Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a dispute over a 15,000 square foot vacation home, the Chesapeake, located in Currituck County, North Carolina. The home is owned by Elizabeth LeTendre and has been the subject of litigation for over a decade regarding its compliance with county and state zoning requirements. The home's design includes a central area and two side wings, each structurally independent and less than 5,000 square feet. LeTendre's neighbors, Marie and Michael Long, contested that the Chesapeake violated a county zoning ordinance, which was upheld by the North Carolina Court of Appeals. The County then sued LeTendre to enforce the mandate and hold her in contempt if she refused to comply.LeTendre removed the case to federal court, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Chesapeake now complies with both county and state requirements. She argued that a recent amendment to North Carolina’s state zoning law abrogated the previous ruling. The district court agreed with LeTendre, holding that the County’s interpretation of a single-family detached dwelling, as applied to the Chesapeake, is “inconsistent with the State Building Code’s definition of a dwelling.”The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the Building Code Council’s determination that the Chesapeake is “a building” controls. The court rejected the appellants' arguments that the district court's ruling violated principles of res judicata and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, stating that the court was not reviewing whether the previous rulings correctly interpreted the Ordinance, but rather that the zoning amendment made the Council decision controlling. View "Currituck County v. LeTendre" on Justia Law

Valentino Darosa was convicted of Hobbs Act robbery and related offenses. The case revolved around a robbery at Atlantic Metals Xchange, a store that buys and sells metals, coins, jewels, and currency notes. The robber, wearing a mask and gloves, handcuffed and duct-taped the store owner, Matthew Schipani, and stole several items. The robber also took Schipani’s backpack, which contained his firearm and wallet. A notebook and roll of duct tape left at the scene were found to have Darosa's fingerprint and DNA respectively.Darosa was indicted on one count of Hobbs Act robbery, one count of brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. He moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search of his vehicle and home, arguing that the search warrant affidavit failed to establish probable cause. The district court denied the motion, finding that Darosa’s fingerprint on the notebook was sufficient to suspect him as the robber.At trial, the government presented evidence connecting Darosa to the crime, including his fingerprint on the notebook, his DNA on the roll of duct tape, and items found in Darosa’s home and vehicle that were stolen from the store. The jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Darosa challenged the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress, failure to give his proposed jury instruction, and admission of certain testimony. He also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, finding no reversible error. View "US v. Darosa" on Justia Law

The case involves Terrance Henderson, an inmate in the Virginia Department of Corrections, who filed a lawsuit seeking to prevent prison officials from deducting money from his prison trust account as restitution for an assault he committed on a fellow inmate in 2015. He also sought to compel the return of money already taken. Henderson claimed that the nearly six-year gap between the guilt-finding phase of his disciplinary hearing and his reconvened restitution hearing violated principles of due process.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment to the defendants on Henderson's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim and dismissed his Virginia state-law claim without prejudice. Henderson appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court agreed that Henderson had a protected property interest in his prison trust account. However, the court found that even if the nearly six-year delay between the guilt-finding phase and the restitution hearing violated due process, the error was harmless because no evidence that could have aided Henderson's ability to contest the amount of restitution was lost due to the delay. The court also affirmed the district court's decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claim. View "Henderson v. Harmon" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Lokheim Jeralle Campbell, who was sentenced to 28 months in prison for violating his supervised release. Campbell had previously served a term for Hobbs Act robbery and using a firearm during a crime of violence. After his release, he attempted to rob Cyril Lowery during a drug deal, which led to a revocation motion filed by his probation officer. Campbell admitted to attempted armed robbery but objected to its classification as a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines Chapter 7 policy statement.The district court overruled Campbell's objection and sentenced him to 28 months' imprisonment, to be served consecutively to the 120-month sentence he had already received for the new criminal charges. Campbell appealed his revocation sentence, arguing that the district court incorrectly determined that his attempted armed robbery violation qualified as a crime of violence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that South Carolina attempted armed robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under the residual clause in the Sentencing Guidelines. The court reasoned that since the completed crime of armed robbery is categorically a crime of violence, attempts to commit such a crime similarly qualify. The court also noted that the Guidelines' commentary, which includes inchoate crimes in the definition of a crime of violence, is consistent with the language of the guideline. Therefore, the district court did not err in determining that Campbell's conduct constituted a Grade A violation of his supervised release. View "US v. Campbell" on Justia Law

A group of parents in Montgomery County, Maryland, challenged the local school board's decision to include LGBTQ-inclusive books in the English Language Arts curriculum without providing parents notice or the option to opt their children out of exposure to these books. The parents, who held various religious beliefs, argued that the board's decision violated their rights under the Free Exercise and Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied the parents' motion for a preliminary injunction, which would have required the board to provide notice and an opt-out option. The parents appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the parents had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims, a necessary requirement for a preliminary injunction. Specifically, the court found that the parents had not provided sufficient evidence to show that the board's decision coerced them or their children to act or believe contrary to their religious faith. The court also found that the parents had not shown that their due process rights were likely to be violated. The court noted that the parents still had the right to instruct their children on their religious beliefs and to discuss the topics raised in the books with their children. View "Mahmoud v. McKnight" on Justia Law

