Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The federal government used the 433-acre Institute Facility for synthetic rubber production during World War II. In 1947, UCC purchased the Facility and began manufacturing hydrocarbon and agricultural products. In 1986-2015, the property was owned and operated by various companies, before ownership returned to UCC, a subsidiary of Dow Chemical. In 1984, UCC applied for a permit to operate hazardous waste management units, under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901. The EPA published a report documenting groundwater contamination at the Facility. Since 1988, as part of the permitting process, the EPA instituted corrective actions at the Facility to address groundwater contamination. In 2013, the West Virginia Department of Administration transferred land to West Virginia State University (WVSU), so that WVSU was immediately adjacent to the Facility. WVSU refused to sign an environmental covenant agreeing not to use the groundwater and ultimately filed suit in state court, asserting state and common law claims and seeking remedial measures, beyond those recommended by the EPA.Defendants removed the action to federal court invoking federal question jurisdiction, diversity jurisdiction, and federal officer jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. 1331, 1332, 1441, 1442, and 1446. The Fourth Circuit affirmed a remand to state court. Defendants were not “acting under” the “subjection, guidance, or control” of the EPA. There is no federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. 1331, over WVSU’s state claims because they neither challenge an EPA-directed CERCLA “cleanup” under nor arise from RCRA remedial measures and, thus, are not preempted. View "West Virginia State University Board of Governors v. The Dow Chemical Co." on Justia Law

Campbell, convicted of possession with intent to distribute opiates, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), received an enhanced sentence as a career offender, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. The district court identified only two predicate “controlled substance offense[s]” justifying the enhancement: a West Virginia conviction for delivery of crack cocaine in violation of a statute that criminalizes attempt offenses, and a federal conviction for aiding and abetting the distribution of cocaine base within 1,000 feet of a school. The career offender enhancement increased Campbell’s recommended imprisonment range from 63-78 months to 210-240 months. Campbell objected, arguing that the Sentencing Guidelines did not include attempt crimes within its definition of “controlled substance offense.”The Fourth Circuit vacated Campbell’s 180-month sentence. The plain text of U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(b) is inconsistent with the Commission’s Commentary to that Guideline, and the only “reasonable construction of” U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(b) is that “controlled substance offense” does not include an "attempt" crime. Campbell’s West Virginia conviction is not a controlled substance offense and so cannot support a career offender sentence enhancement View "United States v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Cabrera, a citizen of Mexico, legally entered the U.S. on a B-2 visa and overstayed. In 2015, her boyfriend physically assaulted her in front of her child. The responding officer noted her physical injuries. Cabrera’s child stated that the man had grabbed Cabrera and choked her. Cabrera’s boyfriend was charged with criminal domestic violence, Cabrera aided the police in prosecuting him, rendering her eligible to seek a U visa, available to noncitizens who have been a victim of criminal activity and who help authorities investigating or prosecuting that crime, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(U). Cabrera obtained the required certification, attesting to her help, from law enforcement in December 2017. In February 2018, before Cabrera filed her U visa application, DHS issued her notice to appear. A month later, Cabrera filed her U visa application. She moved to continue the deportation proceedings.The IJ denied the motion, acknowledging there was a “significant probability” that USCIS would grant the U visa. The BIA dismissed Cabrera's appeal, finding that she failed to show good cause for a continuance. The Fourth Circuit vacated. The BIA and IJ abused their discretion. The BIA has held that there is a “rebuttable presumption” that a movant who has filed a prima facie approvable application for a U visa warrants a favorable exercise of discretion for a continuance. The BIA failed to explain why it departed from established policies. View "Cabrera v. Garland" on Justia Law

Perez violated the conditions of an initial supervised release sentence. The district court revoked that release, imposed a six-month term of imprisonment, and sentenced him to an additional 36 months of supervised release. Perez argued that this new supervised release sentence would exceed the maximum term set by 18 U.S.C. 3583, a provision generally authorizing courts to include supervised release as part of a sentence. The district court disagreed, holding that Perez’s supervised release sentence was governed instead by 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(D), the controlled-substance statute under which he originally was convicted, which imposes no maximum on terms of supervised release.The Fourth Circuit affirmed, noting that 11 courts of appeals have concluded that section 3583(b) does not limit the length of supervised release sentences authorized by section 841(b)(1). Rather, the provisions of section 841(b)(1) itself, which expressly apply “[n]otwithstanding section 3583 of title 18,” alone set the bounds on supervised release in 841(b)(1) cases. Section 841(b)(1)(D) establishes a 24-month minimum but no maximum term of supervised release; the district court’s 36-month sentence falls squarely within the statutory range. View "United States v. Perez" on Justia Law

Sitton pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm. The district court calculated an enhanced base offense level under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(3) based on his South Carolina first-degree assault and battery (A&B) conviction. The enhancement applies if a defendant has a prior felony conviction for either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; a “felony conviction” is “an adult conviction" under that jurisdiction's laws.Sitton appealed, arguing that his A&B conviction arose from an incident when he was 16 years old; he pled guilty and was sentenced under South Carolina's Youthful Offender Act (YOA) at age 18. The YOA defines “youthful offender” as an offender who is under 17 years of age and has been charged with a non-violent crime. Upon conviction of a youthful offender in general sessions court, the court may: place the youthful offender on probation; sentence the youthful offender to an indeterminate sentence not to exceed six years; or, if the court finds that the offender will not benefit from treatment, sentence the youthful offender “under any other applicable penalty provision.”The Fourth Circuit affirmed the sentence. The South Carolina Supreme Court and statutes distinguish juvenile adjudications in family court from adult convictions in general sessions court. Where, as here, a defendant is convicted in general sessions court, that conviction is an “adult conviction” for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines even if the defendant committed the offense before turning 18. View "United States v. Sitton" on Justia Law

