Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Residents and businesses of Lumberton, North Carolina filed a putative class action alleging that CSX Transportation caused their property to be flooded during Hurricanes Matthew and Florence. The district court dismissed each claim as either insufficiently pleaded or preempted by federal law.The Fourth Circuit concluded that dismissal of the breach of contract claim was premature because plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the Tri-Party Agreement was intended to directly benefit the class of persons to which they belong—the residents and businesses of South and West Lumberton left vulnerable to flooding through the gap. However, the court's holding is limited to the Tri-Party Agreement. In this case, plaintiffs alleged the existence of a second, unnamed and undated agreement, but failed to produce it or to plead any of its essential terms. The court also concluded that plaintiffs' tort claims are preempted by the federal Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Edwards v. CSX Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant sought to appeal the district court's order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion. The Fourth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability on the issue of whether defendant's counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to assert a double jeopardy defense.The court affirmed the portion of the district court's order denying relief on defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The court first joined its sister circuits in holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits imposition of cumulative punishments for 18 U.S.C. 924(c) and 924(j) convictions based on the same conduct. However, the court cannot conclude that the double jeopardy claim that defendant now presses was sufficiently foreshadowed at the time of trial to render his counsel's failure to raise it constitutionally deficient representation. The court denied a certificate of appealability as to the remaining issues and dismissed the remainder of the appeal. View "United States v. Palacios" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's order affirming the SSA's denial of plaintiff's application for disability insurance benefits, holding that the ALJ erred by determining that plaintiff was not disabled during the relevant period.The court concluded that the ALJ erred in discrediting plaintiff's subjective complaints by applying the wrong legal standard by effectively requiring plaintiff to provide objective medical evidence of her symptoms; improperly cherry-picking, misstating, and mischaracterizing facts from the record; and drawing various conclusions unsupported by substantial evidence and failing to explain them adequately. Furthermore, the ALJ's decision exhibits a pervasive misunderstanding of fibromyalgia. Applying its discretion to review the issue, the court concluded that the ALJ erred by according little weight to plaintiff's treating physician's opinion. In this case, the ALJ's treatment of the doctor's opinion contains several errors and is not supported by substantial evidence. The court held that the record as a whole clearly establishes plaintiff's disability and thus her legal entitlement to disability benefits. The court remanded to the Commissioner for calculation of disability benefits. View "Arakas v. Commissioner" on Justia Law

Petitioner seeks relief from his sentence, which was enhanced based on the "death results" provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, USSG 2D1.1(a)(1), based on the Supreme Court's decision in Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014). Petitioner argues that he meets the four-part test for relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241 from the court's decision in United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415 (4th Cir. 2018). The district court determined that it lacked jurisdiction over the petition, concluding that because Burrage had not previously been applied to the Sentencing Guidelines, petitioner's invocation of Burrage was premature.The Fourth Circuit agreed and concluded that neither the Supreme Court nor this circuit had applied Burrage's statutory interpretation to the Sentencing Guidelines. However, the court now concludes that Burrage's interpretation does, in fact, apply to the "death results" provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, at least those in effect prior to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Accordingly, while the court found no fault with the district court's dismissal of the petition, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings based on its decision today. View "Young v. Antonelli" on Justia Law

