional violation when it is completed. The court found the claim accrued when the trooper performed the unlawful search in 2014. And the applicable two-year statute of limitations ran out well before Plaintiff’s sued in 2019. Thus the court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Fernando Smith v. Michael Travelpiece" on Justia Law

Defendant moved for relief under Sec. 2255 after he was convicted of causing the death of another through the use of a firearm during a “crime of violence” and sentenced to death. Defendant claims that the Government failed to prove that he committed a “crime of violence.”The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Defendant's petition. The court reasoned that to support a conviction for using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a “crime of violence,” the Government need only prove one qualifying predicate offense. That crime must be a felony that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” Further, the court must ask whether the “most innocent conduct” criminalized by the statute meets the definition of a “crime of violence.” In certain situations, the court applies a “variant” of the categorical approach referred to as the modified categorical approach. The court uses the modified categorical approach when the statute at issue is divisible. Divisible statutes set forth “multiple, alternative versions of the crime” with distinct elements, while indivisible statutes merely set out different means of completing the crime.The court applied the modified categorical approach. The court found that federal premeditated first-degree murder is a “crime of violence.” Moreover, federal premeditated murder requires an intentional mens rea and thus does not in any way violate Borden’s requirement. Thus, premeditated murder in violation of Sec. 1111(a) is categorically a “crime of violence.” View "US v. Richard Jackson" on Justia Law

Infinity Business Group used an accounting practice that artificially inflated its accounts receivable and therefore its revenues. The company’s CEO, board of directors, and outside auditors affirmed the wrongdoing. Appellant, the company’s trustee, alleges that the true mastermind was a financial services company and an adviser of the company (“Defendants”) that Infinity contracted with to unsuccessfully solicit investments.The Fourth Circuit held that even assuming that the financial services company played some role in creating or perpetuating the flawed accounting technique, Appellant still cannot succeed in holding Defendants liable. Infinity engaged Defendant for the limited purpose of assisting with “a private placement of” Infinity stock. Defendants’ task was to help prepare a confidential information memorandum for potential investors, which was to include Infinity’s financial information from 2003 to 2005. Infinity’s CEO prepared and provided the relevant information for all three years. The accounting practice the company used was inconsistent with the generally accepted accounting principles endorsed by the Securities and Exchange Commission.Appellant first contends that he represents Infinity as well as Infinity’s creditors. Thus, when he was acting on behalf of the presumptively blameless creditors, Appellant insists he is immune from in pari delicto. The court held that when a trustee pursues a right of action that ultimately derives from the debtor—even if the trustee is nominally exercising a creditor’s powers when doing so—the trustee remains subject to the same defenses as the debtor. The court ultimately found that Infinity’s officers and auditors were the authors of the company’s demise—not Defendants. View "Robert F. Anderson v. Morgan Keegan & Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed 1983 against two nurses alleging that he was provided inadequate medical care during a health crisis he experienced while incarcerated. He was eventually sent a series of hospitals, where doctors told him a flesh-eating organism was damaging his internal organs.The first nurse was successfully served by the Marshals Service within Rule 4(m)’s 90-day period. The second nurse was not served because service was returned as “refused unable to forward.” The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s lawsuit on timeliness grounds after finding that Plaintiff’s amended complaint did not relate back under Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to his initial and timely complaint.At issue is whether the amended complaint adding Defendants is timely because it relates back to the date of the original complaint. The court found that the district court erred and the text of Rule 15(c)(1)(C) makes clear that the required “notice” and knowledge must come “within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for service.Next, the court addressed whether Defendants were provided the necessary notice within the Rule 4(m) notice period. The court ruled that Rule 15(c)’s requirements have been satisfied as to the first nurse. In regards to the second nurse, the court remanded to the district court for consideration of Plaintiff’s extension request, reasoning that the district court incorrectly believed that Plaintiff lost his chance to take advantage of Rule 15(c)’s relation-back rule. The court vacated the district court’s order granting the motion to dismiss. View "Patrick McGraw v. Theresa Gore" on Justia Law

