Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellants filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2009. The bankruptcy court approved a repayment plan which allowed Appellants to retain possession of a beach house, with the creditor retaining a secured claim for the total outstanding mortgage balance. Several years later, Appellees took as loan servicer for the mortgage. Despite Appellant's timely payments, Appellees mistakenly believed that the account was past due. Eventually, Appellees initiated foreclosure proceedings. Appellants filed an emergency motion for content, which the bankruptcy court granted. However, the district court reversed under Taggart v. Lorenzen, 139 S. Ct. 1795 (2019), finding Appellees acted in good faith because the error involved the previous loan servicer and Appellees based their actions on the advice of counsel.The Fourth Circuit found that both the bankruptcy court and district court erred. The standard announced in Taggart applies to an action to hold a creditor in civil contempt for violating a plan of reorganization of debts entered under Chapter 11. Nothing in the Taggart decision limits the case to Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings. While there are differences between Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 bankruptcies, the power of a bankruptcy court in either type of case derives from the same statutes and the same general principles.However, the Fourth Circuit also held that the district court erred in its application of Taggart. Thus, the court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Gordon Beckhart, Jr. v. Newrez, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff entered the United States in 2014 when he was apprehended by border patrol agents before eventually being released to his older brother (a resident of North Carolina).On or shortly before his eighteenth birthday, Plaintiff filed an application for special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) status with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). SIJ status provides certain protections against removal under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1255 and can lead to lawful permanent residency and citizenship. USCIS issued Plaintiff a Notice of Intent to Deny his SIJ application and Plaintiff appealed to the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO), which upheld the denial. Plaintiff then filed a complaint in district court seeking review of the agency’s denial of his SIJ applicationOn rehearing en banc, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions to grant Plaintiff’s motion to set aside USCIS’s denial of SIJ status. Following his victory before the en banc court, Plaintiff sought to recover attorney’s fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). The district court denied Plaintiff’s EAJA application, finding the government’s position was “substantially justified.” The Fourth Circuit reasoned that "this was a tough case" involving reasonable arguments on both sides. Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s ruling finding the government’s position was substantially justified. View "Felipe Perez v. Ur Jaddou" on Justia Law

Petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. At sentencing, the district court initially applied a 15-year enhancement under the Armed Career Criminals Act ("ACCA"). However, following the United States Supreme Court decisions in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) and Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. 120 (2016), the district court vacated the 15-year ACCA enhancement and sentenced Petitioner to time served.Petitioner then petitioned the district court for a certificate of innocence under 28 U.S.C. 2513(a). The district court declined to issue the certificate, finding Petitioner failed to meet the statutory requirements.The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Section 2513 requires a petitioner seeking a certificate of innocence to prove that his conviction was overturned because he was not guilty of the charged offense. Here, Petitioner concedes that his conviction was not overturned. Petitioner must first overturn his conviction before seeking a certificate of innocence. View "US v. Richard Moon" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of a single count of cocaine distribution. He was tried for that offense in the Court of General Sessions for Horry County, South Carolina (the “trial court”). He brought federal habeas corpus proceedings in the District of South Carolina pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254. Concluding that the court had not unreasonably applied the standards set forth in Strickland. The Fourth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability relative to his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the stand-up order.The trial court jury was initially unable to arrive at a verdict and requested that petitioner stand beside the enlarged image. The court inquired if petitioner's counsel had any objection. The court interjected before an objection could be lodged and directed petitioner to stand as the jury wished. The circuit court found that the PCR court unreasonably applied Strickland to the facts of the case in finding trial counsel’s performance was not deficient. The circuit court reasoned that trial counsel cannot be found to have operated within the broad scope of Strickland’s measure of competence when she only attempted — and thereby failed — to object to the stand-up order. Thus, petitioner’s trial counsel’s failure to object to the stand-up order constituted objectively deficient performance, that her performance prejudiced the defense and that she thereby rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance. View "Lynel Witherspoon v. Donnie Stonebreaker" on Justia Law

