Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2012, Defendant was sentenced to 219 months of incarceration for drug conspiracy charges involving powder and crack cocaine. Defendant moved for relief under the First Step Act, which reduced penalties under the Fair Sentencing Act. The District Court determined Defendant was eligible for relief under the First Step Act but denied Defendant's motion finding that his sentence was already at the statutory minimum.The Fourth Circuit affirmed, albeit on alternate grounds. The court held that Defendant was ineligible for relief under the First Step Act. Section 404 of the First Step Act excludes defendants whose sentences previously were imposed in accordance with the Fair Sentencing Act. Defendant committed the offense before the Fair Sentencing Act became effective date but was convicted and sentenced after that date. His sentencing also came after the Supreme Court clarified, in Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012), that the Fair Sentencing Act was to be applied to pre-Act offenders, like Defendant, who had yet to be sentenced when that Act became effective. Thus, Defendant was ineligible for relief. View "US v. Leroy Goodwin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s new orders on damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs in his suit against American Airlines (“AA”) pursuant to the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act ("USERRA"). Plaintiff challenged the district court’s determination as to the equivalence of the position as the basis for its reassessed damages as well as the methods by which the district court calculated the new costs and fees award.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s award. The court wrote that the sole factual determination before the district court on remand was whether the position AA offered to Plaintiff on October 22 was equivalent to his escalator position as a line pilot. Section 4313(a)(3)(A) instructs that the alternative position must be one the individual is “qualified to perform” and which is “equivalent in seniority, status, and pay.” The court explained that district courts are best positioned to make factual determinations concerning warranted damages and the need for costs and fees.   Here, the court held that Plaintiff’s arguments fail to convince the court of the clear error in the district court’s determination as to the equivalence of the position AA offered. Further, the district court’s total award in attorneys’ fees based on these calculations does not constitute an abuse of discretion. The court employed the proper methodology: It calculated the lodestar by multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably expended, appropriately considering the relevant factors. Ultimately, Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that any aspect of the district court’s fee award determination constitutes an abuse of its broad discretion. View "Thomas Harwood, III v. American Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and its foreign subsidiaries (collectively, “Eli Lilly”) applied to the district court under 28 U.S.C Section 1782 for an order requiring Novartis Pharma AG to provide discovery for use in ongoing patent litigation between the two companies. After Novartis intervened and objected to Eli Lilly’s application, the district court entered an order denying the application.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed and addressed two grounds. The district court held that Novartis was not “found” in the Eastern District of Virginia because it was not physically present there. Eli Lilly contends that the court erred in interpreting the word “found” so restrictively, arguing instead that a person is “found” within a district for purposes of Section 1782 when it is “within the personal jurisdiction” of the district court, extending to “the full reach of personal jurisdiction” under the Due Process Clause.   Here, in view of the definitions in legal dictionaries and Supreme Court opinions, the court presumed that when Congress similarly used “found” in Section 1782, it intended that the same meaning apply — that a corporation is found where it is physically present by its officers and agents carrying on the corporation’s business. Thus, the district court acted in conformance with the requirements of Section 1782 when it denied Eli Lilly’s application to issue a discovery order directed against Novartis on the ground that Novartis was not found in the Eastern District of Virginia. Further, the court wrote it is apparent that the factors addressed by the district court fall squarely within those factors identified by the Supreme Court in Intel as relevant. View "Eli Lilly and Company v. Novartis Pharma AG" on Justia Law

