Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The 2021 South Carolina Fetal Heartbeat and Protection from Abortion Act bans abortions after an ultrasound detects a “fetal heartbeat,” usually around the sixth week of pregnancy, before the “viability threshold” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Act includes exceptions for medical emergencies, rape, and incest and requires abortion providers to “perform an obstetric ultrasound,” display the ultrasound images to the pregnant woman, and "record a written medical description of the ultrasound images of the unborn child’s fetal heartbeat.” The Act provides a private cause of action for a woman to sue an abortion provider if the abortion was performed or induced in violation of the Act or the woman “was not given the information” abortion providers are required to disclose before an abortion procedure.The district court enjoined the Act's enforcement. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The abortion providers suffered an injury in fact sufficient to establish standing. The defendants acknowledged that the six-week “fetal heartbeat” abortion ban is unconstitutional. The district court reasonably determined that, notwithstanding the Act’s severability clause, its provisions were not severable. The function of each of the provisions remaining in the Act after the removal of the six-week abortion ban reveals that the entire statute was designed to carry out the ban. View "Planned Parenthood South Atlantic v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Morgan’s credit reports reflected purported overdue home loan payments. Morgan wrote to his loan servicer: Please find a report ... stating as of 10/13/15 I owe Caliber $16,806[.] [A]lso on 9/20/16 I called Caliber and talked to Thomas ID#27662[.] [H]e stated I owe $30,656.89 and the $630.00 on my record is late charges. Can you please correct your records[?] Your office reporting the wrong amount to the credit agency is effecting [sic] my employment. Morgan included a copy of a credit report. Morgan alleges the defendant continued to report adverse loan information.When Johnson fell behind on her mortgage payments, the defendant reported to credit reporting agencies. While seeking a loan modification, Johnson sent a letter, challenging the existence of “title issues” and requesting “a reasonable investigation,” correction of the “errors,” and “an accounting of all sums you have imposed." The parties ultimately finalized a loan modification but in the interim, the defendant continued reporting adverse information.Johnson and Morgan filed a putative class action. Qualified written requests (QWRs) under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2601 or Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Regulation X, trigger an obligation to cease providing adverse information to credit reporting agencies. The Fourth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Morgan’s claim but affirmed the dismissal of Johnson’s claim. Where a written correspondence to a loan servicer provides sufficient information to identify the account and an alleged servicing error, such correspondence is a QWR; if it merely challenges a contractual issue, it does not implicate a servicing issue and is not a QWR. Johnson’s correspondence did not concern the servicing of her account. View "Morgan v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc." on Justia Law

Then-lieutenant Hasson was arrested at U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters. Agents found 196 Tramadol pills in Hasson’s backpack and another 106 in his desk. A search of Hasson’s residence uncovered another 122 Tramadol pills; 15 firearms; silencers; hundreds of rounds of ammunition, hormones, and steroids. Hasson had Tramadol in his bloodstream. The government alleged Hasson was “a domestic terrorist,” contemplating “biological attacks followed by attack on food supply” and “a bombing/sniper campaign.” His emails stated: Looking to Russia ... or any land that despises the west’s liberalism. … appropriate individual targets, to bring greatest impact. Professors, DR’s, Politian’s, Judges, leftists in general. He compiled manifestos of murderers and terrorists and information about explosives and other weapons.Hasson was charged with unlawful possession of unregistered firearm silencers, 26 U.S.C. 5861(d); unlawful possession of firearm silencers unidentified by serial number, 5861(i); possession of firearms by an unlawful user of and addict to a controlled substance, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3); and possession of a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 844(a). The district court rejected Hasson's argument that Section 922(g)(3)'s phrases “unlawful user” and “addicted to” were unconstitutionally vague on their face and increased Hasson’s Guidelines range (U.S.S.G. 3A1.4), concluding that his offense was intended to promote a federal crime of terrorism. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that Section 922(g)(3) is facially vague and that Section 3A1.4 cannot apply because he was not convicted of a federal crime of terrorism. View "United States v. Hasson" on Justia Law

