Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Green was sentenced as a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, after the district court found that Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951, to which Green pled guilty, qualified as a crime of violence under that provision. Five federal courts of appeals have concluded that Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence. The designation increased his sentencing range from 77-96 months to 151-188 months’ imprisonment.The Fourth Circuit vacated Green’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. A robbery offense that, like Hobbs Act robbery, may be committed through force or threats of force against property as well as against persons is not a categorical match with any portion of the Guidelines definition of “crime of violence” set out in section 4B1.2(a). Nor is Hobbs Act robbery a categorical match for “extortion” as enumerated under section 4B1.2(a)(2). View "United States v. Green" on Justia Law

After the Circuit City Trustee sought a ruling in 2019 on his liability for quarterly fees assessed under a 2017 Amendment to the bankruptcy fees provisions of the United States Code (28 U.S.C. 1930(a)(6)(B)), the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ruled that the fees aspect of the 2017 Amendment is unconstitutional. The U.S. Trustee appealed and the Circuit City Trustee cross-appealed, jointly certifying these appeals to the Fourth Circuit, which the court granted and consolidated.The Fourth Circuit ruled in favor of the U.S. Trustee in both appeals, reversing the Bankruptcy Opinion's uniformity decision challenged by the U.S. Trustee, and affirming the Opinion's retroactivity decision challenged by the Circuit City Trustee. The court concluded that the 2017 Amendment does not contravene the uniformity mandate of either the Uniformity Clause or the Bankruptcy Clause. The court also concluded that Congress clearly intended for the 2017 Amendment to apply to all disbursements made after its effective date, and it intended for the Amendment to be prospective. Accordingly, the court remanded to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings. View "Siegel v. Fitzgerald" on Justia Law

After Charles F. Connor died at the age of 90 of mesothelioma, his son brought a wrongful death action against 22 named defendants. Plaintiff alleges that defendants wrongfully caused Mr. Connor to become exposed to asbestos and develop his fatal mesothelioma cancer. This appeal involves only Covil, a manufacturer and supplier of asbestos insulation. Plaintiff contends that Mr. Connor was exposed to Covil's asbestos products during his time as an employee at Fiber Industries, a polyester production company whose facility contained piping that was wrapped in Covil-supplied asbestos.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Covil, agreeing with the district court that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that Mr. Connor was sufficiently exposed to Covil's asbestos to create a genuine dispute regarding causation. The court explained that, under North Carolina law, a plaintiff must prove that defendant's alleged misconduct was a substantial factor causing plaintiff's injury. Even assuming, without deciding, that the nature of the underlying disease is relevant to the application of the frequency, regularity, and proximity test, the court concluded that plaintiff has not produced sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of fact regarding Mr. Connor's exposure to Covil's asbestos products. Furthermore, because the record demonstrates that Mr. Connor was exposed to comparatively little asbestos at Fiber Industries versus his asbestos exposure at Norfolk Southern, plaintiff cannot establish more than a mere possibility that Covil's asbestos products were a substantial cause of Mr. Connor's mesothelioma. View "Connor v. Covil Corp." on Justia Law

After petitioner was convicted of drug and firearm offenses in Georgia, the state pardoned him. However, DHS sought to remove petitioner based on his convictions before the pardon. The IJ ordered petitioner's removal and the BIA dismissed the appeal.The Fourth Circuit dismissed in part and denied in part the petition for review, concluding that petitioner failed to exhaust his argument that pardoned offenses do not qualify as convictions under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq. The court also concluded that a pardon waives only the removal grounds specifically enumerated in the Act, and petitioner's pardon does not waive all of the removal grounds proven by the government. View "Tetteh v. Garland" on Justia Law

In 2010, defendant was sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment after pleading guilty to various federal narcotics and firearm offenses. In 2019, defendant moved for a reduced sentence under section 404(b) of the First Step Act, contending that his sentence was ten years longer than the current statutory maximum.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's denial of defendant's motion for a reduced sentence under the Act, concluding that, in light of United States v. Chambers, 956 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 2020), the district court may only exercise its discretion to reduce or not reduce any given sentence after faithfully considering a number of resentencing factors. The court held that one of those criteria—as is typically true in sentencing—is the applicable statutory maximum sentence. The court explained that, if sentenced today, defendant would be subject to the sentencing ranges set forth in 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C). And as the district court correctly stated in its order, that range sets a maximum mandatory term of 20 years' imprisonment. Therefore, the district court erred by not resentencing defendant to, at most, 20 years' imprisonment. The court also held that when a court exercises discretion to reduce a sentence, the imposition of the reduced sentence must be procedurally and substantively reasonable. On remand, the court instructed the district court to comply with its substantive and procedural reasonableness requirements, including its requirement that it adequately explain its sentencing decision. View "United States v. Collington" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the owner of a chain of pharmacies in Maryland and nearby states, was the subject of a Medicaid fraud prosecution. After the district court dismissed the charges against plaintiff, he filed suit seeking compensatory and punitive damages from multiple defendants. At issue on appeal are two of the district court's preliminary rulings.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the federal constitutional claims, concluding that these claims would extend the Bivens remedy into a new context, and that special factors counsel against an extension to cover intertwined allegations of wrongdoing by prosecutors and criminal investigators in plaintiff's prosecution. However, the court reversed the district court's determination that the state-law claims can move forward against Prosecutor Pascale. Rather, the court found that absolute prosecutorial immunity bars the claims against her. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings. View "Annappareddy v. Pascale" on Justia Law