In a putative class action, Plaintiffs allege that as prisoners at two of Virginia’s supermax facilities, they have suffered severe isolation in violation of the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiffs argue that the Virginia Department of Corrections (“VDOC”) has not used its supermax facilities for any legitimate penological purposes. Instead, Plaintiffs claim, that Virginia and its officers have warehoused prisoners in solitary, without any meaningful path back to the general population, to justify the profligate costs of building and running those institutions.     The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion. The court explained that Defendants invoked qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss before any of the evidence is in. And on the facts Plaintiffs have pleaded, Defendants cannot succeed. Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that Defendants knew the harms long-term solitary confinement causes and disregarded them. But qualified immunity does not protect knowing violations of the law.   The court explained that its analysis of due process entails a two-part inquiry: (1) whether Plaintiffs had a protectable liberty interest in avoiding security detention; and (2) whether Defendants failed to afford minimally adequate process to protect that liberty interest. Plaintiffs allege Defendants failed to meet even the most basic due process requirements like notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard and that the criteria Defendants employ to assess solitary placements are entirely divorced from legitimate penological interests. On those allegations—and at this litigation stage—Defendants cannot claim immunity. View "William Thorpe v. Harold Clarke" on Justia Law

Charter Day School (“CDS”) a public charter school in North Carolina, requires female students to wear skirts to school based on the view that girls are “fragile vessels” deserving of “gentle” treatment by boys. Plaintiffs argued that this sex-based classification grounded on gender stereotypes violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and subjects them to discrimination and denial of the full benefits of their education in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. Section 1681 et seq. (“Title IX”).  In response, despite CDS’ status as a public school under North Carolina law, CDS denied accountability under the Equal Protection Clause by maintaining that they are not state actors.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s entry of summary judgment for Plaintiffs on their Equal Protection claim against CDS. The court also vacated the district court’s summary judgment award in favor of all Defendants on Plaintiffs’ Title IX claim and remanded for further proceedings on that claim.   The court held that CDS is a state actor for purposes of Section 1983 and the Equal Protection Clause. By implementing the skirts requirement based on blatant gender stereotypes about the “proper place” for girls and women in society, CDS has acted in clear violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The court further held that sex-based dress codes like the skirts requirement, when imposed by covered entities, are subject to review under the anti-discrimination provisions of Title IX. View "Bonnie Peltier v. Charter Day School, Inc." on Justia Law

Air Evac EMS, Inc., is an emergency air ambulance provider. Because the company's services are expensive, it markets and sells what it characterizes as a "debt cancellation program." Under this program, West Virginia residents pay a sum of money annually and any amount due on their bill in excess of what is covered by insurance will be canceled by the company.Through a series of communications and actions taken by West Virginia, Air Evac determined that the state was favoring a competitor. Air Evac brought several suits in district court. This one alleges that the Airline Deregulation Act preempts the West Virginia Insurance Commissioner from taking any enforcement efforts. Following this case, Air Evac brought another case against the Commissioner that remains pending at the time of this appeal.The district court determined that the abstention doctrine applied, however, because the case presented "extraordinary circumstances," the court determined that abstention was not appropriate.The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), federal courts should abstain from exercising jurisdiction to consider matters related to ongoing state criminal proceedings as well as quasi-criminal proceedings if the state proceeding is ongoing, implicates important state interests and provides an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges. The Fourth Circuit determined that the district court properly analyzed the abstention factors. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion. View "Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Allan McVey" on Justia Law