In 28 U.S.C. 2241 proceedings, petitioner sought habeas corpus relief from his military court convictions and sentence, claiming violations of his Fifth Amendment right to due process and Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the section 2241 petition, but recognized that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is the proper basis for the dismissal of both claims. In regard to petitioner's contention that his Fifth Amendment due process claim was not accorded full and fair consideration by the military court, the court held that dismissal of the claim was proper where the propensity instruction given during his court-martial proceedings was insufficiently prejudicial to entitle him to habeas corpus relief. For similar reasons, dismissal of the Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance claim is proper. In this case, petitioner cannot show a reasonable probability that a challenge to the propensity instruction on direct appeal would have been successful. View "Ward v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that PDR Network violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) by sending unsolicited advertisements by fax. The district court held that the Hobbs Act did not require it to adopt the FCC's interpretation of the TCPA (the 2006 FCC Rule) because the Hobbs Act does not control when no party "has challenged the validity of the FCC's interpretation of the TCPA." The district court concluded that, under the TCPA, unsolicited fax advertisements are not actionable unless they have a commercial purpose. The district court then determined that PDR Network's fax was not commercial in nature and dismissed the complaint without granting leave to amend.Plaintiff appealed and the Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in conducting a Chevron analysis, and interpreted the 2006 FCC Rule to mean that a fax offering free goods and services qualifies as an "advertisement" under the TCPA, regardless of whether it has an underlying commercial purpose. PDR Network petitioned for certiorari and the Supreme Court granted review. The Supreme Court determined that to the extent to which the 2006 FCC Rule binds the lower courts may depend on the resolution of two preliminary sets of questions that were not aired before the Court of Appeals.On remand from the Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit resolved the first five of seven issues submitted to the parties by concluding that a remand to the district court for discovery was not necessary; the relevant portions of the 2006 FCC Rule are interpretive rather than legislative; and thus the third, fourth, and fifth issues are moot. In regard to the sixth issue regarding what level of deference (if any) must the district court afford the 2006 FCC Rule, the court declined to decide in the first instance and remanded for the district court to have the first opportunity to perform the applicable analysis. Given the court's remand to the district court to consider what level of deference the court should afford the 2006 FCC Rule and what the proper meaning of "unsolicited advertisement" is in light of that deference, the court found it unnecessary to resolve the issue of whether the district court erred by failing to grant leave to amend. View "Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc. v. PDR Network, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Battalion Chiefs, filed suit against their employer, the City of Chesapeake Fire Department, for non-compliance with the overtime pay requirement of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Plaintiffs argue that none of the FLSA exemptions apply to them, both on their own terms and because the Battalion Chief position falls under a regulatory exception, 29 C.F.R. 541.3(b), that categorically withdraws certain first response workers from the exemptions' scope.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the fire department, holding that section 541.3(b) does not categorically except plaintiffs from the FLSA's system of exemptions, because plaintiffs are, first and foremost, managers within the fire department, not frontline firefighters. The court also held that plaintiffs satisfy all four prongs of the executive exemption and, as executive employees, are not due overtime pay under the FLSA. View "Emmons v. City of Chesapeake" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of making false statements on an ATF form (Count One) and possessing a firearm after being "adjudicated as a mental defective" (Count Two). On appeal, defendant challenged his firearms conviction, arguing that Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), renders the indictment and jury instructions deficient, that the conviction runs afoul of the Second Amendment, and that the district court imposed an unreasonable sentence.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding that because defendant had notice of the allegations against him and has not demonstrated that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different without the indictment error, his challenge to the indictment cannot survive plain-error review. The court also held that the jury found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant was guilty of Count One. In doing so, it necessarily found that defendant knew he had been committed to a mental institution, satisfying Rehaif's knowledge-of-status element in Count Two. The court rejected defendant's Second Amendment claim where United States v. Midgett, 198 F.3d 143 (4th Cir. 1999), foreclosed his argument that his commitment under W. Va. Code 27-6A-3(f) does not fall within the realm of ordinary 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(4) challenges because a different West Virginia statute, W. Va. Code 27-5-1 to -11, governs "final commitment proceedings." Rather, defendant's commitment to restore him to competency under W. Va. Code 27-6A-3(f) falls squarely within the definition of committed as used in section 922(g)(4). Finally, the court held that defendant's sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Collins" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition as untimely. The court rejected petitioner's contention that McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018), extended his limitations period by recognizing a new constitutional right retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. Rather, the court explained that McCoy refines the Gideon rule, but it is an extension of a watershed rule rather than a watershed rule itself. Therefore, the rule announced in McCoy is not retroactively applicable on collateral review. View "Smith v. Stein" on Justia Law

Challengers filed suit alleging that a 2018 North Carolina law requiring voters to present photographic identification is unconstitutional because it was enacted with the same discriminatory intent as the 2013 Omnibus Law. The district court found that the Challengers were likely to succeed on the merits of their constitutional claims and issued a preliminary injunction against the law's enforcement.The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that a legislature's past acts do not condemn the acts of a later legislature, which the court must presume acts in good faith. In this case, the district court considered the General Assembly's discriminatory intent in passing the 2013 Omnibus Law to be effectively dispositive of its intent in passing the 2018 Voter-ID Law. In doing so, it improperly flipped the burden of proof at the first step of its analysis and failed to give effect to the Supreme Court's presumption of legislative good faith in Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2324 (2018). Consequently, these errors fatally infected its finding of discriminatory intent.Furthermore, once the proper burden and the presumption of good faith are applied, the Challengers fail to meet their burden of showing that the General Assembly acted with discriminatory intent in passing the 2018 Voter-ID Law. The court considered the Arlington Heights factors—the sequence of events leading to enactment, legislative history, and disparate impact—and concluded that they cannot support a finding of discriminatory intent. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction. View "North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. Raymond" on Justia Law