Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Fourth Circuit denied a petition for review challenging the BIA's denial of petitioner's application for asylum based on its finding that she had not shown she was persecuted on account of her membership in her alleged particular social group, "family members of Guisela Toledo-Vasquez." The court concluded that, despite the tragic circumstances that caused petitioner to flee Mexico, substantial evidence supports the Board's conclusion that she was not persecuted on account of her family relationship with Guisela. Rather, petitioner's family membership to Guisela is merely an incidental, tangential, superficial and subordinate reason for her persecution. In this case, the record suggests that had petitioner been someone else other than Guisela's sister, she would have been targeted just the same. View "Toledo-Vasquez v. Garland" on Justia Law

This appeal involves a motion to enforce the final judgment and final order in a class action settlement made in the district court by the defendant in the class action, EQT, and class members, the Huey Plaintiffs. The Huey Plaintiffs subsequently filed suit in the Circuit Court of Wetzel County, West Virginia (the Wetzel County litigation) against EQT three years after the entry of the final judgment and final order, alleging that EQT trespassed on their mineral estate in violation of West Virginia statutory and common law. After the district court denied the final judgment and final order and declined to enjoin the Wetzel County litigation, EQT appealed.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of EQT's motion to enforce the final judgment order and final order, concluding that the district court did not err in declining to enjoin the Wetzel County litigation. The court found no error in the district court's assumption that the Huey Plaintiffs were class members bound by the Settlement Agreement. The court agreed with the district court's holding that the trespass claim in the Wetzel County litigation is not a royalty claim and not released by the Agreement. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in not issuing an injunction and by finding that two exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act, the "in aid of jurisdiction" and the relitigation exceptions, did not apply in this case. View "Huey v. Equitable Production Co." on Justia Law

Wilson participates in a health insurance plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Wilson’s minor son, J.W., a beneficiary of the Plan, received in-patient mental health treatment. The Plan denied coverage. Wilson filed suit under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B). The court affirmed the denial of coverage for treatment from December 1, 2015, through May 15, 2016, concluding the plan administrator acted reasonably under the relevant factors. The court dismissed, for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, Wilson’s claims arising from treatment received from May 15, 2016, through J.W.’s discharge on July 31, 2017.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of the claims for 2015-2016 as not medically necessary. J.W. did not require intensive psychological intervention and saw a licensed psychiatrist only about one time each month. The court vacated the dismissal of Wilson’s claims for the administrator’s coverage determinations that were made before January 26, 2017, and that were not for services provided 2015-2016. The court affirmed the dismissal of Wilson’s claim for coverage determinations the administrator made after January 26, 2017, (regardless of when the corresponding services were provided) because Wilson failed to exhaust his administrative remedies for those claims. View "Wilson v. UnitedHealthcare Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Duroseau, a naturalized U.S. citizen, served in Afghanistan in the Marines and suffered PTSD and a possible traumatic brain injury. He was convicted of unlawful exportation and (Count Five) transporting firearms to the Haitian Army, an entity that is not a licensed firearms importer or dealer, 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(5), springing from his attempt to take weapons to his native Haiti in an attempt to help the Haitian government quell gang violence. He was sentenced to 63 months’ imprisonment.Duroseau challenged the conviction on Count Five. The Fourth Circuit vacated that conviction. The government failed to prove a violation of section 922(a)(5), which provides that it is unlawful for any unlicensed person “to transfer, sell, trade, give, transport, or deliver any firearm to any [unlicensed] person” who does not reside in the defendant’s state of residence. Count Five alleged that Duroseau “willfully transport[ed] firearms . . . to the Haitian Army.” The government is bound by the allegations of the indictment and cannot now claim that the conviction was based on the police seizure of the firearms at the airport, a theory that was never presented to the jury. The statute does not criminalize attempts. View "United States v. Duroseau" on Justia Law

Warfield, a securities broker, contended before an arbitration panel that his former employer, ICON, wrongfully terminated him without just cause. Warfield’s employment fell within the ambit of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), so arbitrators resolved the dispute under FINRA Rule 13200(a). Warfield argued the mere fact that disputes over his employment relationship had to be resolved by arbitration implied that he could only be fired for cause. The panel awarded him $1,186,975.The district court refused to enforce the award (9 U.S.C. 9), holding that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law because North Carolina is an “at-will” employment state that does not recognize a cause of action for wrongful termination without just cause. The Fourth Circuit reversed. ICON has not made the “exceedingly difficult showing” necessary to demonstrate that the arbitrators acted with manifest disregard of the law. ICON never cited any North Carolina case rejecting the specific proposition that the arbitrability of an employment relationship implies for-cause protections. Even if ICON had the better argument before the arbitrators, there was still an argument and the issue is “subject to reasonable debate,” View "Warfield v. ICON Advisers, Inc" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Moores sued, claiming that Equitrans breached the parties’ right-of-way agreement and trespassed on the Moores’ land by laying two pipeline segments outside of the area specified in their agreement. A jury found that Equitrans either trespassed on the Moores’ West Virginia property or violated the right-of-way agreement but made no findings as to the proper remedy. While the Moores initially sought equitable relief (ejectment), a subsequent condemnation judgment in favor of Equitrans ultimately precluded such relief. Following several appeals, the district court allowed the Moores to pursue damages for breach-of-contract and trespass but denied leave to add a claim for intentional trespass. Later, the district court barred any claim for breach-of-contract damages. After excluding much of the Moores’ evidence of trespass damages, the court sua sponte entered judgment in favor of Equitrans.The Fourth Circuit vacated in part. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend, in making its motion in limine rulings, or in entering judgment in favor of Equitrans on contract damages. The court rejected a contention that the proper measure of trespass damages includes a portion of Equitrans’s profits. Because the Moores lacked sufficient notice that they needed to come forward with all evidence of trespass damages, the court vacated the portion of the judgment concerning trespass damages for procedural error and remanded. View "Moore v. Equitrans, L.P." on Justia Law

