Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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Stuart entered a U.S. Post Office and robbed the clerk of $173 and a cell phone, brandishing an Airsoft pellet gun. The next day he surrendered. Stuart pleaded guilty to robbing an individual lawfully in charge of mail matter, money, or other property belonging to the United States and, during the course of that robbery, assaulting the postal employee “by the use of a dangerous weapon,” 18 U.S.C. 2114(a). Stuart’s PSR assigned three points to a 2015 North Carolina state offense: possession with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver methamphetamine (Paragraph 27 Offense) and another three points for a second state methamphetamine offense (Paragraph 28). Stuart objected, arguing that the two should be treated as a “single sentence” because the Paragraph 27 Offense sentence was “activated” at the same sentencing hearing at which the Paragraph 28 Offense sentence was imposed: His post-release supervision began for both on January 14, 2017, and the final release date for both cases was March 15, 2018.The district court overruled the objection, calculated a Guidelines range of 130-162 months’ imprisonment, and sentenced Stuart to 130 months’ imprisonment. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, citing USSG 4A1.1(a) and 4A1.2(a)(2). Stuart was arrested for the Paragraph 27 Offense on July 30, 2015, for conduct committed on that date; he was arrested on November 21, 2015, for the Paragraph 28 Offense, for conduct that occurred in September 2015. View "United States v. Stuart" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Tecnocap petitioned for review of the Board's decision affirming an ALJ's finding that the company engaged in several unfair labor practices in violation of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The Board cross-petitioned for enforcement of the order.The Fourth Circuit denied the petition for review and granted the cross-petition for enforcement as to the partial implementation of the last, best and final offer without reaching a good faith impasse and locking out union members in support of a demand that was a permissive subject of bargaining; granted the petition for review and denied the cross-petition for enforcement as to direct dealing; denied the petition for review and granted the cross-petition for enforcement as to Tecnocap's discouragement of union membership in how it undertook the lockout; and remanded for the Board to determine the effect the court's limited grounds for enforcing its order has on the remedies it ordered and for entry of a remedial order that is consistent with the court's decision. View "Tecnocap, LLC v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, a former inmate at Harrisonburg-Rockingham Regional Jail, filed suit against defendant, a doctor for the jail, alleging an Eighth Amendment violation under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and violations of state law, based on the doctor's purported failure to properly treat his diabetes.As a preliminary matter, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court's order sufficiently addressed all permutations of plaintiff's deliberate indifference claims and is therefore final. On the merits, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the doctor. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the doctor's alternative treatment plan was "so grossly incompetent" as to permit a finding of deliberate indifference. Likewise, plaintiff's gross negligence claim of medical malpractice failed for substantially the same reasons. In this case, the doctor was not grossly negligent where he placed plaintiff on a diabetic diet, ordered daily and then twice daily blood sugar tests, and reviewed plaintiff's blood sugar levels on a weekly basis. View "Hixson v. Moran" on Justia Law

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After the district court entered judgment against defendant on plaintiff's claim of torture under the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), defendant challenged the district court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on defendant's statute of limitations defense.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the district court did not err in granting partial summary judgment against defendant on his statute of limitations defense where equitable tolling applied to plaintiff's claims. In this case, the district court did not err in determining that plaintiff's unrebutted evidence demonstrated extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable tolling where plaintiff presented credible evidence that he lacked realistic access to a legal remedy during and after the Barre regime in Somalia given the absence of a functioning government, widespread chaos and violence, and the risk of reprisal. Therefore, plaintiff satisfied his burden of showing the appropriateness of equitably tolling the limitations period until at least 1997. View "Warfaa v. Ali" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, a former student at Oakton High School, filed suit under Title IX against the school board, alleging that her school’s administrators acted with deliberate indifference to reports that she had been sexually harassed by another Oakton student, "Jack Smith." The jury ruled against plaintiff and the district court subsequently denied her motion for a new trial.The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that a school's receipt of a report that can objectively be taken to allege sexual harassment is sufficient to establish actual notice or knowledge under Title IX—regardless of whether school officials subjectively understood the report to allege sexual harassment or whether they believed the alleged harassment actually occurred. The court further concluded that under this standard, no evidence in the record supports the jury's conclusion that the school board lacked actual notice of Smith's alleged sexual harassment of plaintiff. Accordingly, the court remanded for a new trial. View "Doe v. Fairfax County School Board" on Justia Law