David Orlando Marquez Cruz, a Salvadoran national and lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted of attempted second degree child sexual abuse under Washington, D.C., law. The conviction stemmed from a sexual relationship he had with a fifteen-year-old child. Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security charged him with removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) on the grounds of being a noncitizen convicted of a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment, and as an aggravated felon. Cruz denied that he was removable and requested that his removal be cancelled as a matter of discretion.The immigration judge found Cruz removable based on his conviction of a crime of child abuse, but dismissed the aggravated felony removal charge. The judge declined to cancel Cruz’s removal and ordered him removed. Cruz appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), challenging the immigration judge’s finding that his D.C. conviction qualified as a crime of child abuse. The BIA agreed with the immigration judge and dismissed the appeal. Cruz then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for review.The Fourth Circuit held that Cruz’s conviction for attempted second degree child sexual abuse under D.C. law qualifies as a removable crime of child abuse. The court rejected Cruz’s arguments that a crime of child abuse under the INA does not cover attempts and that statutes imposing strict liability as to a victim’s age cannot satisfy the mens rea requirement because they do not require a culpable mental state. The court concluded that a crime of child abuse requires a culpable mens rea and an actus reus of conduct that either injures a child or creates a sufficiently high risk that a child will be harmed. The court denied Cruz's petition for review. View "Marquez Cruz v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC (Appellee), which is constructing an interstate natural gas pipeline. The company acquired easements on properties along the pipeline’s route through condemnation actions under the Natural Gas Act. One such property was owned by Frank Terry, John Coles Terry, and Elizabeth Terry (Appellants), which was encumbered by temporary and permanent easements on 8.37 acres. After the district court granted Appellee immediate possession of the easements, the case proceeded to a jury trial to determine the amount of just compensation owed by Appellee to Appellants for the easements. The jury rendered a $523,327 verdict, which Appellee challenged, arguing that the verdict resulted from the jury improperly mixing expert testimony. The district court agreed with Appellee and granted judgment as a matter of law, vacating the jury verdict and entering a judgment for $261,033.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment as a matter of law and remanded with instructions to reinstate the $523,327 verdict. The court held that the jury’s verdict was within the range of credited testimony and could be supported using residential values alone, without the need to venture beyond the credited testimony. The court also reversed the district court’s grant of a new trial. Additionally, the court vacated and remanded the district court’s order denying Appellants’ second motion for attorney’s fees and costs, leaving these issues for the district court to consider in the first instance. View "Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 8.37 Acres of Land" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of incarcerated individuals who were sent from a detention center to work at a recycling facility operated by Baltimore County, Maryland. The workers alleged that they were employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Maryland state laws, and thus entitled to minimum wage and overtime pay. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county, concluding that no reasonable adjudicator could view the incarcerated workers as "employees" under the FLSA.The district court's decision was based on the fact that the workers were part of a work detail program run by the Department of Corrections (DOC), which the court found had a rehabilitative, rather than pecuniary, interest in the workers' labor. The court also found that the workers did not deal at arms' length with their putative employer, as they were not free to negotiate the terms of their employment and were under the control of the DOC.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court clarified that there is no categorical rule that incarcerated workers cannot be covered by the FLSA when they work outside their detention facility’s walls and for someone other than their immediate detainer. The court also held that the district court applied the wrong legal standards in granting summary judgment to the county. The court emphasized that the question under the FLSA is whether the principal or primary purpose for using incarcerated workers at the recycling center during the time frame at issue was for “rehabilitation and job training.” The case was remanded for a fresh look at the facts under these clarified standards. View "Scott v. Baltimore County, Maryland" on Justia Law

Lonnie Billard, a former teacher at Charlotte Catholic High School (CCHS), sued the school for sex discrimination under Title VII after he was fired for his plans to marry his same-sex partner. The district court granted Billard's motion for summary judgment and denied CCHS's motion, which raised several affirmative defenses, both statutory and constitutional.The district court found that CCHS had indeed fired Billard because of his plans to marry his same-sex partner, which amounted to sex discrimination as defined by Title VII. The court rejected CCHS's affirmative defenses, including its interpretation of Title VII's religious exemption, its defense under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and its First Amendment defenses. The court also ruled on the ministerial exception, despite CCHS's waiver of that defense, and found that Billard did not satisfy the criteria for the ministerial exception.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court concluded that because Billard played a vital role as a messenger of CCHS's faith, he falls under the ministerial exception to Title VII. Therefore, the court instructed the district court to enter judgment for CCHS. View "Billard v. Charlotte Catholic High School" on Justia Law

The case involves Zion Williamson, a former Duke University basketball player, and Prime Sports Marketing, LLC, and its president, Gina Ford. Williamson signed a contract with Prime Sports for marketing representation after his last game at Duke but before being drafted into the NBA. However, Williamson terminated the contract shortly after and signed with a competitor agency, Creative Artists Agency (CAA). Prime Sports argued that Williamson was not a "student-athlete" when he signed the contract, and therefore, he could not benefit from the protections of the North Carolina Uniform Athlete Agents Act, which governs contracts between student-athletes and their agents.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina rejected Prime Sports' argument and granted summary judgment to Williamson on Prime's contract and tort claims. The court ruled that Williamson was a "student-athlete" when he signed the contract with Prime Sports, and Prime's failure to comply with the Act's requirements voided the contract.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Williamson was a "student-athlete" when he signed the contract and that Prime's failure to comply with the Act's requirements voided the contract. The court also affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on Prime's contract and tort claims. View "Williamson v. Prime Sports Marketing, LLC" on Justia Law