Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Estate filed suit alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law after Deputy Sheriff Anthony Momphard, Jr. fatally shot Michael Knibbs while Knibbs was standing inside his home holding a loaded shotgun. The district court concluded that defendant was entitled to qualified immunity from the Estate's section 1983 claim and that the Estate's state law claims against Deputy Momphard, Macon County Sheriff Robert Holland, and the insurance companies that issued the Sheriff's Office a liability insurance policy and a surety bond necessarily failed.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s award of summary judgment to Deputy Momphard on the Estate's section 1983 claim against him in his individual capacity. The court concluded that the district court erred in finding that there were no genuine issues of disputed material fact, and ultimately erred in finding that Deputy Momphard's use of force was reasonable as a matter of law at this stage in the proceedings. In this case, there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Knibbs never pointed his weapon at Deputy Momphard or made any furtive movements, thereby rendering unjustified the deadly force used against Knibbs. Furthermore, the court's case law demonstrates that the contours of Knibbs' constitutional right were clearly established at the time.The court also vacated the district court's summary judgment as to the wrongful death claim for both compensatory and punitive damages under North Carolina law against Deputy Momphard in his individual capacity, and the claims under the Macon County Sheriff's Office's surety bond against Deputy Momphard and Sheriff Holland in their official capacities, and against Western Surety, for up to $25,000 in damages. However, the court affirmed the district court's conclusions that the Estate's Fourteenth Amendment claim fails as a matter of law; Macon County's liability insurance policy preserves the Sheriff’s Office's governmental immunity from suit; and the Estate's claims brought directly under the North Carolina Constitution are precluded. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Knibbs v. Momphard" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Although the court agreed with defendant that application of a bright-line rule based on CDC risk categories would be overly restrictive, the court concluded that the district court did not apply such a rule and otherwise did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion. The court stated, in light of the circumstances, that the district court provided sufficient explanation to allow for meaningful appellate review. In this case, the judge knew of defendant's circumstances, both favorable and unfavorable, and referenced them in the balancing of the 18 U.S.C. 3553 factors, noting that defendant had returned to the same criminal behavior after his first prison stint and that post-sentencing rehabilitation efforts did not outweigh the considerations that led the court to sentence him to 103 months in prison in the first place. View "United States v. Hargrove" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit granted the petition for review of the BIA's decision concluding that petitioner is categorically ineligible under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(H)(i)(I), because his U.S. citizen father is no longer living. Pursuant to section 1227(a)(1)(H)(i)(I), the Attorney General has discretion to grant waiver of removal to a person who is the son or daughter of a citizen of the United States.The court concluded that the statutory text includes no living-parent requirement. In this case, the issue is not whether petitioner should be granted a waiver as a matter of executive discretion—it is whether Congress has forbidden one via legislative command. Because the answer is no, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the Board's decision, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Julmice v. Garland" on Justia Law

Five adjacent Burtonsville, Maryland parcels are restricted from receiving sewer service. Several previous attempts to obtain approval of water and sewer category change requests were unsuccessful. The owners' alternative plan was to sell to a religious organization. They believed that land-use regulations must submit to “[c]hurch use [which] cannot be denied.” They entered into a contract with Canaan, contingent on the approval of the extension of a public sewer line for a new church. Such an extension required amendment of the Comprehensive Ten-Year Water Supply and Sewerage Systems Plan, which involves the Montgomery County Planning Board, the County Executive, the County Council, public hearings, and the Maryland Department of the Environment.Following denial of their requests, the owners sued under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of the claims. The land has been bound by decades of regulations restricting development for both religious and non-religious purposes. The parties were aware of the difficulties in developing the property when they entered into the contract; they could not have a reasonable expectation of religious land use. The restrictions are rationally related to the government’s interest in protecting the region’s watershed. View "Canaan Christian Church v. Montgomery County" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's 162-month sentence for possessing with the intent to distribute cocaine base and being a felon in possession of ammunition. The court concluded that sufficient evidence exists in the record to support the district court's finding that defendant possessed a firearm on each occasion, and that all three incidents were sufficiently connected temporally and involved a regular pattern of similar conduct: illegal possession of like-kind firearms. The court also concluded that the