Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Berg, a resident of South Carolina, sought recovery of art taken by the Nazis following the German invasion of the Netherlands. Berg’s grandfather was a partner in Firma D. Katz, which owned art galleries specializing in the sale of paintings by Dutch Old Masters. Following World War II, much of the stolen art was returned to the Netherlands by the U.S. military under Collection Point Agreements; the Netherlands agreed to hold the art as “custodians pending the determination of the lawful owners thereof.” Firma D. Katz was liquidated in 1974. The artworks have not been returned to the heirs of its partners. In the District of South Carolina, Berg sued the Kingdom of the Netherlands; its Ministry of Education, Culture & Science, its Cultural Heritage Agency (RCE), and municipal museums in the Netherlands holding the artworks.The Fourth Circuit affirmed that the Ministry and RCE, are political subdivisions of the Netherlands and do not lose Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1602 immunity for artworks located outside of the U.S. which were expropriated in violation of international law. As to the museums, venue was improper in South Carolina under U.S.C. 1391(f). View "Berg v. Kingdom of the Netherlands" on Justia Law

Barringer was the Executive Vice President and a Board member of J&R, a Virginia manufacturing company. By 2014, J&R was delinquent on filing and paying its 941 (employee withholding) taxes. Fearing personal liability, Barringer submitted a Hardship Withdrawal Form requesting $311,859.04 from her 401(k) account “[t]o prevent eviction or ... foreclosure of the mortgage on [her] principal residence.” Barringer deposited the funds into J&R's account to pay the delinquent taxes. Barringer’s mortgage balance was approximately $200,000 at the time; her payments were not delinquent. In 2016, J&R was again behind on its 941 taxes. Barringer requested a final distribution from her 401(k) account, falsely citing the end of her employment with J&R. Barringer again deposited the funds, plus some of her personal savings, into the J&R account. Instead of paying delinquent taxes, Barringer paid herself and vendors. After providing misinformation to federal agents, Barringer was convicted of willfully failing to collect and truthfully account for and pay taxes, 26 U.S.C. 7202, and making materially false statements to federal agents, 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2).The Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions and 36-month sentence. Any error in the denial of Barringer’s pretrial motion to dismiss the wire fraud counts was harmless because the court subsequently granted her motion for a judgment of acquittal on those charges. Barringer’s false statements to investigators were “material to a matter within the jurisdiction of the agency.” The court upheld an abuse-of-trust enhancement under U.S.S.G. 3B1. View "United States v. Barringer" on Justia Law

Tomas-Ramos, a citizen of Guatemala, reentered the U.S. illegally in 2018. A removal order previously entered against him was reinstated. Tomas-Ramos expressed a fear of returning to Guatemala because gang members had threatened to kill him for resisting their recruitment of his son. An asylum officer conducted a screening interview and determined that Tomas-Ramos failed to establish a reasonable fear of harm and was not entitled to relief from his reinstated removal order. The asylum officer recognized that Tomas-Ramos might have been threatened because of his relationship to his son but held that immediate family is not a qualifying “particular social group” under 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(A) because it “lacks social distinction.” An IJ agreed.The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded. The primary ground for the IJ’s decision was an erroneous conclusion that there was no “nexus” between the harm Tomas-Ramos faced and a protected ground. The record compels the conclusion that Tomas-Ramos was persecuted on account of a protected ground, in the form of his family ties. The IJ’s finding that “[Tomas-Ramos] can relocate” is not an independent ground for affirmance, because that finding is called into question by the determination that Tomas-Ramos has established past persecution. View "Tomas-Ramos v. Garland" on Justia Law

Marsh, an employee of Petitioner New River Electrical Corporation, suffered severe burns when he picked up a live electrical wire at a job site. No one had tested, tagged, or grounded the transformer connected to the cable that shocked Marsh. Two supervisors attempted to conceal these breaches of New River’s standard safety protocols. They were subsequently terminated. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) investigated the accident, determined that New River committed three serious violations of the applicable safety regulations, and fined the company $38,802. An ALJ affirmed, finding that New River had not established the affirmative defense of “unpreventable employee misconduct,” but decreased the penalty to $12,934. The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission declined to review that decision.The Fourth Circuit reversed. The ALJ improperly relieved OSHA of the burden of proving that New River had constructive knowledge of these violations as part of the prima facie case. When the supervisory employee commits the violation, the employer loses its “eyes and ears” to detect and prevent misconduct. To avoid unfairly imposing liability on an employer for a rogue supervisor, OSHA must prove that a supervisor’s misconduct was “reasonably foreseeable” to establish the employer had constructive knowledge. View "New River Electrical Corp. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission" on Justia Law

West Virginia State Troopers Elliott and Cornelius received three 911 calls about Crumbley. Two different callers stated that Crumbley was armed and dangerous and keeping his family hostage. Another caller stated Crumbley made threats about shooting the police. The troopers, heading to Crumbley’s property, discussed Crumbley’s rumored drug connections. Crumbley came out of the house screaming and threatened a shootout. He had nothing in his hands but threatened to get a weapon. Crumbley went between the yard where the troopers were and the house, threatening to get a weapon and shoot the troopers. Crumbley pulled down his pants to expose his genitals while spinning in a circle. Crumbley then got a shovel, threatened the troopers with it, then ran, throwing the shovel. Cornelius fell in the snow. When Elliott turned a corner, he saw Crumbley turned away from him. Crumbley then abruptly turned toward Elliott and began to raise his hands, causing Elliot to believe that he might have a gun. Elliott fatally shot him. Crumbley did not have a gun.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to Elliott. Crumbley was shot in the back, raising a genuine dispute about Elliot’s version of events. The facts might show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. View "Stanton v. Elliott" on Justia Law