After defendant pleaded guilty to forced labor, in violation of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), the district court sentenced defendant to 120 months' imprisonment and ordered him to pay restitution of roughly $273,000, representing unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation computed under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). In this case, defendant forced the victim to work at his restaurant over 100 hours per week without pay from 2009 to 2014.The Fourth Circuit vacated the award of restitution and concluded that the district court erred in failing to include liquidated damages under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 216(b), for when minimum wages and overtime compensation have not been paid as required, in the restitution award. At bottom, the court concluded that the value of the victim's labor as guaranteed under the minimum wage and overtime guarantees of the FLSA includes liquidated damages provided by the FLSA. The court explained that this fulfills defendant's obligation to compensate the victim for the full amount of the victim's losses, which includes the full value of his labor. Accordingly, the court remanded for recalculation of the restitution award. View "United States v. Edwards" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's 60-month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to knowingly possessing an unregistered silencer. The court concluded that defendant need not be convicted of a terrorism felony for USSG 3A1.4, an enhancement for committing a felony intended to promote terrorism, to apply. Therefore, the district court did not err by including the section 3A1.4 enhancement in defendant's Guidelines calculation. In this case, the district court did not clearly err by finding that defendant intended to promote the destruction of federal property when he named the Terry Sanford Federal Building as a target; defendant obtained (and suggested using) his unregistered silencers to facilitate those attacks, as established by the conversations recorded by the informant; and the district court relied on the "Patriots Against Tyrants" manifesto and defendant's statement that he would "disrupt the plans" of evil as evidence of his intent to influence by intimidation (or retaliate) against the government. The court also concluded that USSG 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), a sentencing enhancement for possessing a firearm with the intent that it be used in connection with another felony, has no impact on the length of defendant's sentence, rendering any alleged error as to its application harmless. View "United States v. Kobito" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254, seeking relief from his convictions in Maryland state court for attempted first degree murder, first degree assault, use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, and second degree assault. Petitioner's conviction stemmed from domestic abuse incidents involving his ex-wife where he ultimately shot her.Petitioner claims that he is entitled to habeas relief because (1) he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to a jury trial, in violation of Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930); (2) the prosecution suppressed material evidence, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); and (3) he received ineffective assistance from his legal counsel, in violation of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The district court granted relief in part on the Patton and Brady claims, dismissing the Strickland claims without prejudice.The Fourth Circuit held that the district court's decision to grant petitioner habeas relief runs contrary to the deference that federal courts are required to afford state court adjudications of federal constitutional claims. In regard to the Patton claim, the court concluded that the state court's adjudication of petitioner's challenge to his waiver was not unreasonable under the standards of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The court explained that petitioner failed to make a plain showing that his waiver was not knowing and voluntary.In regard to the Brady claims, the court concluded that petitioner was not entitled to relief in regard to his paid informant claim, more lenient treatment claim, claims arising out of the government witness and the ex-wife's affidavit, as well as petitioner's claim regarding the alleged confession of other deaths. Finally, because the district court declined to consider petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, and dismissed them without prejudice, the court also vacated this judgment. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Horner v. Nines" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241. Petitioner claims that, pursuant to United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415 (4th Cir. 2018), the district court was permitted to address the merits of his petition.The court declined to hold that the explanation in Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), about how to determine whether parts of a statute are "elements or means" changed this circuit's substantive law applying the modified categorical approach to South Carolina third degree burglary. The court explained that, to the extent petitioner contends Mathis changed settled substantive Supreme Court law, Mathis itself made clear that it was not changing, but rather clarifying, the law. To the extent petitioner contends Mathis changed settled Fourth Circuit law, the court rejected such contentions. Furthermore, petitioner's arguments relying on three other circuit cases failed because these cases do not utilize a test like Wheeler. Therefore, petitioner cannot satisfy prong two of the Wheeler test. View "Ham v. Breckon" on Justia Law