Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

An alien may seek to avoid deportation by showing a clear probability that, if deported, he will be persecuted because of his race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group. If an alien claims he will be persecuted because of his membership in a political social group, that political social group must be "particular."The Fourth Circuit granted the petition for review in part and remanded the BIA's final order of removal, concluding that the BIA's determination that "Salvadoran MS-13 members" lacks particularity is unreasonable. In this case, the BIA's description of the particularity requirement in Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 208, 221–22 (BIA 2014), impermissibly conflates it with the social distinction requirement; the BIA's flawed particularity articulation informed its rejection of the political social group in W-G-R-; and the BIA unreasonably grounded its rejection of the political social group in W-G-R- in part on the fact that it could further subdivide the group in any number of ways. Therefore, the court remanded petitioner's withholding claim for the BIA to consider the IJ's other holdings with respect to that claim. However, because the record does not compel a different understanding of the evidence, the court denied the petition for review of petitioner's claim under the Convention Against Torture. View "Amaya v. Rosen" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's orders partially granting defendants' motions for sentence reductions pursuant to Section 404 of the First Step Act. In each case, the district court granted defendants' motions pursuant to a standard "AO 247" form in which the district court checked the box for "granted" and reduced the term of supervised release on each of defendants' sentences by one year. However, the district court did not alter the underlying sentences.Applying de novo review, the court held that the district court failed to provide individualized explanations to each defendant in the face of newly presented, post-sentencing conduct. The court agreed with defendants that their cases are factually similar to the defendants' cases in United States v. Martin, 916 F.3d 389 (4th Cir. 2019), and thus the court should vacate the district court's orders with instructions for the district court to provide individualized explanations consistent with Martin. The court explained that the presentation of post-sentencing mitigation evidence in each of defendants' motions is sufficient to rebut the Legree presumption that the district court, in fact, considered all of the relevant evidence. View "United States v. McDonald" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possession of child pornography and was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment followed by a lifetime of supervised release. On appeal, defendant challenges three special conditions of supervised release: the employment restriction, the Internet restriction, and the location restriction.The Fourth Circuit held that the employment restriction, requiring that defendant must not work in any type of employment without the prior approval of the probation officer, is overbroad and lacks a sufficient nexus to the nature and circumstances of the offense. However, the court upheld the Internet restriction and location restriction. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, and vacated and remanded in part. On remand, the district court is instructed to craft more precisely an employment restriction that bears a nexus to defendant's particular misconduct without jeopardizing the salient goal of safeguarding children's safety. View "United States v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

Addax filed an in rem action against the vessel to enforce a maritime lien under the Commercial Instruments and Maritime Lien Act (CIMLA) and Supplemental Admiralty Rule C. The vessel asserted that Addax's right to a maritime lien was extinguished when Addax settled its breach of contract claim with the charterer in a separate proceeding.The Court of Appeal first concluded that the district court correctly rejected the vessel's affirmative defense that Addax was not the party legally entitled to bring this claim. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Addax, concluding that the settlement agreement did not extinguish Addax's right to a maritime lien, and that Addax was entitled to enforce that right in the district court. The court explained that the settlement agreement does not reference the maritime lien, and includes no language limiting the obligations of the vessel or Addax's ability to pursue an in rem action to satisfy the debt. The court also rejected the vessel's arguments regarding the value of the lien, the expenses awarded to Addax, and the vessel's due process rights. View "Addax Energy SA v. M/V Yasa H. Mulla" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for seventeen financial crimes and affirmed defendant's 240-month sentence. Defendant's conviction stemmed from her efforts to induce individuals to invest in her website and from her spending large sums of money on personal expenses unrelated to the website.The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's August 29, 2018 continuance motion where defendant had made multiple changes to her legal team and trial counsel stated that he would be prepared. The court upheld the criminal forfeiture order where any error regarding the securities fraud counts did not affect defendant's substantial rights; the district court did not plainly err in considering defendant's ability to pay the forfeiture judgment in addition to the restitution judgment; and the criminal forfeiture is not unconstitutionally excessive under the Eighth Amendment. Finally, the court held that defendant's sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable. In this case, the totality of the sentencing transcript demonstrates that the district court carried out its statutory duty by listening to the positions advanced by both parties and making an individualized finding pursuant to the 18 U.S.C. 3553 factors. Furthermore, the district court thoroughly addressed the section 3553 factors, ultimately varying downward from the guidelines' range. View "United States v. Bennett" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision affirming the ALJ's determination that plaintiff's disability had ceased as of March 31, 2013. The court concluded that the ALJ committed two legal errors: first, the ALJ erred by failing to consider each of the factors listed in 20 C.F.R. 404.1527(c) before affording only negligible weight to the medical opinion of one of plaintiff's treating physicians; and second, the ALJ erred by assessing plaintiff's residual functional capacity (RFC) pursuant to an incorrect framework and without explaining his RFC-related findings in the manner required by Social Security regulations. Accordingly, the court remanded for further administrative proceedings. View "Dowling v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of trademark litigation initiated by RXD against Apple over rights to use the "ipad" mark. After the district court awarded summary judgment in favor of Apple on all claims advanced by RXD and on all counterclaims asserted by Apple, the district court permanently enjoined RXD from any commercial use of the terms "ipad" or "ipod." RXD challenges the district court's infringement rulings.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Apple on both its claims and counterclaims, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its award of injunctive relief to Apple. The court concluded that Apple had an established, protected mark capable of being infringed by RXD's use of the mark in 2016. The court explained that RXD's use of "ipad" on its ipadtoday.com website was not subject to "first user" protection. The court also concluded that a jury could not have reasonably concluded that RXD’s use of the "ipad" mark was unlikely to cause consumer confusion. Therefore, the district court did not err in awarding summary judgment to Apple on its claim of trademark infringement. Given the clear evidence of RXD's infringement of Apple's use of the "ipad" mark, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the injunctive relief in favor of Apple.The court rejected RXD's contention that the district court erred in holding that Apple met its burden of establishing a bona fide intent to use the "ipad" mark for cloud storage services. Rather, contrary to RXD's assertion, Apple did not apply to use the "ipad" mark for cloud storage. The court explained that Apple was not required to prove a bona fide intent to use a trademark for services not identified in its application. Accordingly, the district court did not err in concluding that Apple had a bona fide intent to use the mark for the services listed in its application. View "RXD Media, LLC v. IP Application Development LLC" on Justia Law

