Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action brought by plaintiff, who is serving a life sentence. Plaintiff filed suit alleging that defendant violated his right to due process by failing to provide advance notice of a security detention hearing that led to more restrictive confinement.The court assumed without deciding that a due process violation occurred and conclude that, even so, the right to fair notice of a security detention hearing was not clearly established at the time such that a reasonable official would have known that plaintiff had the right to be notified prior to his security detention hearing. Accordingly, the court remanded with instructions to enter an order granting the motion. View "Halcomb v. Ravenell" on Justia Law

After David Mays was arrested for public intoxication, he was placed in a cell at the county jail to sober up, and was later found dead. Mays' estate filed suit against the officers involved, alleging claims that stemmed from allegations that the officers were deliberately indifferent to Mays' medical needs. The district court granted the officers' motion to dismiss.The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the complaint plausibly alleges that Mays had an objectively serious medical condition requiring medical attention and that the officers subjectively knew of that need and the excessive risk of their inaction. Therefore, the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity. The court also concluded that plaintiff has alleged enough facts to make out a plausible claim for deliberate indifference to Mays' serious medical condition under the Fourteenth Amendment. View "Mays v. Sprinkle" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Red River on the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act claim. Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that Red River had violated the Clean Water Act, the Surface Mining Act, and, in the alternative, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. Plaintiffs' claims stemmed from alleged discharges of pollutants from point sources at Red River's now-inactive mine, and Red River's activities at the mine were governed by a combined Clean Water Act and Surface Mining Act permit issued by Virginia.The court held that, because the Surface Mining Act's lack of a permit shield supersedes, amends, or modifies the Clean Water Act's permit shield, the saving clause prevents liability under the Surface Mining Act for conduct that is otherwise shielded from liability under the Clean Water Act. The court explained that permitting liability under the Surface Mining Act for pollutant discharges that are otherwise exempted from liability under a Clean Water Act permit would contravene the text of the saving clause by allowing the Surface Mining Act to supersede, modify, or amend the Clean Water Act's permitting regime. View "Southern Appalachian Mountain Stewards v. Red River Coal Company, Inc." on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress, concluding that officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk him and thus violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search.In this case, officers relied on information from a confidential informant; two interactions that officers believed were consistent with the manner in which illegal drugs are bought and sold, but in which no drugs were found; and a single officer witnessing a handshake between defendant and another man and concluding that it was a hand-to-hand drug transaction, even though the officer did not see anything exchanged. Furthermore, the officers concluded that this amounted to reasonable suspicion, overlooking the facts that the interaction took place in a public space, in broad daylight, outside of the vehicles, and in front of a security camera. After the interaction, defendant went into a store, rather than immediately leaving the scene. Therefore, the court agreed with defendant that, under the totality of the circumstances, the officers did not have more than a mere hunch that criminal activity was afoot when they stopped him. View "United States v. Drakeford" on Justia Law

The Society field suit challenging the Corps' issuance of a permit to the Town of Ocean Isle Beach to construct a shoreline jetty to stop chronic erosion of its beaches. The Society claimed that numerous analyses conducted by the Corps in both its Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and its Record of Decision were inconsistent with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Clean Water Act (CWA).The Fourth Circuit applied a deferential standard of review under the Administrative Procedure Act and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Corps, concluding that the Corps adequately examined the relevant facts and data and provided explanations that rationally connected those facts and data with the choices that it made. In this case, the Corps collected a broad range of data drawn from the facts and objectives of the project at issue, historical statistics and records, computer analyses, and opinions of other specialized agencies, and it analyzed those data to make judgments ultimately based on its own special expertise under the numerous criteria imposed by NEPA and the CWA. View "National Audubon Society v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

In 1994, a California corporation purchased and registered the domain name and trademarks for “France.com.” Twenty years later, the corporation initiated a lawsuit in France, challenging a Dutch company’s use of the France.com trademark. The French Republic and its tourism office intervened, seeking to protect their country’s Internet identity and establish its right to the domain name. French trial and appellate courts declared the French Republic the rightful owner of the domain name. In the U.S., the corporation sued the French entities, which asserted sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1604. The district court denied a motion to dismiss, concluding that immunity “would be best raised after discovery.”The Fourth Circuit reversed, directing the district court to dismiss the complaint with prejudice. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the appeal because the district court rested its order not on a failure to state a claim but on a denial of sovereign immunity, which constitutes an appealable collateral order. Neither FSIA’s “commercial activity” exception nor its “expropriation” exception applies. It is not clear that the French State’s actions in obtaining the website in judicial proceedings constitute “seizure” or an “expropriation” and they clearly do not constitute “commercial activity.” The corporation itself invoked the power of the French courts; only because it did so could the French State intervene in that action to obtain the challenged result. View "France.com, Inc. v. The French Republic" on Justia Law