In 2011, Defendant pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon. Under the Armed Career Criminals Act, Defendant received a 15-year sentence. Included in Defendant's plea agreement was a waiver of the right to appeal and to collaterally attack his conviction for any reason aside from ineffective assistance of counsel of prosecutorial misconduct. Defendant did not appeal, but filed a Sec. 2255 petition raising prosecutorial misconduct and ineffectiveness claims. The district court denied Petitioner's petition and he was denied a certificate of appealability.Subsequently, Defendant filed a second Sec 2255 petition in the wake of Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015). The Sixth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability on this issue; however, the matter was resolved against Petitioner based on the waivers in his plea agreement.Following the denial of his second Sec. 2255 petition, Petitioner filed a Sec. 2241 petition. The district court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, finding that Sec. 2241 was unavailable to Petitioner because he could not satisfy the requirements of Sec. 2255(e), which limits federal prisoners’ access to Section 2241.The Fourth Circuit affirmed. A federal prisoner may pursue habeas relief through a Sec. 2241 petition only if it “appears that the [Section 2255] remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” Here, the court determined that Sec. 2255 adequately provided an avenue of review, as evidenced by the Sixth Circuit's consideration of Petitioner's Johnson claim. View "Larry Slusser v. Acting Warden Vereen" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g), which prohibits a felon from possessing a firearm. Prior to sentencing, the Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”). The PSR concluded that Defendant’s previous North Carolina conviction for felony assault inflicting physical injury by strangulation was a crime of violence that enhanced Defendant’s base offense level under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Defendant’s prior conviction stemmed from an incident where he put “his hand around [a woman’s] neck and squeez[ed]. Defendant objected to the enhancement, arguing that assault by strangulation is not a crime of violence. The district court disagreed with Defendant and imposed the enhancement.   Defendant appealed his sentence and the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling and held that North Carolina crime of assault inflicting physical injury by strangulation is a crime of violence under the categorical approach. The court explained that North Carolina’s crime of assault by strangulation can only be committed with an intentional, knowing or purposeful state of mind. As such, it satisfies the mens rea required to qualify as a crime of violence. View "US v. Dennis Rice" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were fired from their Department of Public Safety positions with the Village of Bald Head Island (“the Village”), a municipality located in Brunswick County, North Carolina. Following their departures, Village employees published Plaintiffs’ termination letters and department separation affidavits which accused Plaintiffs of violating certain employee policy provisions. Plaintiffs filed suit alleging numerous claims. As relevant here, they brought defamation claims under North Carolina state law against the Village;.the Village Town Manager (“Manager”) ; and the Village Director of Public Safety (“Director”). The district court dismissed the defamation claims against the Village but found the Manager and Director liable for defamation for publishing the termination letters and separation affidavits, respectively. Defendants appealed and Plaintiffs cross-appealed as to the dismissal of the Village.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s (1) judgment against the Manager for libel per se arising from publication of the separation affidavits; (2) dismissal of all defamation claims against the Village; (3) denial of leave to amend to add the August 28, 2014 email as a third publication; (4) exclusion of the August 28 email for other purposes; (5) exclusion of Facebook posts; and (6) denial of Plaintiffs’ untimely Rule 59(e) motion seeking prejudgment interest. The court reversed the district court’s judgment against the Manager on all libel claims stemming from the publication of the termination letters for lack of actual malice. Finally, the court denied Plaintiffs’ pending motion, purportedly filed under Rule 60, “for corrections based on clerical mistakes, oversights, and omissions.” View "Thomas Cannon v. Calvin R. Peck, Jr." on Justia Law

When Defendant was released from prison and began his term of supervised release for racketeering he assaulted his then-girlfriend N.D. In light of this assault the district court revoked supervised release and sentenced him to time served and a new eighteen-month supervised release term with the same terms as those previously imposed. His probation officer then filed a petition to revoke supervised release based on these convictions and his failure to report to counseling. N.D. — now Combs’ ex-wife — did not appear at the revocation hearing that followed. But at the hearing, the district court twice referred to N.D.’s out-of-court statements.   Defendant appealed his sentence, arguing the district court erred by admitting N.D.’s out-of-court statements during the revocation hearing. He contends the district court violated Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b)(1)(B) and (C) by admitting her statements without balancing the interests of the parties, requiring a showing of good cause, or first disclosing the statements to Defendant.   The court rejected the Government’s argument that Rules 32.1(b)(2)(B) and (C) do not apply to the sentencing phase of a revocation proceeding and concluded that the district court erred in introducing N.D.’s statements without balancing the interests of the parties. However, notwithstanding its disagreement with the Government’s arguments regarding the applicability of Rule 32.1(b)(2) to sentencing — and assuming that the district court plainly erred here in violating those provisions the court concluded that Defendant has not shown a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different absent consideration of the undisclosed statements. View "US v. Thomas Combs" on Justia Law