Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in an action where defendants were found liable by a jury for multiple violations of the False Claims Act (FCA). The district court denied defendants' post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, and entered judgment against all three defendants.The court concluded that defendants offered no argument or evidence that required the district court to grant them judgment as a matter of law. Rather, based on all of the evidence presented at trial, a reasonable jury could conclude that defendants willfully paid commissions to independent contractors and, accordingly, that they knowingly violated the Anti-Kickback Statute. The court rejected defendants' contention that commissions to salespeople can never constitute kickbacks under the Anti-Kickback Statute. The court explained that no language in the statute so provides and federal appellate courts have frequently, and indeed invariably, upheld Anti-Kickback Statute violations based on commission payments to third parties. The court rejected defendants' claims of instructional error, and concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the testimony of certain experts. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not err in granting the prejudgment writ of attachment. View "United States v. Mallory" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was convicted in 1993 for misdemeanor assault and battery of a family member, he was prohibited for life under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9) from possessing a firearm unless he obtains a pardon or an expungement of his conviction. Plaintiff filed suit seeking a declaration that section 922(g)(9) is unconstitutional as applied to him.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants, holding that section 922(g)(9) is constitutional as applied to plaintiff. The court applied a two-prong approach in considering as-applied Second Amendment challenges. First, the court assumed without deciding that domestic violence misdemeanants are entitled to some degree of Second Amendment protection. Second, the court applied intermediate scrutiny to consider plaintiff's challenge. Applying United States v. Staten, 666 F.3d 154 (4th Cir. 2011), which rejected an as-applied Second Amendment challenge to section 922(g)(9), the court concluded that the evidence showed "a reasonable fit" between the statute and the substantial governmental objective of reducing domestic gun violence. In reaching this conclusion, the court adopted the approach of its sister circuits and declined to read into the statute an exception for good behavior or for the passage of time. View "Harley v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit vacated defendant's sentence for conspiracy to possess, with intent to distribute, 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. The court found that the district court's explanation for applying the leadership enhancement under USSG 3B1.1(b) precludes meaningful appellate review. The court found no basis in the record for concluding that the district court considered the seven factors for sentencing defendant as a "manager" or "supervisor." In this case, the district court cited no facts regarding defendant's instruction for another person to collect money on his behalf or for others to move money for him from prison. Furthermore, it was unclear as to what evidence the district court was referring to and why it supported the conclusion that defendant managed or supervised his sister to accept money on his behalf from prison. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court committed procedural error under United States v. Chambers, 985 F.2d 1263, 1267 (4th Cir. 1993).Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not clearly err by determining that defendant recklessly created a sufficiently substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person. Therefore, the district court did not err by applying a sentencing enhancement for reckless flight under USSG 3C1.2. The court remanded for further fact-finding and resentencing. View "United States v. Burnley" on Justia Law

JELD-WEN's customers, Steves and Sons, filed suit challenging JELD-WEN's acquisition of a competitor. After a jury found that the merger violated the Clayton Antitrust Act and that Steves and Sons was entitled to treble damages, the district court granted Steves and Sons' request to unwind the merger and plans to hold an auction for the merged assets after this appeal. The district court then held another trial before a different jury on JELD-WEN's countersuit against Steves and Sons for trade secret misappropriation, allowing three individuals to intervene in the case. The jury ruled in favor of Steves and Sons on most of JELD-WEN's claims and entered judgment for the intervenors.The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court properly declined to grant JELD-WEN judgment as a matter of law on whether Steves and Sons demonstrated antitrust injury; the district court acted within its discretion by excluding certain evidence from the antitrust trial and by ordering JELD-WEN to unwind the merger, rejecting JELD-WEN's laches defense in the process; the district court properly found that equitable relief under the Clayton Act was appropriate because the merger created a significant threat that Steves and Sons will go out of business in 2021; and JELD-WEN has not shown that the district court's jury instructions in the trade-secrets trial were improper.However, the court vacated the jury's award of future lost profits to Steves and Sons in the antitrust trial because the issue is not ripe. The court explained that the injury on which the future lost profits award was premised cannot occur until September 2021, and the Clayton Act requires a plaintiff seeking damages—as opposed to equitable relief—to "show actual injury." The court also vacated the district court's entry of judgment for the intervenors in the trade-secrets case because JELD-WEN brought no claims against them. View "Steves and Sons, Inc. v. JELD-WEN, Inc." on Justia Law