Certain members of the The U.S. Tobacco Cooperative(“Cooperative”) seek dissolution of the Cooperative and distribution of its reserves. They claim that “the Cooperative is no longer fulfilling the mandates under which it was created” and “is no longer able to carry out its purpose.” According to the members, the Cooperative simply cannot keep up with market realities and they request the judicial dissolution of the Cooperative.The Cooperative argued that the ground for which the members seek dissolution—that the Cooperative can no longer carry out its purpose—only applies to dissolution under North Carolina’s Nonprofit Corporation Act (“Nonprofit Corporation Act”). The key issue underlying the Cooperative’s motion to dismiss was whether the Business Corporation Act or the Nonprofit Corporation Act applied to the Cooperative’s dissolution. The members argue that the Nonprofit Corporation Act, not the Business Corporation Act, applies to judicially dissolve the Cooperative.The court found the members fail to explain why applying the Business Corporation Act’s dissolution provisions here would contradict the statute’s “so far as appropriate” language. Therefore, the court determined that since the Cooperative is organized “with capital stock,” the Business Corporation Act governs the Cooperative’s dissolution. The Business Corporation Act does not list the failure of a corporation to carry out its purposes as a ground for dissolution. But that is the only ground the members addressed on appeal. Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the members’ claim for judicial dissolution. View "Teresa Speaks v. U. S. Tobacco Cooperative" on Justia Law

In the course of responding to a dispute between neighbors, a Deputy fatally shot a man while he was standing inside his home holding a loaded shotgun. The personal representative of the deceased's estate (“the Estate”), subsequently brought an action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, claiming that the Deputy used excessive force in violation of the deceased’s Fourth Amendment rights, along with various related state law claims.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the following claims and remand the case for further proceedings: (1) the 1983 claim against the Deputy in his individual capacity; (2) the wrongful death claim for both compensatory and punitive damages under North Carolina law against the Deputy in his individual capacity; and (3) the claims under the Macon County Sheriff’s Office’s surety bond against the Deputy and Sheriff in their official capacities, and against Western Surety, for up to $25,000 in damages.Notably, the court found that parties’ factual disputes are quintessentially “genuine” and “material.” Assuming that a jury would credit the Estate’s expert evidence over the Deputy’s competing testimony and expert evidence, leads to the conclusion that the Deputy’s use of force was objectively unreasonable.The court affirmed the district court’s conclusions that: (1) the Estate’s Fourteenth Amendment claim fails as a matter of law; (2) Macon County’s liability insurance policy preserves the Sheriff’s Office’s governmental immunity from suit; and (3) the Estate’s claims brought directly under the North Carolina Constitution are precluded. View "Melissa Knibbs v. Anthony Momphard, Jr." on Justia Law

DENC, Inc. ("DENC") sued Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company ("Philadelphia"), claiming breach of contract and violations of the North Carolina’s Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“UDTPA”) based on Philadelphia's refusal to cover DENC's claim for collapse damage. The district court found Philadelphia improperly denied coverage and therefore breached the terms of the insurance policy and violated the UDTPA. However, the district court declined to award treble damages because DENC didn’t show that Philadelphia’s UDTPA violation proximately caused any injury. Both parties appealed.The Fourth Circuit affirmed on all liability issues, finding that the district court did not err in applying the appropriate standards. However, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of treble damage to DENC, holding that the district court erred in assessing proximate cause under the UDTPA.Under N.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. 75-16, a court must award treble damages if a defendant violates the UDTPA. However, damages are limited to those proximately caused by the defendant's violation. Here, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court that Philadelphia's denial letter was deceptive; however, the district court erred when it engaged in a separate proximate cause analysis. The Fourth Circuit found that the denial letter was aggravating conduct that accompanied the breach, requiring treble damages. View "DENC, LLC v. Philadelphia Indemnity Ins." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States in 2013 without authorization. The next year, Petition was arrested and ultimately found removable. Petitioner sought relief under the Convention Against Torture, claiming he would be tortured by the MS-13 gang, the police, or anti-gang vigilante groups if he was deported to El Salvador.The Immigration Judge denied relief, finding Petitioner's testimony was not credible and that there was "less than a fifty percent chance of torture both separately and in the aggregate" that Petitioner would be tortured by any party. The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") affirmed.On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Immigration Judge properly considered the aggregate chance that Petitioner would be tortured by any party. Neither the Immigration Judge nor the BIA ignored relevant evidence that Petitioner would be tortured. Further, the BIA used the proper standard when assessing Petitioner's claims. View "Miguel Ibarra Chevez v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law