Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2014, Davison began to publicly criticize Louden school policies, alleging violations of federal law, misleading budget information, and flouting Virginia’s Conflict of Interest Act. Davison frequently chastised school board members in many forums and during board meetings. He routinely emailed individual board members and made multiple social media posts about his complaints. Davison also commented on board members’ social media platforms. Davison mentioned weapons; there were concerns about the welfare of his children. Board members voiced personal safety concerns, which led to the 2015 no-trespass letters that prohibited his presence on school property and attendance at any school-sponsored activities unless authorized. Davidson’s previous state-court challenge has been dismissed.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Davison’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit, citing res judicata. Davison agreed to dismiss his state petition, which included federal claims, with prejudice, despite having the opportunity to withdraw his petition. The board’s policy, which prohibits all personal attacks, regardless of viewpoint, because they cause “unnecessary delay or disruption to a meeting,” is a constitutional policy for a limited public forum because it is viewpoint neutral, and the restriction is reasonable in light of the purpose of the board. The district court correctly determined that Davison did not experience retaliation. With respect to claims against individuals and claims based on reports to protective services concerning Davison’s children, the court cited qualified immunity. Davison was not deprived of procedural due process. View "Davison v. Rose" on Justia Law

Officers, investigating drug trafficking at a shopping plaza, abandoned their surveillance and followed Dennis and Guess, who had stopped to talk with their suspect. Guess ran a stop sign. Officers activated their emergency equipment, A high-speed chase ensued. Officer McAndrew saw Dennis discard a gun and a bag containing a white substance. Guess eventually stopped. Officers found a bag concealed in Guess’s anal cleft and a scale in the door pocket. Nothing was found on Dennis. A loaded gun and another bag containing apparent narcotics were found where McAndrew indicated they would be. Officers did not investigate ties the men might have had to broader criminal enterprises nor arrest the original suspect. The discarded packet contained heroin; the substance Guess concealed constituted crack cocaine. The scale had traces of cocaine, heroin, and fentanyl. There was no fingerprint analysis. The men were charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin, cocaine base, and fentanyl; possession with intent to distribute heroin; possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking; and being felons in possession of a firearm.The Fourth Circuit affirmed Dennis’s conviction and 96-month sentence, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to the court allowing the prosecutor to peremptorily strike a Hispanic juror and instructing the jury there is no legal requirement that the government use specific investigative techniques to prove its case. The court noted the “ease with which our law permits conspiracy convictions for conduct that overlaps almost entirely with underlying substantive offenses,” but stated that it was constrained by its precedent. View "United States v. Dennis" on Justia Law

Moss filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that while he was a pretrial detainee, jail officials put him in disciplinary confinement without a hearing, in violation of his procedural due process rights, and that they delayed his access to urgent medical care, again violating his due process rights. Moss claims that he informed the intake officer that he was taking a medication for a thyroid condition, Vyvanse for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and Zoloft for PTSD and alleges delays in providing him with those medications while he was detained.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, finding that Moss failed to exhaust available administrative remedies for his procedural due process claim and that any delay in the provision of medical treatment did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Moss argued that jail officials made administrative remedies unavailable by denying him access to the grievance system while he was in disciplinary confinement but undisputed record evidence establishes that Moss was able to use the grievance system during that time, compelling the conclusion that administrative remedies were available to him. There is no evidence that the defendants knew of but deliberately ignored a substantial risk to Moss’s health. View "Moss v. Harwood" on Justia Law

DXC, a publicly-traded company formed in 2017 from a merger of Computer Science and Hewlett Packard, initially met its strategic financial goals by instituting costcutting measures. In February 2018, it issued a press release announcing its continued financial success. Soon, DXC had to revise its projected revenue guidance to shareholders downward by an estimated $800 million, which it announced in November 2018. DXC’s shareholders incurred losses when its stock price subsequently fell.Plaintiffs represent a class of shareholders who acquired DXC stock from February 8 through November 6, 2018, alleging violations of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), 78t(a), and Rule 10b-5. They claim that Defendants knew the cost-cutting measures implemented in 2018 undermined DXC’s ability to generate revenue and that this was contrary to information released to the public so that the Defendants fraudulently induced them to acquire DXC stock by making material misstatements and omissions regarding DXC's financial health and that they did so with the requisite scienter. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The statements issued by DXC were either forward-looking statements protected under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), 15 U.S.C. 78u-5, safe-harbor provision, or non-actionable puffery and that the complaint, viewed as a whole, did not contain factual allegations sufficient to give rise to the “strong inference” of scienter required by the PSLRA. View "KBC Asset Management NV v. DXC Technology Co." on Justia Law

