Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, former recipients of Social Security disability benefits and former clients of an attorney who orchestrated one of the largest fraud schemes in the history of the SSA, argued in consolidated appeals that SSA's categorical exclusion of allegedly fraudulent medical evidence during the redetermination process was unlawful because they were never afforded any opportunity to rebut the allegation that their evidence was tainted by fraud.The Fourth Circuit joined its sister circuits and held that the SSA's redetermination procedures violate the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The court agreed with plaintiffs that it is arbitrary and capricious for the agency to deny beneficiaries an opportunity to contest the Office of the Inspector General's fraud allegations as to their cases, while permitting other similarly situated beneficiaries to challenge similar allegations arising from SSA's own investigations. The court also agreed with plaintiffs that the SSA's redetermination procedures violated their due process rights under the Fifth Amendment because they were denied the opportunity to contest the Office of the Inspector General's fraud allegations against them. In this case, the court considered each Mathews factor and concluded that each factor supports a finding that the SSA's redetermination procedures violated plaintiffs' due process rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed in No. 19-1989 and reversed in No. 19-2028. View "Kirk v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration" on Justia Law

Bayer filed suit against Belmora, alleging that Belmora engaged in unfair competition in violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. The district court held that Bayer's section 43(a) claims were time-barred. In this case, because the Lanham Act does not include a limitations period for section 43(a) claims, the district court borrowed the statute of limitations from the most analogous state law, declining to apply the equitable doctrine of laches to those claims.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment, concluding that the equitable doctrine of laches, rather than a statute of limitations, is the appropriate defense to Bayer's section 43(a) claims. The court also concluded that the district court failed to consider whether Bayer's related state-law claims were subject to tolling. The court remanded to the district court to determine in the first instance whether Bayer's section 43(a) claims are barred by laches and whether Bayer's related state-law claims are subject to tolling. The court affirmed the district court's judgment in all other respects. View "Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG" on Justia Law

GPI and Foodbuy were engaged in a non-exclusive commercial relationship, which was memorialized in a supplier agreement. Foodbuy subsequently filed suit against GPI alleging, among other claims, breach of contract for overcharging its Committed Customers. GPI counterclaimed, asserting, in relevant part, breach of contract for over-invoicing and violations of North Carolina's Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA). The district court held that the Agreement's terms were unambiguous, and, under its plain language, required GPI to pay a volume allowance only for purchases made through Foodbuy's program (and thus at Foodbuy's price). In the alternative, the district court determined that should the Agreement's terms be found to be ambiguous, the same result would follow because the various methods of contract interpretation pointed to the same conclusion.The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court that Foodbuy failed to show that it suffered any individualized harm as a result of GPI's alleged failure to sell its products to Committed Customers at the correct pre-determined prices under the Agreement. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Foodbuy's overcharging claim for lack of standing. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Foodbuy's motion in limine to exclude GPI's damages calculation, and in denying Foodbuy's request for leave to amend its answer to conform to the evidence. The court noted that the proper framework for resolving the breach of contract claim involves the tools for interpreting ambiguous contracts. In this case, the district court undertook that analysis in its alternative holding wherein it concluded that the parties' intent was to require GPI to pay a volume allowance on only those purchases made through the Foodbuy program at the negotiated price. Because Foodbuy failed to present any argument in its opening brief taking issue with this facet of the district court's alternative holding, even though the court found the Agreement to be ambiguous, Foodbuy has waived any challenge to the district court's judgment on that ground. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's interpretation of the Agreement. However, the district court wrongly denied GPI's cross-claim alleging violations of the UDTPA. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded on this issue. View "Foodbuy, LLC v. Gregory Packaging, Inc." on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, holding that a conviction under South Carolina's carjacking statute, S.C. Code 16-3-1075, which prohibits taking or attempting to take a motor vehicle "by force and violence or by intimidation while the person is operating the vehicle or while the person is in the vehicle," is a violent felony predicate under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).In this case, petitioner claims that "intimidation," as it is used in the carjacking statute, requires the threat of physical force against the person in the vehicle. However, the court explained that, although South Carolina courts have not explicitly interpreted the carjacking statute, the state has given every indication that it meant "intimidation" in its carjacking statute to require the use, attempted use or threat of physical force against the person in the vehicle. Therefore, the district court correctly concluded that South Carolina carjacking is a violent felony under the ACCA. View "United States v. Croft" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit joined the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits in holding that an amended complaint does not divest an earlier verified complaint of its evidentiary value as an affidavit at the summary judgment stage. In this case, the court concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to law enforcement officers without considering plaintiff's verified complaints and abused its discretion in granting summary judgment before resolving plaintiff's repeated discovery requests. On remand, the district court should determine what, if any, additional discovery is appropriate. The district court should then consider afresh the officers' summary judgment motion on the full record, including plaintiff's verified complaints. View "Goodman v. Z. Diggs" on Justia Law