A district court's finding of whether a particular false statement or omission in a warrant affidavit was made intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth is a factual one, subject to reversal only upon an appellate finding of clear error.The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction, pursuant to a plea agreement, for intent to distribute a quantity of hydrocodone. The court upheld the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence that was seized pursuant to warrants authorizing searches of his residence, automobile, and mobile device in connection with a robbery. Because the court found no clear error in the district court's factual findings regarding the Franks intentionality prong, the court rejected defendant's challenges and need not reach the materiality prong. Likewise, the court need not reach defendant's Lull-premised contention that all of the co-suspect's statements should be removed from the affidavit and that the affidavit, so altered, is insufficient to establish probable cause. The court also concluded that the district court did not commit clear error in its remaining findings of fact. In this case, the district court expressly credited the detective's testimony that the robbery co-suspect provided information that was found to be credible based on it having been corroborated. View "United States v. Pulley" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's 36-month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after commission of an aggravated felony. The court held that there was no error in the district court's application of a six-level sentencing enhancement for a prior felony conviction with a sentence exceeding one year and one month under USSG 2L1.2(b)(2)(C). In this case, defendant was sentenced to 6-17 months in prison for his 2018 North Carolina offenses and, under North Carolina's Justice Reinvestment Act of 2011, the last nine months of that sentence was to be served in post-release supervision. The court concluded that defendant's argument, that a post-release supervision term is the functional equivalent of a suspended sentence and should not be included in the determination of the maximum term of imprisonment imposed, is foreclosed by United States v. Barlow, 811 F.3d 133, 137 (4th Cir. 2015). View "United States v. Velasquez-Canales" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision dismissing petitioner's appeal of the denial of her requests for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Petitioner claims that she received repeated death threats from a gang in Guatemala after she and her family witnessed a mass killing by gang members and refused to acquiesce to the gang's extortion and other demands.The court rejected the Board's "excessively narrow" view of the nexus requirement, and concluded that petitioner established that her familial ties were one central reason for her persecution. In this case, the record conclusively establishes a nexus between the death threats made against petitioner and her ties to her nuclear family. The court also concluded that the record conclusively establishes that the Guatemalan government was unable or unwilling to control petitioner's persecutors. Accordingly, the court remanded to the Board to reconsider petitioner's claims. View "Diaz De Gomez v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that three local zoning ordinances are constitutional under the Takings Clause and the Due Process Clause, and that Clayland's equitable claims are moot. In this case, Bill No. 1214 reduced the permissible density of residential properties from four units per acre to one unit per two acres and prohibited subdividing any existing parcel into more than one additional lot. Bill No. 1229 established seven tier classifications related to "the type of subdivision and the kind of wastewater treatment system planned for each subdivision type." Bill No. 1257 extended Bill No. 1214's restrictions on Village Center zones (including the decreased density of residential units and the limitations on new subdivisions) until Talbot County "adopt[ed] . . . comprehensive rezoning and land use regulations regarding density . . . pursuant to the County's comprehensive plan."The court concluded that Bill Nos. 1214 and 1257 do not constitute a taking where the balance of the Penn Central factors ultimately favors the County. The court explained that Bill Nos. 1214 and 1257 were public-benefit regulations that did not deprive Clayland of all development potential and—most significantly, and perhaps even decisively—did not divest Clayland of any vested rights. The court also concluded that Bill Nos. 1214, 1257, and 1229 do not constitute a substantive due process violation. Finally, the court concluded that Clayland's equitable claims are moot. View "Clayland Farm Enterprises, LLC v. Talbot County" on Justia Law

In this court order, the Fourth Circuit certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Virginia: Under Virginia common law, can an individual be convicted of robbery by means of threatening to accuse the victim of having committed sodomy? View "United States v. White" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Virginia common law, challenging his stop, arrest, and subsequent prosecution. The district court denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granted the officers' motion for summary judgment on each of plaintiff's claims.The Fourth Circuit held that, when Deputy Fulford told plaintiff that he was not free to leave until he identified himself, this unambiguous restraint on plaintiff's liberty converted the previously voluntary encounter into a compelled detention—an investigatory stop. Furthermore, the district court erred in finding that Fulford's stop was supported by reasonable and particularized suspicion. In this case, it is not enough that Fulford first began to suspect criminal activity when a man that he intended to help approached him in dark clothing. The court also held that plaintiff's arrest was likewise unlawful where Stafford County Ordinance 17–7(c), which makes it a crime for any person at a public place or place open to the public to refuse to identify himself at the request of a uniformed law-enforcement officer if the surrounding circumstances are such as to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety requires such identification, is unconstitutional when applied outside the context of an investigatory stop.The court further held that Fulford is not entitled to qualified immunity for his unconstitutional investigatory stop, but the officers are entitled to qualified immunity for their unlawful arrest under Stafford County Ordinance 17–7(c). Until today, the court explained that no federal court has prescribed the constitutional limits of section 17-7(c)'s application and thus this right was not clearly established at the time of plaintiff's arrest. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the officers on plaintiff's claims under the Virginia common law. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions. View "Wingate v. Fulford" on Justia Law