Said and six other Somali citizens attacked the USS Ashland. Said and another held loaded AK–47s. The codefendant fired at the Ashland. The Ashland returned fire, killing one attacker. Six survivors were brought to Virginia for prosecution.Said was convicted of conspiracy to commit hostage-taking, 18 U.S.C. 1203(a); conspiracy to commit kidnapping, (1201(a)(2), (c)); conspiracy to perform an act of violence against persons on a vessel, (2291(a)(6), (9)); conspiracy to use and carry a firearm and a destructive device during and in relation to, and to possess a firearm and a destructive device in furtherance of, a crime of violence, (924(o)) (Count 4); piracy, (1651); attack to plunder a vessel, (1659); assault with a dangerous weapon on a federal officer or employee, (111(a)(1), (b)); performing an act of violence against persons on a vessel, (2291(a)(6)); using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to, and possessing a firearm in furtherance of, a crime of violence, (924(c)(1)(A)) (Count 9); and using, carrying, and discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, (924(c)(1)(A)(iii)) (Count 10). The verdict form did not require the jury to identify the predicate offenses upon which the firearms convictions were based.On habeas review, the district court vacated Said’s convictions on two firearm counts because the Count 1-3 convictions on which they could be based were no longer valid after the Supreme Court invalidated the “residual clause” defining crimes of violence. The Fourth Circuit reversed. Said did not establish that the error in the jury instructions had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” View "United States v. Said" on Justia Law

Milton employees were performing work at Perry’s home. Milton’s owner authorized Perry to move Milton’s truck, which was blocking the driveway. Perry accidentally struck Ball, a Milton employee, who sustained serious injuries. Milton had a commercial automobile liability insurance policy issued by United, which provided $1 million in liability coverage to Milton and to any person using Milton’s vehicles with its permission. United sought a declaratory judgment that it had no obligation to cover Perry’s liability, based on “Worker’s Compensation” and “Employee Indemnification and Employer’s Liability” exclusions.The district court granted United judgment, finding Ball sustained his injuries while working within the course of his employment. The court rejected Ball’s argument that West Virginia Code 33-6-31(a) required United to extend liability coverage to Perry as a permissive user of an insured automobile. The Fourth Circuit held that because Ball’s negligence claim was against a third party, rather than against his employer for workers’ compensation the exclusions did not apply. On remand, United argued that while the exclusion was unenforceable up to the $25,000 minimum liability coverage required by West Virginia law, it remained enforceable as to any amount above that statutory minimum. Ball and Perry argued that United was required to provide Perry with coverage of up to $1 million. The district court granted United summary judgment. The Fourth Circuit certified the question to the state’s highest court. View "United Financial Casualty Co. v. Ball" on Justia Law

Labor unions and the West Virginia Pipe Trades Health and Welfare Fund, sued Nitro Construction under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 185, after Nitro made several tardy payments to the Fund. Nitro had paid its required contribution before the suit was filed; the suit sought $77,373.95 in liquidated damages, plus interest and attorneys’ fees, as provided for by the collection procedures.The district court granted Nitro summary judgment, holding that the liquidated damages constituted penalties and were therefore unrecoverable. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Although ERISA allows punitive liquidated damages, federal common law prohibits punitive damages for breach of contract. The federal common law to be applied in LMRA Section 301 cases is ordinarily the general law of contracts. The court noted that the Fund sought almost $80,000 in liquidated damages, even though its actual damages (lost interest) are readily ascertainable and were only $3,952. Nitro’s late payments did not result in any claim being denied. Nitro never agreed to the liquidated damages provisions; the Fund unilaterally created its delinquent employer procedures under its governing document. The district court did not err by finding these liquidated damages provisions to be punitive and declining to enforce them. View "Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 625 v. Nitro Construction Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Officers approached Buster as he was walking; 30 minutes earlier, the officers had responded to “a domestic assault where a firearm discharged in the air.” The officers believed Buster matched descriptions of the assailant and that he was the person they had seen outside the victim’s apartment earlier. Buster declined to stop and eventually ran but tripped. The officers tackled him. Buster was wearing a cross-body bag. The officers pulled the bag to Buster’s back and handcuffed him. Buster said the strap was choking him. An officer cut the strap, removed the bag, which felt “[h]ard to the touch,” then opened the bag and found a gun and ammunition. The officers questioned Buster without giving the Miranda warnings. At the police station, an officer gave Buster the Miranda warnings, and elicited “‘essentially’ the same material discussed in the pre-Miranda interview.”The government agreed not to use the pre-Miranda statements. The court suppressed Buster’s post-Miranda statements, as “the product of an impermissible two-step interview tactic” but concluded the initial stop was valid and that “the pat-down of Buster’s person and the search of his bag were reasonable.” Buster was sentenced to 51 months’ imprisonment. The Fourth Circuit reversed. The “Terry” exception does not cover a warrantless search of a bag recently possessed by a person who was—by the time the bag was opened— handcuffed and face-down on the ground. View "United States v. Buster" on Justia Law