An inmate at the Rockbridge County, Virginia Regional Jail, was badly beaten and potentially poisoned; he was taken to the hospital. Officer requested that the Sheriff’s Office investigate. Investigators discovered that another inmate also showed signs of being severely beaten but was not taken to the hospital. Virginia State Police dispatched agents to investigate. A member of the Rockbridge staff and a State Police officer, who was also a sworn member of the FBI’s violent crime unit, noticed an “incident report” created by Hassler, the jail’s head nurse, included several inconsistencies. A State Police investigator and an FBI agent interviewed Hassler, who admitted that “[he] wrote this report to cover [his] butt.” Hassler denied knowing that there was an investigation.Hassler was charged with obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. 1519. The court rejected Hassler’s objection to the government’s proposed jury instruction, arguing that, under “Rehaif,” he could not be convicted unless, at the time he acted, he knew or contemplated that a federal investigation—as opposed to a state or local investigation— was occurring or would occur. Hassler was sentenced to 12 months and one day of imprisonment. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Knowledge of a federal investigation under section 1519 is a jurisdictional element and not a separate mens rea requirement that the jury must specifically find. View "United States v. Hassler" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the class action antitrust claims brought by plaintiff against the Hospital Authority. The court concluded that the Hospital Authority is a "special function governmental unit" under section 34(1)(B) of the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984. The court explained that Sandcrest Outpatient Servs., P.A. v. Cumberland Cnty. Hosp. Sys., Inc., 853 F.2d 1139, 1142 (4th Cir. 1988), did not address, much less decide, the issues here. The court was unpersuaded that either the Act's text or the statutory interpretation principle noscitur a sociis supports plaintiff's contention that "special function governmental unit" as described in section 34(1)(B) applies only to governmental entities with certain powers and/or characteristics, which the Hospital Authority lacks. The court reasoned that there is no magic combination of powers that a governmental body must have to be classified as a "special function governmental unit," however those of the Hospital Authority readily qualify.The court explained that the Hospital Authority is far more similar to the hospital in Sweeney v. Athens Regional Medical Center, than to the public trust hospital in Tarabishi v. McAlester Regional Hospital, 951 F.2d 1558 (10th Cir. 1991). Finally, the court rejected plaintiff's contention that, even if the Hospital Authority was a "local government" when it was established, it has outgrown its immunity. The court stated that the text of the Act asks only whether an organization qualifies as a "local government" as defined by the Act and that determination requires examining the state law applicable to the entity's creation. Therefore, the court agreed with the district court that the Hospital Authority is a "special function governmental unit" and is therefore a "local government" under the Act. View "Benitez v. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment against defendant after a jury found him guilty of four counts of aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2, 1951(a); four counts of carrying a firearm in connection with a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c); and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2).The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to sequester the co-defendant witnesses. The court noted that this was not the easiest situation in the world to manage, what with four codefendant witnesses and limited holding cells; in the context of defendant's requests and the building's constraints, the district court handled this issue with care; at no point did defendant move for a mistrial or request a limiting instruction with regards to sequestration; and the district court suggested removing a co-defendant from the building and allowed fulsome cross-examination, which was a fully sufficient response to defendant's request. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion for a new trial. The court explained that, given the ample evidence that was adduced at trial against defendant, the new evidence that defendant proffered in support of his Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 motion came very late and would have hardly made any kind of difference. Finally, the court concluded that the uncertainty as to the predicate offenses for the section 924(c) convictions did not render them invalid. In this case, considering the overwhelming weight of the evidence the government presented at trial, defendant cannot meet his burden of establishing that the outcome would have been different absent the improper instruction. View "United States v. Ali" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment of acquittal after a jury convicted defendant, a former executive of the now-dissolved Flynn Intel Group, of two counts. In Count One, the grand jury charged defendant with criminal conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. 371. The conspiracy charge had two objects: (a) acting as an undisclosed Turkish agent, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 951; and (b) making a materially false Foreign Agents Registration Act filing, in violation of 22 U.S.C. 618(a)(2). In Count Two, the grand jury charged defendant with a substantive section 951 violation—i.e., for acting as a foreign agent in the United States without first notifying the Attorney General.The court largely agreed with the district court that, similar to common-law conspiracy, section 951’s definition of "agent" envisions a mutual agreement to operate subject to foreign direction or control. However, the court disagreed with the district court as to the degree of foreign involvement required to violate section 951. The court concluded that, to be an "agent of foreign government," a person must "agree[] to operate . . . subject to [foreign] direction or control." The court explained that such an agreement cannot be one-sided, and a person does not become an "agent" for purposes of section 951 simply by acting in accordance with foreign interests or by privately pledging allegiance. Nonetheless, a foreign principal's involvement does not need to mirror an employer's control over the workings of an employee; a lesser degree of "direction" is sufficient, as it would be under the common law. The court also conculded that the "legal commercial transaction" exception found in section 951(d) provides for an affirmative defense—which must be raised first, if at all, by a defendant—rather than an essential element of the offense.In this case, the court concluded that the jury heard sufficient evidence that defendant acted as "an agent of a foreign government" in violation of section 951. The court explained that a rational juror could conclude that Project Truth was synonymous with Project Confidence; that the Turkish government was, in fact, behind the project; that, through a Turkish businessman, Turkey communicated both general and specific instructions; and that defendant hewed to those directions over the life of the engagement—all without notifying the Attorney General. The court also concluded that a reasonable jury could conclude that defendant conspired to act subject to Turkey's direction without first notifying the Attorney General. Finally, the court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in conditionally granting a new trial and the district court's reasons for granting a new trial provided insufficient justification for doing so. Accordingly, the court vacated the conditional grant of a new trial and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Rafiekian" on Justia Law