After Julian Jackson Smith was diagnosed with mesothelioma, he died the following year. Before his death, Mr. Smith and his wife filed suit alleging that Schlage Lock and dozens of other defendants may have exposed Mr. Smith to asbestos at some point in the past. Plaintiffs sued Schlage Lock on the theory that Mr. Smith inhaled asbestos fibers while working as a pipefitter during the construction of a Schlage Lock plant in Rocky Mount, North Carolina in 1972.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Schlage Lock, agreeing with the district court that there was a lack of evidence that Mr. Smith was exposed to asbestos at the Schlage Lock site which later caused his mesothelioma. In this case, Schlage Lock not only pointed to Mrs. Smith's lack of evidence of causation, but also put forth affirmative evidence that there had never been asbestos at the plant. The court explained that, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mrs. Smith, it does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Smith was exposed to asbestos at the plant. Furthermore, even if Mr. Smith had been exposed to asbestos at the Schlage Lock site, Schlage Lock cannot be held liable for any related injuries because the exposure arose incident to his work for an independent contractor. Therefore, the independent-contractor exception to landowner liability would apply here. View "Smith v. Schlage Lock Company, LLC" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for attempted sex trafficking of a minor and three child pornography offenses. The court upheld the district court's denial of a Franks hearing to challenge the veracity of law enforcement's declarations in two warrant affidavits, because defendant failed to make a substantial preliminary showing that the law enforcement agent acted with the requisite intent in omitting a confidential informant's criminal history from the warrant affidavits. The court also held that substantial evidence supported defendant's attempt conviction where his words strongly corroborated his intent to recruit, entice, or solicit children to engage in commercial sex acts. The court further held that there was no error in the district court's application of a five-level sentencing enhancement under USSG 4B1.5(b) for being a repeat and dangerous sex offender against minors.However, the court vacated defendant's sentence because the district court should not have applied a four-level sentencing enhancement under USSG 2G1.1 for an offense involving a minor who had not attained the age of twelve years. The court explained that the district court erred in applying the enhancement, because neither subparagraph (A) or (B) of the application note defining "minor" for section 2G2.1 encompass a situation in which a private citizen represents that a fictitious child could be provided to engage in sexual conduct. View "United States v. Haas" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the legality of defendant's arrest under Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 373 (2003), which held that when a law enforcement officer finds illegal drugs in an automobile that the officer has legally stopped and searched and none of the occupants claim ownership of the drugs, it is "entirely reasonable" for the officer to infer that all the automobile's occupants are in a common enterprise and therefore to arrest them on probable cause that they are committing a crime.In this case, defendant was a passenger in an automobile that was legally stopped and search, where officers found 300 grams of fentanyl in the vehicle. The court explained that the officers reasonably believed that, in the absence of any claim to owning it, defendant and the driver were in a common enterprise that involved possession of the fentanyl, and that such circumstances are sufficient to support particularized probable cause that the two were committing a crime under Pringle. View "United States v. Myers" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief to petitioner under 28 U.S.C. 2254, rejecting petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Petitioner contends that his trial counsel failed to call any forensic experts to testify on his behalf and asserted that such failure was not a strategic decision but was made out of counsel's ignorance of the availability of funding to pay experts.Even though the district court did not restrict its review by considering only the state court record, as required in the circumstances, but instead considered an affidavit of a forensic expert that petitioner presented for the first time in the district court, the court nonetheless agreed with the district court's conclusion that the expert failed to show prejudice with evidence or a proffer of evidence "of what a defensive forensic expert would have testified to and how that could have altered the trial." The court explained that the forensic expert only identified investigatory issues that he or another forensic expert could have explored and did not test or challenge any evidence actually presented to the jury so as to support a conclusion that testimony from him or another forensic expert could have made a difference. View "Vandross v. Stirling" on Justia Law

Fleet Feet filed suit against NIKE, alleging that NIKE's advertising campaign with the tagline "Sport Changes Everything" infringed on Fleet Feet's trademarks "Change Everything" and "Running Changes Everything." Fleet Feet also sought a preliminary injunction, which the district court granted, enjoining NIKE's use of the tagline and any designation "confusingly similar" to Fleet Feet's marks.While NIKE's appeal was pending, NIKE ended its advertising campaign and disavowed any intent to continue using the tagline. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot because NIKE no longer has a legally cognizable interest in the validity of the preliminary injunction. The court explained that, at best, NIKE's argument that the "confusingly similar" language in the preliminary injunction order presents only a potential controversy, which cannot sustain this appeal. In regard to NIKE's contention that the injunction bond is a live issue, the court agreed that the bond keeps the case as a whole from being moot but it does not do the same for the appeal. In this case, if the district court ultimately finds that NIKE's "Sport Changes Everything" campaign infringed on Fleet Feet's marks, the preliminary injunction will have been, at worst, harmless error. If it does not, NIKE may recover on the bond. Either way, the court explained that the district court must be the first to resolve NIKE's challenge on the merits. The court found no good reason to vacate the district court's order and opinion granting a preliminary opinion, remanding for further proceedings as necessary. View "Fleet Feet, Inc. v. Nike, Inc." on Justia Law