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North Carolina abortion providers filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the State's criminalization of previability abortions. The State contends that the Providers do not have standing to bring suit because they do not face a credible threat of prosecution for violation of the challenged statutes, N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-44 and 14-45, and the exceptions thereto, section 14-45.1(a)–(b).The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court that the Providers have established a credible threat of prosecution and therefore have standing to bring this suit. In this case, amidst a wave of similar state action across the country, North Carolina has enacted legislation to restrict the availability of abortions and impose heightened requirements on abortion providers and women seeking abortions. The court explained that, given these facts, the court cannot reasonably assume that the abortion ban that North Carolina keeps on its books is "largely symbolic." Where North Carolina's continued interest in regulating abortion remains vividly apparent, the court cannot dismiss the threat of prosecution as "not remotely possible." Furthermore, informal statements by two of the defendants that they do not presently intend to enforce the challenged statutes do not alter the court's analysis. View "Bryant v. Woodall" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, a sex offender incarcerated at Augusta Correctional Center, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action challenging the prison's decision for twice denying him in-person visitation privileges with his minor daughter. Plaintiff alleged that for years before 2015, he enjoyed in-person visitation with the child without incident. However, consistent with amendments to prison Operating Procedures adopted in March 2014, the child was removed from his in-person visitation list in 2015. As amended, Operating Procedure 851.1 prohibits those inmates required to register on Virginia's Sex Offender and Crimes Against Minors Registry from having in-person visits with minors unless the offender receives an exemption from prison officials.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of the VDOC's motion to dismiss, concluding that the right of association protected by the Constitution does not require a prison to allow an inmate who has committed a sex offense against a minor to have in-person visitation with his minor daughter. In this case, defendant did not plausibly allege that the VDOC's denial of his applications for exemptions for in-person visitation with his minor daughter under Operating Procedure 851.1 violated any aspect of the right to association that may have survived incarceration. The court rejected defendant's contention that the VDOC's denial of his two applications for exemption violated his procedural and substantive due process rights. Finally, defendant failed to plead a plausible equal protection claim. View "Desper v. Clarke" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Plaintiffs alleged a First Amendment challenge to section 1-201 of the Criminal Procedure Article of the Maryland Code, insofar as that statute prohibits and punishes the broadcasting of the official court recordings of state criminal proceedings. In January 2020, the district court dismissed the entire action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, concluding that the Broadcast Ban constitutes a content-neutral regulation of the time, place, and manner of speech that survives intermediate scrutiny.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of the First Amendment claim, concluding that the Broadcast Ban is properly assessed as a penal sanction for publishing information released to the public in official court records and is therefore subject to strict scrutiny under the Supreme Court's decisions in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), and Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979). The court explained that, at bottom, the district court was wrong to apply intermediate scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny, to the Broadcast Ban. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Soderberg v. Carrion" on Justia Law

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The Fourth Circuit concluded that Maryland's Governor and Attorney General have no control over the potential enforcement actions that could be brought against plaintiff. In this case, plaintiff, a professional counselor seeking to provide talk therapy to reduce his minor clients' same-sex attractions, filed suit against the Governor and the Attorney General of Maryland, alleging that Maryland has infringed his First Amendment rights by preventing him from engaging in the type of counseling he wants to do.Plaintiff argues that he can sue the Governor and the Attorney General under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), which provides an exception to their immunity from being sued in federal court. However, the court explained that neither the Governor nor the Attorney General have the necessary connection to enforcing Md. Code Ann., Health Occ. 1-212.1 that permits plaintiff's suit against them. Therefore, because of plaintiff's choice of defendants, the court may not consider the First Amendment issues he raises. While plaintiff requests leave to amend his complaint, the court left that question to the district court. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's decision as to the Governor and Attorney General's immunity from suit in federal court and vacated the remainder of its rulings. View "Christopher Doyle, LPC v. Hogan" on Justia Law

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After wrecking his car while intoxicated, Ziegler falsely, unsuccessfully claimed to be an Assistant U.S. Attorney in an attempt to avoid charges and retrieve his impounded car. He made those claims to deputies, the magistrate judge, and the towing company. In his prosecution for impersonating a federal officer, 18 U.S.C. 912.1, Ziegler, though not a lawyer waived his right to counsel and represented himself.The Fourth Circuit affirmed his conviction, rejecting Ziegler’s claims that the court erred in permitting Ziegler to represent himself because he was incapable of doing so and failed to make necessary inquiries into his mental competency and that the evidence does not show that he “acted” as a federal officer. The district judge thoughtfully evaluated Ziegler’s request to represent himself. The public defender, initially appointed to Ziegler’s case, said that he did not “have any questions with [Ziegler’s] legal competency” based on Ziegler’s “base of experience.” The court repeatedly counseled Ziegler that he should allow the public defender to represent him. Ziegler claimed to be an Assistant U.S. Attorney and told police officers that, as a result of this position, the officers lacked jurisdiction over him, the charges would get dismissed, and he did not need a license. This is a sufficient show of authority to “act” as an official. View "United States v. Ziegler" on Justia Law