Ali sought to pursue 42 U.S.C. 1983 proceedings challenging as unconstitutional an executive order of Maryland’s Governor that prohibits boycotts of Israel by business entities that bid on the state’s procurement contracts. According to the Initial Complaint, “Ali is a computer software engineer who wishes to submit bids for government software project contracts but is barred from doing so due to the presence of mandatory ‘No Boycott of Israel’ clauses.”The district court dismissed with prejudice Ali’s lawsuit for want of Article III standing to sue. The Fourth Circuit affirmed but modified the judgment to provide that the dismissal is without prejudice. The court first disagreed with Ali’s interpretation of the Order. The Order indicates that if a business entity has engaged in anti-Israel national origin discrimination in the process of preparing a bid for a state procurement contract, the entity is barred from being awarded the contract; if the entity has engaged in a boycott of Israel entirely unrelated to the bid formation process, the Order is of no relevance. The court rejected Ali’s argument that the certification requirement constitutes an unconstitutionally vague loyalty oath. The Order does not require the entity to pledge any loyalty to Israel or profess any other beliefs. View "Ali v. Hogan" on Justia Law

In 2005, Lyons opened a Home Equity Line of Credit (HELOC) with PNC’s predecessor, signing an agreement with no arbitration provision. In 2010, Lyons opened deposit accounts at PNC and signed a document that stated he was bound by the terms of PNC’s Account Agreement, including a provision authorizing PNC to set off funds from the account to pay any indebtedness owed by the account holder to PNC. PNC could amend the Account Agreement. In 2013, PNC added an arbitration clause to the Account Agreement. Customers had 45 days to opt out. Lyons opened another deposit account with PNC in 2014 and agreed to be bound by the 2014 Account Agreement, including the arbitration clause. Lyons again did not opt out. Lyons’s HELOC ended in February 2015. PNC began applying setoffs from Lyons’s 2010 and 2014 Accounts.Lyons sued under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). PNC moved to compel arbitration. The court found that the Dodd-Frank Act amendments to TILA barred arbitration of Lyons’s claims related to the 2014 Account but did not apply retroactively to bar arbitration of his claims related to the 2010 account. The Fourth Circuit reversed in part. The Dodd-Frank Act 15 U.S.C. 1639c(e) precludes pre-dispute agreements requiring the arbitration of claims related to residential mortgage loans; the relevant arbitration agreement was not formed until after the amendment's effective date. PNC may not compel arbitration of Lyons’s claims as to either account. View "Lyons v. PNC Bank" on Justia Law

STA, an association of businesses involved with the transport of cargo at the Port of Baltimore, and the Longshoremen’s union (ILA) entered into trust agreements to create funds that provide employee benefits in accordance with the Labor Management Relations Act. The agreements provide an equal number of trustees representing the labor union and trustees representing the employers. Not all companies that do business at the Port are STA members. The Union Trustees sought to expand the definition of “Employer” in the trust agreements to include non-STA employers engaged in the same businesses as STA-affiliated employers at the Port, to include “any employer who signs a CBA [collective bargaining agreement] with the ILA or its [local affiliates] that requires contributions to the Trust.” Expanding the definition would increase the number of contributors to the trusts. The Management Trustees opposed the amendment, creating a deadlock, and refused the Union Trustees’ request to arbitrate. The Union Trustees sued to compel arbitration under 29 U.S.C. 186(c)(5)(B).The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Although courts incorporate a “presumption of arbitrability” in employer-union arbitration disputes when an arbitration agreement exists, here the trust agreements provide a “positive assurance” that arbitration may not be compelled. View "Krueger v. Angelos" on Justia Law

