Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two months after he turned 18, Doe was caught having sex with his 14-year-old girlfriend. Doe could have been charged with “carnal knowledge of a child,” a Class 4 felony but instead pleaded to “taking indecent liberties with children,” which only prohibits behavior like propositioning a child for sex, which resulted in a shorter prison sentence. Both crimes generally put an offender on the highest tier of the sex-offender registry for life, but for carnal knowledge convictions, an offender less than five years older than his victim may be removed from the registry in time. Doe, in his 30s, sought removal from the registry, raising an equal protection claim and an Eighth Amendment claim, arguing that a lifelong registration is not an appropriate sanction for a single nonviolent crime committed by a high-school student.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Virginia’s sex-offender registry complies with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Even if Doe is similarly situated to an offender convicted of carnal knowledge, the differential treatment between the offenders satisfies rational-basis scrutiny. The government has a legitimate interest in not imposing its harshest collateral consequences on children. The registry is a regulatory scheme, not a punishment for Eighth Amendment purposes. View "Doe v. Settle" on Justia Law

An immigration bond allows the release of a detained individual based on a surety’s contractual undertaking to the United States to either deliver the individual as demanded or forfeit the sum specified in the bond. Nexus runs a bonds program: It screens immigrants and maintains contact with them throughout their release. Nexus lacks the Department of Treasury’s commercial-surety certification and needs another surety to take on the liability to the government. RLI performs that function for a fee. Nexus agreed to indemnify RLI for all losses. The parties’ Commercial Surety General Indemnity Agreement involves nearly 2,500 bonds and contains several clauses designed to keep RLI whole. One obligates Nexus to provide collateral sufficient to cover all of RLI’s exposure,Nexus argued that RLI’s exposure should be measured on each bond individually, that RLI is not actually “exposed” to any risk, and Nexus does not need to deposit collateral until there is reason to believe that RLI will have to pay on a particular bond because an immigrant fails to appear in court.The Fourth Circuit affirmed in favor of RLI. Although it is not known which immigrants will breach, some will. The Agreement must secure against aggregate risk—the likelihood Nexus will be able to (timely) indemnify RLI for all future breached bonds. Nexus’s financial condition, its historical willingness to indemnify RLI, and the historical rate of bonds breached bear on that likelihood and should inform the collateral calculus. View "RLI Insurance Co. v. Nexus Services, Inc." on Justia Law

White was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. In determining White’s sentence, the district court applied the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) 18 U.S.C. 924(e), based on three prior convictions for “violent felonies,” including Virginia common law robbery. The court imposed the ACCA’s mandatory minimum sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment. White argued that he did not qualify as an armed career criminal because Virginia common law robbery can be committed without the actual, attempted, or threatened use of physical force, by threatening to accuse the victim of having committed sodomy. The Virginia Supreme Court responded to a certified question: Under Virginia common law, an individual can be convicted of robbery by means of threatening to accuse the victim of having committed sodomy “if the accusation of ‘sodomy’ involves a crime against nature under extant criminal law.” The Eighth Circuit then vacated the sentence. Virginia common law robbery can be committed without proving as an element the “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force,” an element required for prior convictions to qualify as predicate offenses under the “violent force” provision of the ACCA. View "United States v. White" on Justia Law

Nine parents of students with disabilities who attend South Carolina public schools and two disability advocacy organizations filed suit challenging a South Carolina provision in the South Carolina state budget that prohibits school districts from using appropriated funds to impose mask mandates. The district court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the law's enforcement.The Fourth Circuit concluded that the parents and the disability advocacy organizations lack standing to sue the governor and the attorney general, and thus vacated the district court's order granting the preliminary injunction as to those defendants. In this case, although plaintiffs have alleged a nexus between their claimed injuries and the Proviso, they have not established that such injuries are fairly traceable to defendants' conduct or would be redressed by a favorable ruling against defendants. Accordingly, the court remanded with instructions to dismiss defendants from this case. View "Disability Rights South Carolina v. McMaster" on Justia Law

