Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Fourth Circuit granted the petition for review of the BIA's final order affirming the denial of petitioner's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Petitioner alleged that the IJ and the BIA made several legal errors in their consideration of his claims for withholding of removal and for relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).The court held that IJs have a legal duty to develop the record, which takes on particular importance in pro se cases, and that the IJ in this case erred in failing to discharge that duty. The court also concluded that the BIA erred in refusing to consider petitioner's particular social groups based on Matter of W-Y-C- and in mischaracterizing his claim. In regard to the CAT claim, and pursuant to Rodriguez-Arias v. Whitaker, 915 F.3d 968 (4th Cir. 2019), the court agreed with petitioner that the BIA erred in failing to consider and aggregate the risk of torture from different sources. Furthermore, neither the IJ nor the BIA duly considered all of the record evidence relevant to whether the Salvadoran government would consent to or acquiescence in torture. Accordingly, the court vacated petitioner's final order of removal and remanded to the BIA with instructions to remand the case to the IJ for further fact-finding and reconsideration. View "Arevalo Quintero v. Garland" on Justia Law

After plaintiff, a York County Sheriff's Office (YCSO) employee, disclosed confidential information about an ongoing investigation into an inmate's death to his wife, who worked at a local news station, and then lied to internal investigators about the disclosure, defendant terminated plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff filed suit against defendant under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that he was fired in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights. The district court ruled in favor of plaintiff, but the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded. On remand, the district court concluded that plaintiff's speech was not protected speech after applying the proper standard. The district court found the speech in question caused a reasonable apprehension of disruption in the YCSO and that defendant's interest in avoiding such a disruption outweighed plaintiff's circumstantially diminished First Amendment interest. Plaintiff appealed, challenging the district court's balancing of the parties' interests.The Fourth Circuit afforded diminished weight to plaintiff's First Amendment interest and concluded that it was outweighed by defendant's reasonable apprehension of disruption. In this case, plaintiff acted on limited and unconfirmed information when disclosing confidential details, and did so knowing that an investigation into the incident was underway, making no effort whatsoever to proceed through the chain of command or any law enforcement channel. Furthermore, the record reveals a reasonable apprehension of disruption in the YCSO, particularly considering plaintiff's speech propelled a frenzy of media attention about unconfirmed facts related to the inmate's death. The court explained that the disruption ballooned into separate internal investigation into the unauthorized disclosure, undercutting manpower and resources to continue the ongoing investigation into the incident. Accordingly, plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim failed and the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Billioni v. Bryant" on Justia Law

Defendant was found in the United States after having previously been removed under the expedited removal procedure of 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1). Defendant was charged with reentry without permission after having been removed, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326(a).The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment, rejecting defendant's claim that his 2016 expedited removal order was "fundamentally unfair" for lack of representation by counsel during the removal proceeding, as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause and afforded by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and therefore was invalid. The court concluded that the Due Process Clause did not entitle defendant to counsel when apprehended at the border and promptly removed. Furthermore, the court rejected defendant's contention that the APA requires — as an additional procedural right in removal proceedings — that the alien have the opportunity to obtain counsel in expedited removal proceedings under section 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). View "United States v. Guzman" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part defendant's sentence for one count of receiving child pornography. The court concluded that defendant's prior conviction for Tennessee statutory rape categorically qualifies under the federal child pornography statute for the recidivist enhancement as relating to abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2252A(b)(1). Therefore, the district court properly applied the statutory recidivist enhancement. However, the court vacated the district court's imposition of a life term of supervised release and associated conditions because the district court failed to explain its reasoning. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Hardin" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and armed robbery, and sentenced to death for the murder and 20 years' imprisonment for the robbery. After exhausting his state remedies, petitioner sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court vacated petitioner's death sentence, concluding that the state postconviction court (1) unreasonably determined that a juror who was hearing impaired was competent to sit on the jury and unreasonably applied clearly established federal law in so concluding; and (2) unreasonably concluded that petitioner's state trial counsel was not ineffective in allowing the hearing-impaired juror to sit on the jury. However, the district court rejected a claim by petitioner that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to press a Batson challenge.The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's rulings on petitioner's claims relating to the hearing-impaired juror, concluding that the postconviction court did not unreasonably apply federal law in determining that the juror's presence on the jury did not violate petitioner's right to a competent jury. In this case, the postconviction court found that the juror heard all testimony during the guilty phase and was able to compensate for her hearing deficiencies. Furthermore, there was not a sufficient showing that the juror missed material testimony at trial or that her hearing difficulty was of such degree as to indicate she missed material testimony. Furthermore, the state postconviction court's denial of petitioner's related ineffectiveness claim was not unreasonable. Finally, the court concluded that petitioner failed to satisfy the requirement of Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 17 (2012), that his underlying Batson-based claim of ineffective assistance was sufficiently substantial to allow the district court to excuse his procedural default of that claim. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's rulings on petitioner's claims relating to the hearing-impaired juror and otherwise affirmed. The court remanded with instructions to deny petitioner's application for habeas relief under section 2254 with prejudice. View "Bryant v. Stephan" on Justia Law