Benjamin was hired as headmaster at the k-12, non-denominational, faith-based Epiphany School. Epiphany community members “evaluated Benjamin on various criteria[,] including ‘Christian Tradition.’” Benjamin, who describes himself as a Quaker of Jewish ethnicity, alleges that he was told by a board member that Epiphany community members did not see him as a “true Christian.” Benjamin’s time at Epiphany was marked by conflicts with students, parents, faculty, and staff. According to Defendants, Benjamin was hostile, inattentive to deadlines, and frequently absent from school events. According to Benjamin, the conflicts were driven by hostility toward his Jewish background, Quaker faith, and efforts to promote diversity. The Board held a forum at which Benjamin gave a speech explaining his religious beliefs. The parties disagree as to whether this speech was voluntary and as to whether Benjamin resigned or was terminated.Benjamin sued, alleging retaliation; discrimination based on race, national origin, religion, and disability; breach of contract, defamation, tortious interference with prospective economic relations; false imprisonment; assault; and violation of the North Carolina School Violence Prevention Act. The district court rejected some claims on summary judgment; a jury rejected the others. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, upholding rulings preventing Benjamin from introducing certain deposition testimony, implementing time limits for each side’s presentation of its case, admitting evidence about Benjamin’s misrepresentations regarding his prior employment, and declining to adopt Benjamin’s proposed jury instructions and verdict form for the breach of contract and defamation claims. View "Benjamin v. Sparks" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, alleging claims of race- and gender-based discrimination under Title VII and racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of her action for failure to state a claim, because plaintiff was not an "employee" of the firm she sought to sue. The court explained that plaintiff was a partner and equal owner of the firm, not an employee, and thus she is not within the scope of Title VII's coverage.In regard to plaintiff's section 1981 claim, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to plead specific factual allegations tending to corroborate her claim of eligibility for leave. In this case, plaintiff declined to indicate the nature of the medical conditions or events that allegedly qualified her for leave, despite being the individual best-positioned to do so. Furthermore, even if plaintiff's qualification for leave was assumed, plaintiff failed to allege that her race was the but-for cause of the Board's denial of her leave application as required by the Supreme Court's recent holding in Comcast Corporation v. National Association of African American-Owned Media, 140 S.Ct. 1009 (2020). As to plaintiff's one factually-specific, non-conclusory allegation of racially-motivated conduct, she failed to allege any facts linking it to the Board vote denying her short-term leave. View "Lemon v. Myers Bigel, P.A." on Justia Law

After VA Medical Center selected Metro Health's bid on the condition that Metro Health could obtain a permit from the City to operate emergency medical services (EMS) vehicles, the City refused to grant Metro Health a permit. Metro Health then filed suit against the City and RAA, alleging violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case with prejudice, agreeing with the district court that defendants were entitled to immunity from federal antitrust liability where they acted pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy. Furthermore, federal law does not preempt their actions. The court rejected Metro Health's contention that by thwarting the VA Medical Center's competitive bidding process, the City and RAA have violated the Supremacy Clause. The court explained that, where, as here, a federal agency, of its own volition, imposes a contract condition consistent with federal law, the Supremacy Clause is not implicated. View "Western Star Hospital Authority, Inc. v. City of Richmond" on Justia Law