In two consolidated cases, petitioners seek review of the Forest Service and BLM's decisions to allow the Mountain Valley Pipeline to cross three and a half miles of the Jefferson National Forest in Virginia and West Virginia. The Fourth Circuit previously vacated the agencies' records of decision (RODs) because the Forest Service and the BLM failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the National Forest Management Act (the NFMA), and the Mineral Leasing Act (the MLA). Petitioners argue that the agencies' renewed RODs after remand also violate NEPA, the NFMA, and the MLA.The Fourth Circuit concluded that the Forest Service and the BLM inadequately considered the actual sedimentation and erosion impacts of the Pipeline; prematurely authorized the use of the conventional bore method to construct stream crossings; and failed to comply with the Forest Service's 2012 Planning Rule. Accordingly, the court granted the petitions for review as to those errors; denied the petitions for review in regard to petitioners' remaining arguments about the predecisional review process, alternative routes, and increased collocation; vacated the decisions of the Forest Service and the BLM; and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wild Virginia v. United States Forest Service" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a False Claims Act qui tam suit against his employer, Forest Laboratories, alleging that it engaged in a fraudulent price reporting scheme under the Medicaid Drug Rebate Statute by failing to aggregate discounts given to separate customers for purposes of reporting "Best Price."The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint, concluding that because Forest Laboratories' reading of the Rebate Statute was at the very least objectively reasonable and because it was not warned away from that reading by authoritative guidance, it did not act "knowingly" under the Act. In this case, Forest Laboratories made eminently reasonable assumptions based on the statutory text, and CMS invited assumptions precisely of this sort. The court noted that the government is not without recourse. Should Congress so wish, it can alter the Rebate Statute to require the aggregate reporting of discounts to separate entities. View "United States ex rel. Sheldon v. Allergan Sales, LLC" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit held that, after the Commissioner of Internal Revenue conceded that a taxpayer owed $0 and was entitled to the removal of any lien or levy, the United States Tax Court did not have jurisdiction to determine that the taxpayer overpaid and to order a refund. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, explaining that, when as here, the Commissioner has already conceded that a taxpayer has no tax liability and that the lien should be removed, any appeal to the Tax Court of the Appeals Office's determination as to the collection action is moot. The court stated that the phrase "underlying tax liability" does not provide the Tax Court jurisdiction over independent overpayment claims when the collection action no longer exists. View "McLane v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

On rehearing en banc, the court vacated defendant's sentence for possession with intent to distribute hydrocodone and oxycodone. Instead of pursuing defendant's objections, counsel relied entirely on a motion to enter a drug court diversion program (the BRIDGE program) that could have permitted defendant, if admitted, to enter treatment instead of going to prison.The court concluded that defendant clearly received ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel was unequivocally wrong on the law when he waived her meritorious objections to the PSR on the ground that none of those objections reduce the number that is relevant to this court. Rather, if successful, defendant's objections would have reduced the low end of her Sentencing Guidelines range by almost ten years. Because counsel's deficient performance prejudiced plaintiff, the court remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Freeman" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendant's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion seeking to vacate his sentence. The district court found that defendant qualified as an armed career criminal by relying on prior convictions that were not identified as predicates in defendant's presentence report and of which he had no notice at sentencing. The court concluded that the district court's finding was contrary to United States v. Hodge, 902 F.3d 420 (4th Cir. 2018), which held that the government cannot rely on collateral review on ACCA predicates that were not identified at sentencing, in order to preserve an enhancement that no longer can be sustained by the original predicates. Because there was a Hodge violation in this case, the court vacated defendant's 18 U.S.C. 922(g) sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Benton" on Justia Law

Nadendla, a physician, is of Indian origin. Nadendla was a member of WakeMed’s hospital's medical staff where she was granted clinical privileges in 2010, In 2017, citing “clinical concerns,” WakeMed informed Nadendla that she would not be reappointed clinical privileges; her appointment on the medical staff would expire. Nadendla requested a hearing, pursuant to the Bylaws. She alleges that WakeMed’s actions during the hearing process “exhibited an abject lack of fairness” and deprived her of adequate process in contravention of the Bylaws.Nadendla sued the hospital under 42 U.S.C. 1981, which guarantees to all persons in the United States “the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.’” The district court initially ruled that Nadendla sufficiently stated a section 1981 claim and state-law claims for breach of contract and for arbitrary and capricious conduct, but subsequently dismissed Nadendla’s section 1981 claim. The Fourth Circuit affirmed in part. The district court had the discretion to revisit its prior order and did not abuse its discretion in doing so. The complaint contained extensive, specific allegations regarding WakeMed’s failure to abide by the Bylaws but details regarding race are conspicuously absent. The court reversed the dismissal of Nadendla’s claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. View "Nadendla v. WakeMed" on Justia Law