district court did not clearly err when applying a base offense level of twenty-two. Furthermore, the district court did not clearly err in applying the three-firearm enhancement under USSG 2K2.1(b)(1)(A), and the connection-with-another-felony-offense enhancement under USSG 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). Finally, the court concluded that the district court adequately addressed the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors. View "United States v. McDonald" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for possession with intent to distribute 50 or more grams of methamphetamine. Defendant argued that the district court's jury instructions at his trial constructively amended his indictment by permitting the jury to convict on a basis not included in the indictment.The court previously held in United States v. Floresca, 38 F.3d 706 (4th Cir. 1994), that constructive amendments must always be reversed without reference to the four factors of plain error review. However, Floresca's reasoning and holding are inconsistent with subsequent Supreme Court opinions and thus no longer tenable. Rather, the court concluded that Supreme Court authority requires plain error review. In this case, defendant failed to establish that his conviction for possession with intent to distribute would seriously affect the fairness, integrity and public reputation of judicial proceedings. The court rejected defendant's other challenges to his conviction, concluding that the jury instructions were not duplicitous, and there was no error in the admission of the Facebook certificate and messages. View "United States v. Banks" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendant's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to correct his sentence. The court agreed with defendant that the force clause under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) is inapplicable because one of his predicate convictions—Maryland assault with intent to prevent lawful apprehension or detainer—is not a categorically "violent felony" for ACCA purposes. The court explained that Maryland courts have clearly held that an assault with intent to prevent lawful apprehension can be accomplished with de minimis conduct such as an offensive touching. Therefore, because such conduct does not involve the use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent physical force against another, the assault-with-intent-to-prevent-lawful-apprehension offense is not categorically a violent felony under the force clause. The court remanded with instructions to correct defendant's sentence. View "United States v. Proctor" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit held that a party, like the plaintiff here, who previously consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge, but who sought to withdraw such consent before any other party consented, need not show good cause to withdraw that consent. In this case, the district court erred in requiring plaintiff to show good cause to withdraw his consent. The court saw no reason that plaintiff should not have been allowed to withdraw his consent to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge and concluded that, on the record, plaintiff's request to withdraw should have been allowed. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order denying plaintiff's motion; vacated the magistrate judge's order entering final judgment; and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Muhammad v. Fleming" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's certification of the class and the approval of the insurance class action settlement. The settlement agreement requires Banner to refund to class members a portion of the money they had paid, with a minimum of $100 per class member, and provides some nonmonetary benefits, with a total value of roughly $40 million.The court concluded that the Allen Trust's argument that the district court improperly placed upon it the burden of overcoming the settlement provides no basis for reversal; the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the Dickman class met the requirements of class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a); and the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate under Rule 23(e)(2). View "1988 Trust For Allen Children v. Banner Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that his public high school suspended him in violation of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from the actions taken against him by school personnel after he engaged in a conversation with his classmates about the shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas Highschool. The district court held that plaintiff's suit was barred under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted.The Fourth Circuit concluded that the school board acted as the final policymaking authority in approving plaintiff's suspension, and thus Monell does not bar the suit. Furthermore, plaintiff's complaint plausibly alleges a First Amendment claim where the First Amendment does not permit schools to prohibit students from engaging in the factual, nonthreatening speech alleged here. In this case, plaintiff engaged in a factual conversation with his peers about a current event that is uniquely salient to the lives of American teenagers, a school shooting. The court stated that schools cannot silence such student speech on the basis that it communicates controversial or upsetting ideas. To do so would be incompatible with the very purpose of public education. However, the court concluded that the district court properly held that the complaint alleges no plausible Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment claim. Accordingly, the court reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "Starbuck v. Williamsburg James City County School Board" on Justia Law