Hobbs’ former girlfriend, Foreman, called Baltimore police around 7:00 p.m. and stated that Hobbs had come to her home, brandished a semi-automatic handgun, broke a window, forcibly entered the home, removed a television, threatened to kill Foreman and her seven-year-old daughter, and stated that he also would kill responding officers. Detective Nesbitt verified that Hobbs had a violent criminal history and concluded that there was “an extreme urgent threat.” Around midnight, he submitted an “exigent form” to T-Mobile, Hobbs’ cell phone provider. T-Mobile responded with real-time “pings” that alerted Nesbitt to Hobbs’ general location. Another detective used call logs obtained from T-Mobile to determine which of Hobbs’ associates lived within the geographical range of each “ping.” About six hours after the domestic incident, officers attempted a traffic stop. Hobbs tried to flee but collided with a parked vehicle. Officers placed Hobbs under arrest and recovered a loaded handgun.Hobbs moved to suppress evidence of the firearm, arguing that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not justify the use of the cell phone “pings” and call logs. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. The court also rejected an argument that the jury was not instructed to find that Hobbs knew he was a felon at the time of the offense, as required by the Supreme Court’s “Rehaif” decision. View "United States v. Hobbs" on Justia Law

Faver, a practicing Muslim inmate, sued, alleging the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC), had denied him the ability to practice tenets of his religion, in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc. He alleged that, because of the VDOC’s single-vendor policy for its commissaries, he was required to purchase “his perfumed oils [for prayer] from Keefe,” which also sells “swine and idols” to other inmates. While he did not allege that the Keefe prayer oil was itself unsuitable, he alleged that “Islam prohibits the acquisition of religious accouterments from a company that sells swine and idols.” VDOC explained that before 2013, under a multiple-vendor policy, VDOC experienced “negative and harmful results” to the security, safety, and efficiency of its facilities.The Fourth Circuit affirmed that VDOC did not violate Faver’s rights under RLUIPA. While Faver had a sincerely-held religious belief and his religious exercise was substantially burdened by the single-vendor policy, the policy furthered the VDOC’s compelling interest of “preventing contraband, which promotes prison safety and security, and reducing the time prison personnel must devote to checking commissary shipments, which controls costs.” The policy was “the least restrictive means to further its compelling interests.” View "Faver v. Clarke" on Justia Law

Two months after he turned 18, Doe was caught having sex with his 14-year-old girlfriend. Doe could have been charged with “carnal knowledge of a child,” a Class 4 felony but instead pleaded to “taking indecent liberties with children,” which only prohibits behavior like propositioning a child for sex, which resulted in a shorter prison sentence. Both crimes generally put an offender on the highest tier of the sex-offender registry for life, but for carnal knowledge convictions, an offender less than five years older than his victim may be removed from the registry in time. Doe, in his 30s, sought removal from the registry, raising an equal protection claim and an Eighth Amendment claim, arguing that a lifelong registration is not an appropriate sanction for a single nonviolent crime committed by a high-school student.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Virginia’s sex-offender registry complies with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Even if Doe is similarly situated to an offender convicted of carnal knowledge, the differential treatment between the offenders satisfies rational-basis scrutiny. The government has a legitimate interest in not imposing its harshest collateral consequences on children. The registry is a regulatory scheme, not a punishment for Eighth Amendment purposes. View "Doe v. Settle" on Justia Law

An immigration bond allows the release of a detained individual based on a surety’s contractual undertaking to the United States to either deliver the individual as demanded or forfeit the sum specified in the bond. Nexus runs a bonds program: It screens immigrants and maintains contact with them throughout their release. Nexus lacks the Department of Treasury’s commercial-surety certification and needs another surety to take on the liability to the government. RLI performs that function for a fee. Nexus agreed to indemnify RLI for all losses. The parties’ Commercial Surety General Indemnity Agreement involves nearly 2,500 bonds and contains several clauses designed to keep RLI whole. One obligates Nexus to provide collateral sufficient to cover all of RLI’s exposure,Nexus argued that RLI’s exposure should be measured on each bond individually, that RLI is not actually “exposed” to any risk, and Nexus does not need to deposit collateral until there is reason to believe that RLI will have to pay on a particular bond because an immigrant fails to appear in court.The Fourth Circuit affirmed in favor of RLI. Although it is not known which immigrants will breach, some will. The Agreement must secure against aggregate risk—the likelihood Nexus will be able to (timely) indemnify RLI for all future breached bonds. Nexus’s financial condition, its historical willingness to indemnify RLI, and the historical rate of bonds breached bear on that likelihood and should inform the collateral calculus. View "RLI Insurance Co. v. Nexus Services, Inc." on Justia Law

White was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. In determining White’s sentence, the district court applied the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) 18 U.S.C. 924(e), based on three prior convictions for “violent felonies,” including Virginia common law robbery. The court imposed the ACCA’s mandatory minimum sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment. White argued that he did not qualify as an armed career criminal because Virginia common law robbery can be committed without the actual, attempted, or threatened use of physical force, by threatening to accuse the victim of having committed sodomy. The Virginia Supreme Court responded to a certified question: Under Virginia common law, an individual can be convicted of robbery by means of threatening to accuse the victim of having committed sodomy “if the accusation of ‘sodomy’ involves a crime against nature under extant criminal law.” The Eighth Circuit then vacated the sentence. Virginia common law robbery can be committed without proving as an element the “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force,” an element required for prior convictions to qualify as predicate offenses under the “violent force” provision of the ACCA. View "United States v. White" on Justia Law