Defendant argues that the district court erred in denying his suppression motion because the officers abandoned the purpose of the traffic stop and deliberately delayed their investigation so the canine unit could conduct its dog sniff. He also contends that the court clearly erred by crediting the officer’s testimony after he impeached the officer with a prior inconsistent statement.The circuit court found that though the stop could have been shorter (and begun more efficiently), it wasn’t impermissibly prolonged, and the officers’ actions were reasonably related to investigating an expired license plate. Reasoning that the acceptable length of a routine traffic stop can’t be stated with mathematical precision,” but the officers here were diligent enough to pass constitutional muster. United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498 (4th Cir. 2011).Regarding the other officer’s testimony, the circuit court was not persuaded that the district court erred in finding him credible. The district court acknowledged that the defendant impeached the officer with a prior inconsistent statement yet otherwise found the officer credible. The circuit court declined to disturb the district court’s credibility assessment. As such, the circuit court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "US v. Joffrey Perez" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs filed suit in South Carolina state court against fourteen defendants (ten individuals and four agencies), alleging five causes of action. The circuit court reviewed five preserved issues: (1) the applicable statutes of limitations for plaintiffs' claims under the Rehabilitation Act ("RA") and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"); (2) whether the district court abused its discretion in excluding the witnesses' testimonies; (3) the plaintiffs' assertion that the district court improperly instructed the jury as to the duty owed under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act; (4) whether the district court improperly dismissed plaintiff’s RA claims; and (5) whether the court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s 1983 claims.The circuit court affirmed the district court’s decision to limit the plaintiffs' witness's testimony and further found that the court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the hybrid witness's testimony or by determining whether the defendant’s deposition had any potential to lead to admissible evidence.Further, the court found no error in the district court’s instruction or its' finding that the ADA and RA claims were subject to the South Carolina Human Affairs Law’s one-year statute of limitations. The plaintiffs failed to show reversible error as they neither pleaded nor proved any action or inaction by any individually named defendants that caused them harm. View "Johnny Timpson v. Anderson County Disabilities" on Justia Law

On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit evaluated eight distinct grounds for removal that twenty-six multinational oil and gas companies ("Defendants") argue provide federal jurisdiction over the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore’s (“Baltimore”) climate-change action.The circuit court looked to two legal doctrines that inform removal inquiries before a federal court: (1) the well-pleaded complaint rule, and (2) complete preemption. Here, the circuit court reasoned that the municipality has decided to exclusively rely upon state-law claims to remedy its own climate-change injuries, which it perceives were caused, at least in part, by the defendants’ fossil-fuel products and strategic misinformation campaign. The circuit court concluded that these claims do not belong in federal court. They declined to take a position on whether Baltimore will ultimately fail or succeed in proving its claims under Maryland law. Ultimately, the circuit court did not discern a proper basis for removal that permits a federal court to entertain Baltimore’s action; thus, the court affirmed the district court’s order granting Baltimore’s Motion to Remand. View "Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C." on Justia Law

AirFacts, Inc. sued a former employee for breaching several provisions of his employment agreement and misappropriating trade secrets. After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of the employee on all counts. On Airfacts first appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed. On remand, the district court found for the employee again. Airfacts filed a second appeal.The Fourth Circuit first held that AirFacts had abandoned all its contract claims except one alleging that defendant breached the employment agreement’s noncompete clause, which the court then rejected. AirFacts argued that defendant misappropriated its trade secrets by taking the flowcharts and proration documents. The circuit court found that defendant breached the employment agreement, but only immaterially because there’s no evidence his conduct harmed or prejudiced AirFacts. Thus, because AirFacts has failed to prove it suffered any harm from the defendant’s breaches, the district court did not err by awarding only nominal damages on these claims. The court further found there is no evidence that the defendant took confidential information with him. Finally, the court remanded the case back to the district court to decide what AirFacts deserves in reasonable royalty damages. View "AirFacts, Inc. v. Diego De Amezaga" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Russian scientist, held a J-1 exchange visitor visa as a researcher sponsored by his employer. In 2010 and 2011, Petitioner received W-2 in the amount of $76,729 and $79,061, respectively. Petitioner filed 1040-NR forms, taking the position that all his earnings were exempt from taxation under the United States-Russia Tax Treaty (“Tax Treaty”). In 2014, the IRS sent Petitioner a notice of deficiency and Petitioner sought relief at the Tax Court.The Tax Court found in favor of Petitioner, holding that his W-2 income was properly considered “a grant, allowance, or similar payments” under the Tax Treaty. The court reasoned that “wages may be eligible for exemption so long as they are similar to a grant or allowance.”The Fourth Circuit reversed. The Tax Treaty provides that salaries, wages, and other similar remuneration are taxable; however, a grant, allowance, or similar payments payable to a person who is studying or doing research is exempt. Adopting the reasoning in Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741 (1969), the court held the relevant question is “whether there is a “requirement of any substantial quid pro quo” that distinguishes compensation for employment from a “relatively disinterested, ‘no-string’” grant.” The Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the Tax Court for further proceedings. View "Vitaly Baturin v. Commissioner, Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action against the defendant, claiming defamation and tortious interference. The court dismissed plaintiff's claim, finding it without merit. The court warned plaintiff's counsel that if he were to "file further inappropriate pleadings or pursue frivolous post-judgment litigation against any of these defendants, sanctions might well be justified."Ten months later, plaintiff filed another claim based on the same underlying conduct. The court dismissed plaintiff's claim and imposed sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.On appeal, the Fourth Circuit determined that the allegations in plaintiff's complaint were not frivolous and thus, did not form the basis of a Rule 11 violation. Thus, the district court abused its discretion in imposing Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff and her attorney. View "Svetlana Lokhova v. Stefan Halper" on Justia Law