Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action brought by plaintiff, alleging that the school district had violated her daughters' rights under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The court held that plaintiff's withdrawal of the children from the school district system rendered moot her request for prospective relief. Furthermore, because the district court proceedings under the IDEA are original civil actions, the court held that plaintiff's failure to specify in her complaint that she was seeking compensatory education for her children, or to include allegations from which a request for compensatory education reasonably could be inferred, precludes her present assertion of a live controversy in the district court. View "Johnson v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools Board of Education" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas relief and petitioner's accompanying request for supplemental expert funding. The court granted a Certificate of Appealability (COA) on five issues.The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's supplemental expert funding request. In regard to petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC), the court concluded that petitioner's jury sentencing claim was without merit and there is no flaw in the district court's conclusion that the record establishes that petitioner was fully advised of his rights to a jury trial and sentencing, as well as the possibility that a jury could sentence him to life; the district court did not err in denying relief on petitioner's mitigation evidence claim where petitioner could not overcome the procedural bar for his defaulted subclaims and the evidence does not fundamentally alter his claim; counsel's performance in investigating and presenting mitigation evidence was not deficient and petitioner failed to establish prejudice; the record leaves no doubt that petitioner admitted to two aggravating circumstances in his guilty plea and knowingly and voluntarily waived any challenge to judicial factfinding by the trial court and that challenge would have been futile; and petitioner procedurally defaulted his guilty plea claim. View "Mahdi v. Stirling" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for possessing heroin with intent to distribute and three offenses related to possessing a firearm. The court concluded that defendant lacked standing to raise his Fourth Amendment claim where he had neither a privacy interest in the car nor a personal interest in being free from detention since he was nowhere in or near the car at the time of its seizure. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of simple possession under 21 U.S.C. 844 where defendant's intent was not sufficiently in dispute to warrant a jury instruction on simple possession. Finally, there was more than sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

First Baptist retained Skyline to provide emergency remediation services to address wind damage to First Baptist’s real estate. Skyline then received the right to collect any proceeds from First Baptist's insurance policy with Church Mutual. Church Mutual subsequently disputed coverage in part and Skyline filed suit to recover the value of services provided to First Baptist but not paid by Church Mutual.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Skyline's claims because they were barred by the applicable North Carolina statute of limitations. The court found that the applicable statute of limitations is three years from the date of loss, and agreed that Skyline's claims for declaratory judgment and breach of contract are time barred because Skyline brought this action in November 2019, more than three years after the time of loss; October 2016. The court denied as moot Church Mutual's motion to strike part of Skyline's reply brief. View "Skyline Restoration, Inc. v. Church Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Lighthouse Church filed suit challenging the legality of executive orders the Governor of Virginia issued to combat the spread of COVID-19. The specific executive orders that Lighthouse Church challenged expired in June of 2020, and the state of emergency in Virginia upon which they were predicated ended on July 1, 2021. Furthermore, the end of the state of emergency terminated all outstanding COVID-19-related executive orders.The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded for dismissal of the action as moot, concluding that the executive orders that Lighthouse Church challenges are no longer in effect and no exception to mootness is applicable. Therefore, there is no live controversy between the parties in these proceedings. Because the action is moot, the court also vacated the district court's judgment without reaching or addressing the issue concerning Governor Northam's entitlement to sovereign immunity. View "Lighthouse Fellowship Church v. Northam" on Justia Law

After an explosion at Massey’s West Virginia coal mine killed 29 miners, Blankenship, then Massey’s Chairman of the Board and CEO, was convicted of conspiring to willfully violate federal mine safety and health standards, 30 U.S.C. 820(d) and 18 U.S.C. 371. The evidence indicated that Blankenship had willfully failed to address numerous notices of mine safety violations that Massey had received, favoring production and profits over safety. Following the trial and in response to Blankenship’s ongoing requests, the government produced documents to Blankenship that it had not produced before trial and that it should have produced under applicable Department of Justice policies. The suppressed documents fell broadly into two categories: memoranda of interviews conducted of seven Massey employees and internal emails and documents of the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) showing, among other things, some MSHA employees’ hostility to Massey and Blankenship.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Blankenship’s 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his conviction. While the documents were improperly suppressed, they were not material in that there was not a reasonable probability that they would have produced a different result had they been disclosed before trial. The verdict that Blankenship conspired to willfully violate mandatory mine standards was supported by ample evidence. View "United States v. Blankenship" on Justia Law