After Mejia-Velasquez entered the United States without inspection, she sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under CAT, claiming that she and other members of her family had been the victims of physical harm due to their membership in a particular Honduran political party, and their affiliation with a family member who was elected mayor of the family’s hometown as a member of that same party. Because Mejia-Velasquez failed to produce biometrics (such as her photograph, fingerprints, and signature) in support of her application, after having been warned of the consequences of failing to do so, the immigration judge deemed her application abandoned pursuant to 8 C.F.R.1003.47(c) and 1208.10 and ordered her removed.The BIA and Fourth Circuit affirmed. Section 1003.47(d) is unambiguous as to the three requirements specified — oral notification, a biometrics notice, and instructions. Mejia-Velasquez actually received a biometrics notice from the IJ at her master calendar hearing. That document, entitled “Fingerprint Warning,” contained all the information that could reasonably be contemplated by the regulation’s requirement of “a biometrics notice.” It warned of the consequences for failing to submit the required information (abandonment) and set a deadline. View "Mejia-Velasquez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Employees of a Navy services contractor, SA-TECH, sued the contractor in California state court for violations of the state’s labor laws. Before and during that suit, SA-TECH sought guidance from the Navy as to whether California’s labor laws applied to it and its subcontractors, given the federal nature of its service contract. Those requests went unanswered. SA-TECH’s claim with its contracting officer under the Contract Disputes Act was denied. SA-TECH then sought declaratory relief on the questions: whether the modified understanding of California labor laws would control SA-TECH’s operations on Navy and Navy-chartered ships; whether SA-TECH would be permitted or required by the Navy, under its contracts, to pay any sleep-time over-time; and whether costs incurred by SA-TECH in settling the state-court litigation would be allowable costs under its current contract.The district court dismissed the complaint, citing lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Contract Disputes Act’s exhaustion requirements, 41 U.S.C. 7103(a)(1)–(3). The Fourth Circuit affirmed. SA-TECH did not specifically assert any legal or contractual grounds entitling it to the Navy’s opinion on its agency status. Its other issues are monetary claims for which SA-TECH did not present a requested sum certain, as required to exhaust its remedies. View "Systems Application & Technologies, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

A class action claimed Nationstar violated consumer protection laws in servicing class members’ mortgage loans. Years later, the parties filed a notice of settlement. A magistrate granted preliminary approval. In order of priority, the parties proposed that the $3,000,000 settlement fund pay for administrative expenses up to $300,000, attorneys’ fees, a class representative award, and class claims. The settlement proposed notice by Email, Postcard, and Longform. The Email and Postcard Notice informed class members of the amount of the settlement, how to submit a claim, how to opt-out of the class, and where to find the Longform Notice. The Longform Notice explained the attorneys’ fee arrangement. The notices did not estimate each class member's recovery. Nationstar agreed not to oppose class counsel’s fee request up to $1,300,000. Class counsel submitted records that supported $1,261,547.50 in fees and $217,657.26 in unreimbursed expenses but requested only $1,300,000. The value of a class member’s claim is determined by a points system based on Nationstar’s treatment of their account and the class member’s expenses.An absent class member, having sued Nationstar in California state court, objected to the settlement, arguing that the notice was insufficient; the settlement was unfair and inadequate; the release was unconstitutionally overbroad; and the attorneys’ fee award was improper. The magistrate overruled those objections. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, noting that over 97% of the nearly 350,000 class members received notice and the low opt-out rate. View "McAdams v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC" on Justia Law

Environmental nonprofit organizations challenged the Fish and Wildlife Service’s 2020 Biological Opinion and Incidental Take Statement (BiOp) for the Mountain Valley Pipeline. The Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(2), requires that whenever an agency action “may affect listed species,” the agency must formally consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service, which must formulate a “biological opinion” on whether that action, in light of the relevant environmental context, “is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of [those] species.” The plaintiffs alleged that the agency failed to adequately consider the project’s environmental context while analyzing impacts to two species of endangered fish, the Roanoke logperch and the candy darter.The Fourth Circuit vacated the approval. Serious errors at steps two and three of the jeopardy analysis render the 2020 BiOp arbitrary and capricious. The court recognized that its decision will further delay the completion of an already mostly finished Pipeline, but reiterated the Act’s directive to: “halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost.” In effect, the Fish and Wildlife Service attempted to pass off its summary of range-wide conditions and threats as an action-area analysis. Caguely referring to the “destruction and modification of habitat” within the action area, without explaining the specific causes or extent of this local degradation, leaves unclear at what the baseline condition for the logperch might actually be. View "Appalachian Voices v. United States Department of the Interior" on Justia Law