Lewis and two others robbed a pawnshop. Lewis pointed his firearm at the manager and struck him in the back of the head three times, causing him to fall to the floor. The robbers stole 28 firearms, more than $61,000 worth of jewelry, and $2,000 in cash. The police found a “red spot” on the back of the manager’s head, which was not bleeding. The manager felt “dizzy” and was taken to the hospital. His medical expenses totaled $3,676.92. Lewis pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), Hobbs Act robbery, and brandishing a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The PSR recommended a two-level enhancement because a victim sustained bodily injury. Lewis objected that an injury must be “significant” to sustain the enhancement and that an injury must have “more than momentary consequences” to be “significant.”The district court “guess[ed]” that the manager had suffered a “mild concussion,” applied the enhancement and sentenced Lewis to 46 months followed by 84 months for Count III. The Fourth Circuit vacated. The court erred in imposing the injury enhancement. The prosecution failed to produce police reports, medical records, photographs, or testimony with respect to the injury to establish that the manager received more-than-precautionary medical attention. Nor did it establish that the manager’s injuries lasted for a “meaningful period.” View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Clendening sued the government for her husband’s wrongful death allegedly caused by his exposure to contaminated water and environmental toxins while stationed at the Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune in Jacksonville, North Carolina. Her complaint also asserted claims for subsequent fraudulent concealment and failure to warn relevant personnel of the severity, scope, and impact of said exposure.The district court dismissed all claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The wrongful death claims are barred under the “Feres” doctrine and the failure-to-warn claims are barred under the Federal Torts Claims Act’s “discretionary function” exception, 28 U.S.C. 2680(a). The exposure cited as the cause of Clendening’s death stemmed from the relationship between Clendening and his military service; the military’s provision of water and accommodations to its troops is clearly activity incident to service. While the failure-to-warn claim is not barred by Feres, the government had no mandatory duty to warn Clendening of his exposure after the fact. The “challenged conduct is the product of judgment or choice,” and involved a decision “based on considerations of public policy.” View "Clendening v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2017, SCANA, an electric and natural gas public utility, halted construction at the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station in South Carolina. WEC, a contractor with SCANA, laid off its employees working at the project, as did Fluor, a subcontractor hired by WEC. Employees of WEC and Fluor sued SCANA and Fluor, alleging that the companies failed to give notice of the plant closure and layoffs as required under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act, 29 U.S.C. 2102(a).The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. None of the plaintiffs were “employees” of SCANA. There was no common ownership between SCANA and WEC or Fluor, nor did they share any directors or officers. WEC and Fluor were responsible for hiring, firing, and paying their own personnel and decided which employees would be responsible for accomplishing which tasks. WEC and Fluor employees did not even receive SCANA’s employee handbook, nor were they at all integrated with SCANA’s human resources department. WEC and Fluor operated “distinct businesses that were not dependent” on SCANA. Fluor was relieved of any obligation to provide 60 days of notice by the unforeseeable business circumstances exception. View "Pennington v. Fluor Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

Burr was convicted for the 1991 murder of an infant, “Susie.” Burr was living with Susie’s mother, Bridges, and was physically abusive to Bridges. Bridges had returned home to find Susie unconscious, having seizures, bruised, and with broken bones. Burr was sentenced to death. Burr has pursued habeas remedies before the state and federal courts. In 2020, the district court declined to grant habeas relief on the basis of claims under "Brady" and "Napue," related to transcripts of interviews with two witnesses, Susie’s brother, Scott, and Bridges.The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Burr has not demonstrated that the state court’s decision was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts,” 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2). The state court did not unreasonably apply Brady when it concluded that “any inconsistencies between the trial testimony of [Bridges and Scott] and their pre-trial comments to the prosecutors are of de minimis significance.” Burr did not explain how the transcript would have allowed him to impeach that testimony. The jury could make its own determination of how much weight to give the statements of a young child who repeatedly stated that he could not remember key details. Burr has not pointed to any “false impression” about Scott’s testimony that prosecutors should have been aware of and flagged but that the jury would not also have been aware of after listening to that testimony. View "Burr v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Pugin, a citizen of Mauritius, was admitted to the U.S. in 1985 as a lawful permanent resident. In 2014, Pugin pleaded guilty in Virginia to being an accessory after the fact to a felony. He was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment with nine months suspended. Pugin was charged with removability because he was convicted of an aggravated felony: “an offense relating to obstruction of justice, perjury, or subornation of perjury,” 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(S), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).The IJ employed the categorical approach to determine whether the Virginia conviction qualified as obstruction of justice, noting that the BIA had previously decided that a federal conviction for accessory after the fact is a crime relating to obstruction of justice. The IJ then held that Virginia accessory after the fact is an offense relating to obstruction of justice because, like its federal counterpart, the offense requires the defendant “act with the ‘specific purpose of hindering the process of justice.’” The Fourth Circuit affirmed that Pugin may be deported. The BIA definition of “obstruction of justice” under the Act is entitled to "Chevron" deference and the Virginia offense of accessory after the fact categorically matches that definition. View "Pugin v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Union represents employees at Constellium’s plant. In 2013, after Constellium attempted to change retirees’ health benefits, the Union sued. In 2017, the Fourth Circuit held, in "Barton," that, because the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) stated that retiree health benefits would endure only for the CBA's term, they did not vest. Constellium and the Union subsequently negotiated another CBA, effective through September 2022, which outlines retiree healthcare benefits. Constellium sent a letter to its Medicare-eligible retirees, announcing changes to their healthcare coverage.The Union initiated a grievance, citing the CBA’s guarantee of retiree health benefits for the CBA’s term. Constellium claimed that the change did not violate the CBA and that Barton permitted the change with respect to retirees who retired under previous CBAs. Constellium unsuccessfully sought a declaratory judgment that it prevailed on preclusion grounds; the district court reasoned that whether Barton precluded arbitration was a question for the arbitrator.An arbitrator ruled in favor of the Union, reasoning that “the question of whether retiree health benefits were vested or durational”—which was “central” in Barton—was "a red herring” because the Union’s new claims did not depend on whether the benefits were vested or durational, but focused on the terms of the 2017 CBA, under which Constellium was obligated to maintain the same health benefits for the relevant retirees throughout the CBA's full term. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Constellium’s motion to vacate the arbitrator’s award. View "Constellium Rolled Products Ravenswood, LLC v. United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial & Service Workers International Union" on Justia Law