Herrera-Martinez owned a restaurant and a bar in Honduras with a business partner. In 2002, narco-traffickers began to pressure him to sell drugs; they allegedly beat him and threatened his life after he reported them to police. Herrera-Martinez fled to the United States and hired a lawyer, but skipped his last immigration hearing. Herrera-Martinez was later deported but returned after five days. Herrera-Martinez pled guilty to burglary of a habitation with intent to commit theft and was, again, deported. During his third stay in the U.S. Herrera-Martinez was detained for illegal reentry. He sought withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture, testifying that the narco-traffickers killed his former business partner after he left Honduras and murdered his brother-in-law.An IJ held that Herrera-Martinez experienced “at best a severe level of harassment,” did not establish a well-founded fear of future persecution, did not show persecution on account of any recognized social groups, and did not establish that Honduran officials would acquiesce in any torture. On remand, the IJ additionally found Herrera-Martinez not credible. The BIA affirmed. The Fourth Circuit denied a petition for review. Herrera-Martinez’s withholding claim failed because the particular social group he advanced, prosecution witnesses, was not particular. Herrera-Martinez’s testimony was not credible; he failed to show that it is more likely than not he would be tortured if he returned to Honduras and that the Honduran government would acquiesce to such torture. View "Herrera-Martinez v. Garland" on Justia Law

Conner sued her employer, EMS, under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201–219, alleging that she was underpaid for non-overtime hours worked during weeks in which she also worked overtime. To determine the overtime rate for 24 on/48 off EMS personnel, the employee’s regular hourly pay rate was determined by dividing her annual salary by 2,928 hours (based on the 24 on/48 off schedule; the overtime rate was the resultant hourly rate multiplied by 1.5. To calculate a “revised semi-monthly rate,” the hourly rate was multiplied by 2,080 (40 non-overtime hours per week for 52 weeks), then divided by 24. When an employee worked overtime during a particular pay period, EMS added the overtime amount to the revised semimonthly wages. Conner alleged that this “revised semi-monthly rate” unlawfully paid her regular wages using overtime compensation. She claims her annual salary established by ordinance represents her compensation for regular wages and that for each semimonthly pay period, she should be paid regular wages (her salary divided by 24) plus any overtime.The Fourth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the case, holding that the Act permits an action for “gap time” that is not directly covered by its overtime or minimum wage provisions. The complaint must plausibly allege that the employee worked overtime in at least one week and was not paid all straight-time wages due under an employment agreement or statute. The employee need not “identify a particular week.” View "Conner v. Cleveland County" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Defendant argued that his pre-existing medical conditions placed him at a heightened risk for contracting and suffering severe complications from COVID-19. The record compelled the court to conclude that the delay between the filing of the form order and memorandum opinion was merely a clerical error. Therefore, both the form order and the memorandum opinion may be considered on appeal. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion where the district court determined that the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors weighed against granting relief in this case. View "United States v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's 120 month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to distribution of a detectable amount of fentanyl. Defendant's conviction was related to Trevor Nelson's death stemming from a drug overdose.The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing an upward variance under the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors where the district court cited defendant's awareness of the risk involved with distribution of fentanyl, his pattern of recidivism, and the need for general deterrence to support the variance. The court also concluded that defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable where the substantial upward variance was supported by the record and the district court's lengthy sentencing explanation. The court noted that, when drug dealers knowingly ply their customers with what could well be lethal doses, district courts do not abuse their discretion by taking behavior simultaneously destructive of society and individual life into account. View "United States v. McKinnie" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254, seeking to apply retroactively a federal procedural rule first announced in 2019 to overturn the result of his state disciplinary proceedings that took place in 2015. At issue is whether the principles articulated in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), prohibiting the retroactive application of procedural rules on federal collateral review, apply to bar the inmate's effort in the circumstances of this case.The Fourth Circuit concluded that the retroactivity principles stated in Teague do indeed apply and that they preclude retroactive application of Lennear v. Wilson, 937 F.3d 257, 273–74 (4th Cir. 2019), to this case. The court concluded that Virginia made judicial relief available, even though no Virginia court addressed the relief claimed, and thus petitioner's assertion that the district court was his only "opportunity" for judicial review is a misstatement. Furthermore, defendant's argument that federal habeas review in this case is "direct review" in which new procedural rules apply is also not legally supportable. In regard to petitioner's alternative argument, the court concluded that, at bottom, petitioner's section 2254 petition is a federal collateral proceeding, not direct review of a state administrative proceeding, and therefore Teague's principle that a new procedural rule does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review governs. In this case, the court concluded that all the requirements of Teague have been met. The court rejected petitioner's remaining arguments and affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief. View "Wall v. Kiser" on Justia Law