Ge, then a citizen of China, entered the U.S. on a student visa. After pursuing his education for four years, he enlisted in the Army through the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) program, which allows foreign nationals to enlist in the armed forces and thereafter apply for naturalization under 8 U.S.C. 1440(a). Ge filed his application in May 2016. After completing interviews and tests administered by USCIS, he received notice in July 2017, that his naturalization oath ceremony had been scheduled for later that month. Days later, he was informed that the ceremony had been canceled. USCIS had a new policy, requiring that enhanced Department of Defense background checks for all MAVNI applicants before their naturalization applications could be granted.Ge filed suit in December 2018, under 8 U.S.C. 1447(b). The district court directed USCIS to adjudicate Ge’s naturalization application within 45 days. Shortly after the court’s remand order, Ge reported that he had been sworn in as a citizen. The court dismissed Ge’s action. Ge then sought attorneys fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. 2412, alleging that he was the “prevailing party” and that USCIS’s position was not “justified in law and fact at all stages.” The district court denied his motion, ruling that Ge did not qualify as a prevailing party because its remand was not a judgment on the merits or consent decree that created a “material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties.” The Fourth Circuit affirmed. After the remand order, Ge was still the applicant; USCIS was still the agency that could grant or deny the application. The legal relationship had not changed. View "Ge v. United States Citizenship & Immigration Services" on Justia Law

In 2003, Shupe was an Executive Sous Chef for Hyatt when he began experiencing symptoms of osteomyelitis, an infection in his spinal cord. He was 37 years old. After rounds of antibiotics and surgery, he was unable to maintain his employment and left his position in July 2004 due to pain from chronic osteomyelitis, degenerative disc disease in the lumbar spine, and spinal stenosis that was so severe that he could not stand for an extended period of time. Hyatt’s long-term disability plan, a “qualified” plan under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, paid Shupe disability benefit for 11 years. Hartford then terminated his benefits, finding that there were alternative occupations that Shupe could physically perform, was qualified for, and pay greater than 60% of his prior salary, so that he did not meet the plan’s definition of “disabled.”The district court rejected Shupe’s 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B) suit on summary judgment. The Fourth Circuit reversed, in favor of Shupe. His post-termination evaluations, coupled with Shupe’s contemporaneous medical history, all uniformly conclude that Shupe was incapable of full-time sedentary employment. Hartford’s assessment was an “outlier.” View "Shupe v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) prohibits any fiduciary of an employee benefit plan from causing the plan to engage in transactions with a “party in interest” when that party receives more than fair market value, 29 U.S.C. 1106(a)(1)(A),(D). A fiduciary who violates this prohibition is liable for the plan's resulting losses In 1993, Vinoskey, who founded Sentry Equipment, established an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP). By 2004, the ESOP owned 48% of Sentry, with Vinoskey owning the remaining 52%. Vinoskey served as an ESOP trustee. Around 2010, Vinoskey wanted to sell his remaining shares to the ESOP. To avoid a conflict of interest, Sentry engaged Evolve Bank as the ESOP’s independent fiduciary to review the transaction. The ESOP purchased the Vinoskey stock for $20,706,000, including an interest-bearing promissory note. Four years later, Vinoskey, forgave $4,639,467 of the ESOP’s debt.The Secretary of Labor sued Evolve and Vinoskey under ERISA. The district court concluded that Evolve’s due diligence was “rushed and cursory” and found that the fair market value of Sentry’s stock was $278.50 per share, not $406 per share. The court found Vinoskey jointly and severally liable with Evolve for $6,502,500 in damages and did not reduce the award by the amount of debt that Vinoskey forgave. The Fourth Circuit affirmed with respect to Vinoskey’s liability but reversed the district court’s legal conclusion concerning the damages award. View "Walsh v. Vinoskey" on Justia Law

In 2007, Tactile hired Sempowich — a woman. In 2014, Tactile promoted Sempowich — then 49 years old — to be the regional sales manager, supervising a team of up to 15 people. Later that year, Tactile hired Seeling — 46-year-old man — as the regional sales manager for another region. In 2018, Sempowich was notified that she would no longer be a regional manager. Her region was reassigned to Seeling. She could retain her base salary in a newly-created marketing position, which she regarded as a demotion. She did not accept the position and was terminated.In Sempowich’s suit, alleging Title VII discrimination, retaliation, and Equal Pay Act claims, the parties disputed whether she me the company’s performance goals, the district court granted Tactile summary judgment. The Fourth Circuit vacated. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Sempowich, there is an issue of material fact as to whether Tactile’s asserted expectations were legitimate or genuine. Sempowich presented substantial evidence that they were not. The district court also erred in applying the same-actor inference, under which if the plaintiff’s “hirer and the firer are the same individual and the termination of employment occurs within a relatively short time span following the hiring, a strong inference exists that discrimination was not a determining factor.” View "Sempowich v. Tactile Systems Technology, Inc." on Justia Law