Industrial hired Roberts as a diver’s assistant. Roberts received and acknowledged the company handbook, which included a policy, requiring that all complaints of sexual harassment be reported to the CEO, Glenn. Roberts’ supervisor, Rhyner repeatedly called Roberts “gay,” made sexually explicit and derogatory remarks toward him, and physically assaulted Roberts at least twice. Roberts complained to Rhyner’s supervisor, to another supervisor, Neal, who witnessed some of Rhyner’s conduct, and to the company’s Human Resources Manager (wife of the CEO) but did not complain directly to Glenn. Rhyner was not disciplined or counseled; the harassment continued. Roberts was involved in a work-related accident in which he suffered burns. Later, Roberts was on an assignment when Neal removed him from the site for being “disruptive and acting erratic,” working in the wrong area, and wearing earbuds. Glenn contends that he terminated Roberts based on the two safety incidents.Roberts sued, alleging same-sex sexual harassment and retaliation under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000(e). The Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the company on Roberts’ retaliation claim, but vacated summary judgment on his sexual harassment claim. A plaintiff may prove same-sex harassment where the plaintiff was perceived as not conforming to traditional male stereotypes. A reasonable jury could conclude that Roberts was subjected to conduct based on his sex and that the conduct was unwelcome, sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of his employment, and was imputable to Glenn Industrial. Roberts did not establish a causal relationship between his protected activity and his termination. Glenn did not have actual knowledge of Roberts’ complaints and there was a lack of temporal proximity between Roberts’ last complaint and his termination. View "Roberts v. Glenn Industrial Group, Inc." on Justia Law

After plaintiff's murder conviction was vacated when another person confessed to the murder, plaintiff filed suit against the City of Baltimore, the Baltimore Police Department, and others, alleging violations of his federal and state civil rights which led to his wrongful imprisonment for the murder. After a ten-day trial, the jury returned a $15 million verdict in favor of plaintiff. Defendant Goldstein, one of the officers at the scene of the murder, appealed.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial under Rules 50 and 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, because there was evidence from which a reasonable jury could have found police misconduct. The court found no error in the district court's jury instructions, taken as a whole, because they complied with the law and the district court's earlier rulings. Finally, although the district court improperly admitted hearsay evidence, the error, in the context of the record as a whole, was harmless. Accordingly, the court affirmed the jury's verdict and the district court's denial of Rule 50 and 59 motions. However, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim against the Baltimore Police Department under Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) where the district court did not explain why the allegations of the complaint that were sufficient earlier no longer were. Rather, the district court's dismissal seems to be based on the verdict issued against Defendant Goldstein. If the City does in fact indemnify Goldstein and the judgment is satisfied, the Monell claim would be moot. View "Burgess v. Goldstein" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court ruled that defendant had two prior convictions for controlled substance offenses and imposed an increased base offense level pursuant to USSG 2K2.1.The court concluded that South Carolina Code section 44-53-375(B)'s permissive inference does not remove the "intent to distribute" element from defendant's conviction for possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. Therefore, defendant's February 2003 conviction for possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine under section 44-53-375(B) is categorically a controlled substance offense under the Guidelines. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Wickersham filed suit against Ford, alleging that Wickersham's Ford Escape airbag system was defective and seeking various damages. Wickersham's claims stemmed from John Wickersham's accident in his Ford Escape that left him with serious injuries. The pain from John's injuries was difficult to control, he struggled to maintain his employment as a pharmacist after the accident, and committed suicide almost a year and a half after his accident. Ford moved for summary judgment, arguing in relevant part that the company was not liable for Wickersham's wrongful-death action because any defective design could not be the proximate cause of Wickersham’s death by suicide under South Carolina law. The district court denied Ford's motion for summary judgment and a jury subsequently found in favor of Wickersham as to all claims.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment as to Wickersham's wrongful-death action where there is no presumption in South Carolina that a death by suicide is unforeseeable as a matter of law and the district court must first decide whether John's suicide was "unforeseeable as a matter of law." If not, the jury must then consider foreseeability as well as causation-in-fact. Because the district court rejected traditional proximate-cause principles and did not appear to have explicitly analyzed the foreseeability of John's death by suicide, the court cannot be certain that the district court's analysis comports with South Carolina law. Considering the unique procedural posture of this case, the court believed that the most prudent course is to remand for the district court to reconsider its Rule 50(b) motion under the proper legal framework. Furthermore, a properly instructed jury could have found that John's death was unforeseeable to Ford, especially given the difficulty of establishing such a connection, and the district court's improper instruction seriously prejudiced Ford. The court also vacated the resulting $2.75 million damages awards to Wickersham's estate and Crystal Wickersham. The court affirmed the district court's judgment in all other respects. View "Wickersham v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit reversed defendant's conviction and sentence for using "abusive language" in violation of Virginia Code 18.2-416, as assimilated by 18 U.S.C. 13. The court explained that the First Amendment permits criminalization of "abusive language," but only if the Government proves the language had a direct tendency to cause immediate acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, it was addressed.The court concluded that the ugly racial epithet used by defendant undoubtedly constituted extreme "abusive language," but the Government failed to prove (or even to offer evidence) that defendant's use of this highly offensive slur tended to cause immediate acts of violence by anyone. In this case, the record contains no evidence that defendant employed other profanity, repeated the vile slur, or issued any kind of threat, let alone one dripping with racism. Furthermore, the Government failed to offer any contextual evidence that defendant's "mode of speech" was likely to provide violence by the store employee or the African American man or anyone else present. View "United States v. Bartow" on Justia Law